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ABSTRACT 
 
During the debate over the ratification of the United States-Central America-Dominican 
Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), the Bush Administration argued that 
implementation of a free trade agreement would help strengthen the nascent democracies 
in Central America.  As a bilateral agreement, CAFTA would not only foment greater 
trade liberalization by expanding market access and eliminating trade barriers, but also 
help transform the entire commercial frameworks in Central America and promote 
economic development.  These implications are not just economic – in particular, its 
provisions on intellectual property and investment rights, government procurement and 
labor standards affect the political institutions underpinning democracy and rule of 
law.  This thesis assesses the role in which CAFTA has affected democratic institutions 
in Central America.  It employs a methodology known as the Democratic Audit to 
evaluate consequences to four dimensions of democracy – the electoral processes, open 
and accountable institutions, civil and political liberties, and civil society.  It 
demonstrates the value of using the Democratic Audit to assess a trade agreement’s 
political effects with an application to Mexico after NAFTA.  Then this work considers 
the case studies of El Salvador and Costa Rica, the most salient examples of democratic 
institutional change after CAFTA, by drawing on original research especially into the 
electoral politics and civil society development in these countries.  Ultimately, the thesis 
argues that the most significant institutional effects of CAFTA have been its role as a 
political issue, rather than its content, in galvanizing popular opinion and reinvigorating 
electoral politics and civil society – ironically, not the consequences that the 
Administration originally had in mind.  The research demonstrates that, even if some 
conclusions cannot be drawn due to the recency of CAFTA, the framework it has 
employed will be an invaluable tool for assessing future trade agreements.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
In a 2005 address at the Heritage Foundation, a prominent Washington think tank, 
former United States Trade Representative and Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick 
alleged that the implementation of a trade agreement with Central America would help 
consolidate democracy in a region beleaguered by a history of political authoritarianism 
and violence.  The United States-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA) offered more than just an arcane debate on tariff levels, rules of 
origin, and intellectual property rights, a chance to weigh the entire political implications 
of regional economic integration.  Zoellick called the impending agreement “the logical 
culmination of twenty years of democratic and social progress in Central America, 
nurtured and encouraged by the United States.”1 
According to Zoellick, CAFTA was an instrument to reinforce the budding 
democratic institutions in Central America established less than two decades prior.  He 
explained that, “[CAFTA] will strengthen the foundations of democracy by promoting 
growth and cutting poverty, creating equality of opportunity, and reducing corruption.”2  
As per his reasoning, trade-induced growth would grant citizens a greater economic stake 
in their society, encouraging them to participate in their democracy.  This oft-asserted 
                                                           
1
 Robert Zoellick, “From Crisis to Commonwealth: CAFTA and Democracy in Our 
Neighborhood” (lecture, the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., May 16, 2005).  Available 
at www.heritage.org/research/tradeandforeignaid/hl884.cfm: 3. 
2
 Ibid., 4.  
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theoretical association between market capitalism and liberal democracy supports many 
of the claims enunciated by free trade proponents, but determining the actual strength of 
this relationship is far more complicated than they presume. This central argument, posed 
by Zoellick in the run-up to the U.S. Congress’s approval of CAFTA, is the genesis for 
this thesis – to what extent has CAFTA strengthened democracy in Central America? 
The Bush Administration employed the rhetoric of “democracy promotion” 
throughout the negotiation process.  In January 2002, President George Bush announced 
that he would undertake formal trade talks with Central America, starting a multiyear 
negotiation process that culminated with the trade ministers of each country signing an 
agreement in 2004.  Pursuant to the 2002 Trade Act that granted the President “fast track 
authority,” President Bush notified Congress before signing the trade agreement.  His 
letter of intent to formally enter into a free trade agreement with Central America 
expresses this association again between trade liberalization and democratization: 
Our Central American partners have made dramatic progress in transitioning from 
countries wracked by civil war to peaceful, democratic societies.  This agreement 
will write a new page of our history with Central America – one that depicts 
sustained engagement in support of democracy, peaceful regional integration, 
economic opportunity, and hope.3 
 
In this thesis, I will explore the accuracy of this rhetoric by evaluating the results 
of the Central American Free Trade Agreement on democratic political institutions in 
Central America.  I will construct a methodology through which the influence of an 
international free trade agreement on domestic politics can be gauged.  By considering 
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 George W. Bush, Notification of intention to enter into a free trade agreement (FTA) with the 
governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.  Message to the 
House Committee on Ways and Means, 108th Cong., 2d sess., H. Doc. 108-159 (February 20, 
2004).    
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different dimensions of democracy, this procedure will be able to isolate the factors and 
elements in CAFTA that have left the greatest impact on democratization in this region.  
In doing so, it will contribute original research and analysis to investigate a subject 
untouched by current scholarship.  Most of the literature on trade agreements tends to 
focus on economic and socio-economic factors, and the recency of CAFTA even further 
reduces the amount of published work on the topic.  Based on the theories that link 
economic growth with democratization and the actual copious language in CAFTA 
devoted to institutional capacity building, I will hypothesize that CAFTA has had a 
generally positive effect on democracy in Central America.  
 The remainder of this chapter is devoted to providing context to CAFTA by 
tracing its roots in the market capitalist reforms of the previous decade and the 
justifications articulated on both sides to sign such a transformational agreement.  A 
general explanation of the textual content of CAFTA and the negotiation process will 
follow.  Ultimately, this chapter serves as an introduction from which to launch into 
deeper analysis of the agreement’s political results.     
 
Free Trade Agreements 
 Bilateral free trade agreements proliferated after World War II.  Despite a 
coordinated effort to establish multilateral or global agreements through the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later the World Trade Organization, many 
states pursued agreements with specific countries for more than economic reasons.  
Bilateral free trade agreements create preferences and disparities in the international 
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system while trying to achieve certain foreign policy objectives.   They can distort trade if 
they divert the flow of goods, services and capital to less efficient producers than other 
countries outside the bilateral relationship.4  However, countries often employ bilateral 
trade agreements as diplomatic tools for foreign policy interests, as they can be 
negotiated to reward partners with economic privileges and to underscore a strategic 
alliance.   
 Developing countries in particular pursue preferential trade agreements to 
improve their access to foreign, developed markets and to integrate themselves into the 
new system of global competition.  These agreements also help contribute to domestic 
growth by promoting foreign investment and expanding the internal goods market.5  
While in some instances trade alone accounts for small changes in the economy, its 
impact can multiply the effects of domestic fiscal or monetary policy.   
 The economic rationale for free trade is well founded; in fact, support for trade is 
nearly ubiquitous among economists, no matter their ideological bent.  The principle of 
comparative advantage, that countries should export the goods at which they are more 
efficient and import the rest, underpins more sophisticated theories of international trade, 
such as the Heckscher-Ohlin Model.  These models demonstrate that trade is 
economically efficient and enables populations to consume goods above the level at 
which they can produce in autarky.  However, as the models note, trade does redistribute 
wealth among social sectors.  Thus, they reveal the central paradox facing countries in 
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 U.S. Congressional Research Service, The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States 
Free Trade Agreement (RL31870, January 8, 2009) by J. F. Hornbeck, 4.  
5
 Jeffrey J. Schott, “Free Trade Agreements: Boon or Bane of the World Trading System,” in 
Free Trade Agreements: U.S. Strategies and Priorities, ed. Jeffrey J. Schott (Washington, D.C.: 
Institute for International Economics, 2004), 10.  
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liberalizing trade flows – do the costs to the society outweigh the economic benefits of 
trade?   
 The amount of trade’s benefits is often difficult to gauge.  The models show that 
free trade lowers prices for consumers, a nationwide improvement in welfare that may 
actually seem negligible in some instances.  Also, greater focus on one industry may 
diminish the ability of another industry to succeed.  In developing countries, for example, 
agricultural sectors have endured significant obstacles after the enactment of trade 
agreements while the heavy manufacturing sector has expanded.  Remnants of 
protectionism, such as agricultural subsidies and quotas, or inadequate implementation of 
the trade agreement can explain many of these real hardships encountered. 
 On its own, liberalizing trade does not primarily attempt to liberalize politics; 
trade is by definition an economic phenomenon.  Yet trade can unintentionally result in 
an inordinate number of social and political changes as well.  Free trade changes the 
economic structure, and because of its income distribution effects, it can especially give 
birth to popular movements to express their dissent or affirm their satisfaction with 
neoliberal ideology. These movements engage people in the political process and thus 
help in democratizing the system.    
Often, foreign policy objectives trump economic interests in executing free trade 
agreements.  Greater access to the relatively miniscule Central American market provided 
little advantages to the U.S., but it still piloted the trade negotiations.  In this way, 
CAFTA resembled the trade agreements signed with Israel and Jordan in the 1990’s.  In 
terms of economic clout and size, Israel and Jordan pale against the United States, and 
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these countries overwhelmingly benefited from trade liberalization far more than the U.S.  
Yet the U.S. implemented free trade with these partners out of its foreign policy, rather 
than economic, interests to solidify its bilateral relationships.6   The Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative, the executive agency charged with coordinating and negotiating 
the American foreign trade agenda, assesses the level of cooperation between U.S. 
foreign policy goals and the possible influence of free trade to economic growth and 
democratization before entering negotiations with a potential trade partner.7  Trade can 
serve as a reward to weaker allies for their support of American policy as well as a means 
to further American goals in that country. “Countries that are prosperous encourage 
political pluralism and a strengthening of democratic governance.  In turn, these countries 
are more stable politically and better markets for U.S. exporters and investors.”8  The 
intricate relationship among free market capitalism, economic growth and democracy – 
the subject of Chapter 2 – thus coalesces behind free trade agreements.  
 
Free Market Reform in Latin America and the Antecedents of CAFTA 
The notion of trade as an economic panacea for development came into vogue in 
the mid-1980’s, and trade fervor swept Latin America especially in subsequent years.  
Market liberalization forged a new economic and political direction for many of these 
nations as they transitioned from authoritarian, state-driven economies or from outright 
conflict.  Such is the case in the small countries of Central America, where during the 
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 Schott, 52. 
7
 Ibid., 370. 
8
 Ibid.   
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1980s – the so-called “Lost Decade” – Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras 
(constituting all the CAFTA signatories except Costa Rica), endured violent civil wars 
and government-sponsored repression.  At the same time, the economies across the 
hemisphere collapsed under the foreign debt crisis that followed the 1982 Mexican peso 
default.  Structural adjustment programs to restore the Latin American economies forced 
these states to abandon the import substitution industrialization that had initially 
delivered remarkable growth rates but had swollen their foreign debt.  As Central 
America eased out of its conflicts, its governments accepted the dominant economic 
paradigm, later known as the Washington Consensus, and embarked on market-based 
reforms.  These included privatization of state enterprises, stabilization of currency and 
inflation, deregulation of industries, and liberalization of trade flows.  By minimizing the 
state in economic affairs, these reforms also marked a fundamental turning point in the 
restructuring of political institutions.9 
The processes to broker peace in Central America also attempted to establish 
democracies in a region until then ruled by dictators from the oligarchic elite or 
repressive military juntas.  The countries’ authoritarian past could have possibly 
frustrated the democratic experiment.  Costa Rica has always proven an exception to the 
norm, as this country has maintained a stable democracy since 1948 in part due to its lack 
of armed forces.  Still, even in this case, the economic restructuring of the late 20th 
Century exerted pressures on that country’s democratic institutions.  In these countries, 
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 Jochen Hippler, “Democratisation of the Third World After the End of the Cold War,” in The 
Democratisation of Disempowerment: The Problem of Democracy in the Third World, ed. Jochen 
Hippler (London: Pluto Press and the Transnational Institute, 1995), 23.  
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democratization had to come in tandem with economic development.  Exclusion from the 
economic system because of the widespread poverty further excludes citizens from in the 
political process.  Incorporating people once marginalized from society would expand 
and solidify the limits of democracy.10 
 The pro-market ideology, also called neoliberalism, became hegemonic across 
Latin America.  The region began to integrate itself into the global economy by 
promoting competition and attracting foreign investment through state privatization 
programs, bank deregulation and strengthening of investor protections.  The reduction in 
trade and non-tariff barriers invited multinational corporations to extend their operations 
in the region.  Mexico and Central America in particular saw a rise in the maquila or low-
technology manufacturing sector, and all countries in the region increased their exports of 
low-skill manufactured goods.11  Bilateral agreements to expand trade and to promote 
economic growth did not necessarily lead to technological advancement in these 
countries; instead, they forced Latin American countries to rely on their supply of natural 
resources and unskilled labor rather than improve their human capital and potential for 
economic growth.12 
Bilateral trade agreements, including most notably CAFTA in 2002, were seen as 
stepping stones to the establishment of a larger multilateral pact.  At the 1994 Summit of 
the Americas, held in Miami, delegates from all countries in the Western Hemisphere 
except Cuba announced a goal to establish the Free Trade Association of the Americas 
                                                           
10
 Xavier Gorostiaga, “Problems and Chances of Democracy in Central America,” in Hippler, 77.  
11
 Duncan Green, “A trip to the market: the impact of neoliberalism in Latin America” in 
Developments in Latin American Political Economy, ed. Julia Buxton and Nicola Phillips 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 20. 
12
 Ibid., 21. 
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(FTAA).  The FTAA would reduce or eliminate all barriers to inter-hemispheric trade.  
The negotiation of many bilateral accords notwithstanding, talks to create the FTAA 
began to falter after 2001 due to a groundswell of opposition from the governments of 
larger countries in South America and from civil society organizations.  The breakdown 
of the Doha Round of World Trade Organization negotiations and a deal cut among 
FTAA negotiators that allowed individual countries to opt out of certain provisions in the 
language further gutted the potential agreement.13  With the prospect of hemispheric free 
trade dimming, the Bush Administration campaigned even stronger for ratification of 
CAFTA.  Ultimately the FTAA was pronounced dead at the 2005 Summit of the 
Americas in Mar del Plata, Argentina.   
Because of their small size and economic influence, each Central American 
country needed to find partnerships with one another and outside the region to fuel their 
development.   Regional integration provided a first step to establishing larger economic 
ties.  In 1959, the Central American countries created the Central American Common 
Market, a customs union with a common external tariff, but it collapsed after twenty 
years amid the violence across the region.  Attempts to restore the political system also 
sought improved regional integration in order to tackle the economic and social 
challenges that pervade Central America with a stronger, unified voice.  In the 
Tegucigalpa and Guatemala Protocols of 1991 and 1993, respectively, regional leaders 
sought to revive the Central American Common Market by establishing a lower common 
external tariff and harmonizing the tariff schedules of each individual country.   
                                                           
13
 For a detailed evaluation of the FTAA negotiations, consult Jeffrey J. Schott, Does the FTAA 
Have a Future? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2005). 
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In addition to this common liberalization plan, Central American states 
individually began to dismantle their trade barriers as part of pro-market reforms in 
conjunction with peaceful democratization.  By the middle of the 1990’s, the region 
possessed some of the lowest tariff levels in Latin America; average import duties in the 
CAFTA countries fell from 45 percent to 7.1 percent.14  These policies help expand trade 
flows between Central America and the rest of the world, making the region relatively 
open compared to the rest of the hemisphere.  Entering into CAFTA negotiations, Central 
America already possessed few barriers to trade left to dismantle.  
Additionally, by then Central America enjoyed preferential access to American 
goods through the Caribbean Basin Initiative, approved in 1983.  This initiative allowed 
Central American countries (and other parties to the agreement) the ability to purchase a 
substantial number of U.S. products duty-free.  In particular, the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative expanded regional textile trade, conferring on Central American manufacturers 
considerable privileges to export apparel to the United States.15   Yet Central American 
countries feared that their standing as trade partners would diminish after the U.S. signed 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which bestowed new privileges to 
Mexico.  Frustrated, Central American countries lobbied for “NAFTA parity,” or 
equivalent terms of access as Mexico had obtained in NAFTA.  Their governments 
presented U.S. President Clinton with a potential trade agreement during his visit to 
Costa Rica in May 1997.  The proposal called for immediate “NAFTA parity” and the 
                                                           
14
 Carlos Felipe Jaramillo and Daniel Lederman, Challenges of CAFTA: Maximizing the Benefits 
for Central America (Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2006), 18, 21.  
15
 Ibid., 22. 
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start of negotiations for a permanent free trade agreement.  Lacking the Trade Promotion 
Authority (fast track) privileges he needed to enter into further trade negotiations, Clinton 
declined the offer, and the notion of a trade agreement with Central America was 
tabled.16   
 The Bush Administration renewed the possibility of trade liberalization with 
Central America in January 2002, facilitated by the Congressional approval that year of 
Presidential fast track authority.17  Changes to preexisting trade relations with Central 
America with the passage of the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (2000) basically 
made the regulations equivalent to NAFTA in terms of market access.  Still, Bush 
promoted the negotiation of a permanent, bilateral trade agreement specifically with 
Central America.18  The agreement was modeled after NAFTA with respect to the 
elimination schedule of tariff and non-tariff barriers and the language particular to 
intellectual property rights, services and investment.19  In certain respects CAFTA 
actually surpassed its predecessor – mechanisms were included to enforce investor rights, 
labor, and environmental provisions.20  CAFTA enhances the privileges enjoined by the 
                                                           
16
 José M. Salazar-Xirinachs and Jaime Granados, “The U.S.-Central America Free Trade 
Agreement: Opportunities and Challenges,” in Schott, Free Trade Agreements: U.S. Strategies 
and Priorities, 226. 
17
 Throughout this thesis, in contexts specific to CAFTA provisions, the term “Central America” 
will refer to the five countries that are party to the treaty – Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua – and will exclude Belize and Panama.  Also, general references to 
Central American CAFTA signatories, unless otherwise specified, will include the Dominican 
Republic, even though that country is not geographically a member of Central America.  
18
 Congressional Research Service, 8. 
19
 Carlos A. Imendia, “Fondo de Desarrollo del CAFTA: Una propuesta,” in Revista 
Centroamérica en la Economía Mundial del Siglo XXI (San Salvador: Universidad 
Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas,” 2003), 20. 
20
 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, CAFTA Rhymes with NAFTA But Is Better in Many 
Ways (Washington, D.C.: Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, June 2005). 
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Caribbean Basin Initiative and other preferential trade agreements by establishing 
reciprocal duty-free treatment for U.S. exports to Central America.   In this way, it makes 
little adjustment to the existing rules that allowed nearly 77 percent of Central American 
goods to enter the U.S. without tariffs.21   
Economic rationales fail to explain the American enthusiasm for signing CAFTA.  
This economic juggernaut dwarfs Central America: trade with the DR-CAFTA countries 
accounts for only 1.5 percent of all American commerce abroad, and their combined 
GDP equals less than 1 percent the size of the American economy.22   Upon 
implementation, American consumers would enjoy duty-free access to a plethora of 
Central American products, and American farmers would take advantage of an even 
larger market for agricultural goods.  These advantages were hardly momentous – far 
more significant in economic terms were the increased potential opportunities for 
investment by U.S. corporations.  Overall, though, U.S. strategic interests were at play – 
CAFTA supposedly would promote economic and social stability in Central America.  
This objective had major national security and foreign policy implications, given the 
large transnational crime and narcotics problems threatening Central America.  Signing 
CAFTA would also signal to the rest of the hemisphere a U.S. commitment to free trade 
and toward the eventual FTAA.23  
Increased trade with the U.S. would afford significant commercial opportunities 
for Central America as well.  Central American trade with the U.S. before the agreement 
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 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Free Trade with Central America: Highlights of the 
U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement (Washington, D.C.: Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, 22 April 2009). 
22
 U.S. Congressional Research Service, 8.  
23
 Salazar-Xirinachs and Granados, 229-33. 
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amounted to 56 percent of exports and 44 percent of imports, demonstrating the 
economic caliber of this relationship.24  CAFTA would open foreign trade even more by 
promoting and diversifying regional agricultural and textile exports, attract foreign 
investment, and supposedly improve economic institutions.   This would theoretically 
trigger significant economic development, especially as the Central American industries 
adopted new technologies requiring higher skill sets and, in turn, compensating workers 
at a higher wage.  Politically, it would further deepen an alliance with the United States.25  
Detractors complained that the development potential was a delusion, as trade 
liberalization would only improve those low-skill industries in which Central America 
possessed a comparative advantage.  In particular, it would increase the dependence on 
agricultural export and depress real wages.  Thus, CAFTA would not alleviate poverty 
after all. 
The U.S. International Trade Commission, an agency in the Commerce 
Department, forecast that after full implementation, CAFTA would increase U.S. exports 
to Central America by $2.7 billion or 15 percent, while imports would increase by $2.8 
billion, or 12 percent.  This boost in trade would have a minimal effect on the American 
economy.26  Still, the U.S. exported nearly $11 billion in goods to Central America in 
2003, more than its exports to Russia, India and Indonesia combined.  Across Latin 
America, only Mexico will exceed the market for American exports created by 
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 U.S. Congressional Research Service, 10.  
25
 Salazar-Xirinachs and Granados, 234-6. 
26
 U.S. Congressional Research Service, 15. 
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implementing CAFTA with the five Central American countries plus the Dominican 
Republic.27  
 
CAFTA’s Content and Language 
The economic effects of CAFTA, however, derive from only one part of the trade 
agreement’s provisions.  The agreement deals with far more subjects than tariff 
procedures and market access; it purports to modernize commercial regulations and 
institutions as a whole.  In this way, CAFTA can be considered a transformational policy 
with repercussions beyond the economic sphere.  These repercussions are felt in the 
democratic institutions.  
The preamble to the trade agreement reveals much about the intentions of the 
parties that adopted the agreement.  The first clause resolves to “strengthen the special 
bonds of friendship and cooperation among their nations and promote regional economic 
integration.”  Rather than begin the trade agreement with trade-related articles, the 
signatories opted to signal their foreign policy goals.  While the majority of the twenty 
clauses deal with trade-related matters, a few also refer to the goals of strengthening 
commercial regulations and labor and environmental standards.  These stipulations are 
significant themes in the agreement and will become central to this thesis, as they 
demonstrate that CAFTA deals with far more than just trade laws.   
Expanding free trade, of course, forms the fundamental objective of CAFTA.  As 
a regional trade agreement, CAFTA itself is composed of identical obligations and 
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 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Free Trade with Central America: Highlights of the 
U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement. 
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commitments for all parties, but each country defined its individual schedule to 
implement the market access provisions with the United States.  The agreement 
supersedes and enhances market access provisions, which govern trade barriers such as 
tariffs, quotas and rules of origin, extended by the U.S. to Central America under 
previous preferential treaties such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Generalized 
System of Preferences.   Each country negotiated an individual period over which to 
phase out tariffs on its most sensitive goods.  More than eighty percent of American 
consumer and industrial exports and more than half of current American agricultural 
exports to Central America would become duty-free immediately, and the remaining 
tariffs would be eliminated in stages over the subsequent ten to fifteen years.28   In turn, 
the provisions would lift tariffs on Central American textiles, one of that region’s largest 
exports, and give these goods preferential protections to make them more competitive 
against apparel imported from Asia.  Unique to this treaty are the duty-free benefits 
granted to products with fabric produced in Mexico and Canada to encourage integration 
of the textile industries across North and Central America.29  Agricultural commodities, 
also essential for the Central American export market, faced remarkable changes as a 
result of CAFTA.  Tariff elimination would occur over a negotiated timeframe for 
“sensitive goods” – crops like maize, potatoes and rice with considerable importance to 
the agricultural sector.  Notwithstanding intense lobbying from the U.S. sugar industry, 
CAFTA pledged to double the quota on sugar imports from Central America, but did not 
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 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Free Trade with Central America: Highlights of the 
U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement.  
29
 “Adoption of the Central American Free Trade Agreement,” American Journal of International 
Law 98, no. 2 (2004): 351.  
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commit the U.S. to reduce its farm subsidies, to the chagrin of CAFTA critics.30  In 
negotiations, the delegates managed to erode once stubborn agricultural protectionism 
while still recognizing the importance of protectionist policies to support this vital sector, 
seen in the careful tariff elimination schedules.  
Beyond its stipulations on market access, CAFTA transforms the commercial 
framework under which the Central American governments and economies operate.  By 
incorporating chapters that deal with investment, intellectual property rights, government 
procurement, services, and labor and environmental standards, the trade agreement 
presents a significant opportunity to advance a market-based economic agenda.  In many 
cases, it introduces foreign competition in sectors once regulated extensively by the state.  
This issue is particularly contentious and exposes CAFTA to some of its most strident 
resistance.  While advocates observe the benefits of improved competition to economic 
efficiency and development, detractors express outrage that such an international treaty 
could breach the powers of Central American governments to govern their economies. 
For example, the investment stipulations grant nondiscriminatory rights to foreign parties, 
thus reducing the leverage of the Central American regulatory state to protect against any 
investment by a multinational corporations considered predatory or in conflict with the 
interests of the local population.  Raúl Moreno, a noted Salvadoran economist and 
outspoken opponent of CAFTA alleges, “with these ‘extra-commercial contents, the 
                                                           
30
 Jaramillo and Lederman, 41-5. 
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agreements invade the sovereign competences of states and affect the compliance and 
effectiveness of economic, social, and cultural rights of the population….”31 
 Of particular importance to a study of political institutions are the subjects of 
intellectual property and government procurement regulations, arbitration procedures, 
and environmental and labor standards.   The intellectual property laws in Chapter 15 
encompass patent and copyright laws and extend protections for digital music recording 
and software.  These safeguards in effect deal with a more recent phenomenon in the 
informal economies in Central America and have provoked specific concern because they 
would crack down on pirated media sales – a reliable source of income for many poor 
individuals.  CAFTA signatories agree to improve their intellectual property laws and 
their enforcement.  These norms ensure that all businesses and trademark holders receive 
equal treatment and that patent rules resemble U.S. standards.32  Granting Central 
American firms equivalent rights does not necessarily suggest that they will effectively 
have equivalent leverage and protections as U.S.-based multinational corporations.  
CAFTA opponents fear that the laws will enable more influential American companies to 
expand their trademarked businesses into Central America to the detriment of native 
enterprises.  One study of the availability of pharmaceutical drugs in Guatemala 
determined that CAFTA’s monopoly protections privileged brand-name drugs over their 
generic versions, thereby reducing access to generics and inflating drug prices.33 
                                                           
31
 Raúl Moreno, “Free Trade Agreements, CAFTA and FTAA: Key Pieces in Accumulation of 
Transnational Capital,” in The Bush Doctrine and Latin America, ed. Gary Prevost and Carlos 
Oliva Campos (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 173. 
32
 U.S. Congressional Research Service, 22. 
33
 Ellen R. Shaffer and Joseph E. Brenner, “A Trade Agreement’s Impact on Access to Generic 
Drugs,” Health Affairs 28, no. 5 (2009): w957-w968. 
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In terms of government procurement, or the contractual acquisition of goods and 
services by government agencies, in Chapter 9 CAFTA grants non-discriminatory rights 
to potential contract bids by Central American public and private entities, enabling 
Central American firms to purchase U.S. federal and state government contracts and vice 
versa.  The provisions require fairness and transparency in bidding processes, including 
advance notification of public purchases, and they clarify that bribery or corruption in 
bids is a criminal offense according to all the Central American legal codes.34  By 
strengthening these laws, the trade agreement effectively restricts opportunities for 
corruption, for example by arranging contracts through non-competitive procedures or 
through personal connections.  The text of the agreement further obligates the Central 
American governments to create an impartial mechanism to review compliance with the 
procurement and transparency laws and to invalidate any entity that has committed 
fraud.35 
 CAFTA builds on regulations in NAFTA to create norms for the U.S.-Central 
American market.  The procedures in CAFTA to resolve commercial and labor disputes 
are identical. If initial government-to-government consultations do not come to a 
consensus, an arbitration panel comprised of independent experts determines if a 
violation occurred.  Under this outcome, the petitioning country can demand monetary 
remuneration or suspend trade benefits.36  Because the dispute provisions recommend 
fines as the primary penalty, this arbitration method is considerably stronger against 
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offending governments while not potentially damaging to ordinary workers who might 
suffer from trade sanctions.  By creating a permanent process, CAFTA creates 
expectations for businesses and governments and intends to create a more enforceable 
legal framework.  Partly because of this framework, the CAFTA arbitration provisions 
are stronger and more transparent than those prescribed by NAFTA,37 although that treaty, 
to its credit, did pioneer the inclusion of investment dispute mechanisms among trade 
agreements.   
Closely related to the question of dispute regulation and intellectual property 
rights are the possible environmental issues posed by CAFTA.   Enemies of free trade 
claim that these agreements permit large corporations that locate operations in developing 
countries to exploit feeble environmental regulations and enforcement in nations with 
which they have no relationship beyond their financial investment.  While this was a 
large issue in the American ratification of NAFTA, the U.S. Congress – civil society 
organizations engaged in the debate notwithstanding – expressed fewer objections to 
environmental standards in CAFTA because of the inclusion of environmental language 
in the text itself.   Nonetheless, significant concerns in Central America did remain about 
the environmental impact of the treaty. 
The negotiations of CAFTA involved the input of environmental groups in the 
process through the public submissions text of its Environmental Chapter (Chapter 17).  
CAFTA was the first trade agreement to include a public submissions mechanism in its 
body, building off of a side agreement to the NAFTA negotiations.  In addition, the 
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negotiators signed an Environmental Cooperation Agreement to identify goals and 
benchmarks to coordinate legislative action to protect the Central American 
environment.38  Ten Central American environmental advocacy groups sent a letter to 
Robert Zoellick declaring their support for CAFTA because of its Environmental Chapter.  
In particular, they lauded the specific language calling on all countries to enforce their 
national environmental regulations: “the proper enforcement of national laws is precisely 
what will help mitigate environmental degradation in the region and the reason why we 
endorse the environmental provisions set forth in this agreement.”39  They solicited 
continued civil society participation in the negotiations as well to guarantee that the 
environmental provisions were not degraded. The governments established a commission 
in the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration, a pre-existing body, to 
monitor environmental matters in the region.  
More than environmental concerns, though, the question of labor rights as 
embedded in the text provoked criticism of CAFTA.  Chapter 16 explains CAFTA’s 
commitment to labor standards among its signatory nations.  Modeled after provisions in 
NAFTA and the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, it obligates members to “not fail to 
effectively enforce” the labor statutes already integrated their legal codes.  Defiance of 
this pledge can subject the offending country to arbitration through the dispute settlement 
procedure entailed in CAFTA and to fines or trade sanctions.40  This threat of retaliation 
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makes CAFTA the strongest yet among U.S. free trade agreements in terms of labor 
protections.  
 In addition to this disciplinary approach, CAFTA and its side negotiations also 
detail particular ways that each Central American country and the Dominican Republic 
can modernize their labor ministries to improve regulation.  Through trade capacity 
initiatives passed alongside CAFTA ratification, the U.S. government authorized funds 
specifically for this purpose.  The substance and efficacy of these projects will be 
explored in detail in the El Salvador chapter. 
During the negotiation process, the Vice Ministers for Trade and Labor in the 
CAFTA countries published a joint report on the implementation and enforcement of 
labor standards in their country.   Published under auspices of the Inter-American 
Development Bank, its recommendations became key in the development of additional 
trade capacity projects.  The “White Paper,” as it is known informally, identified six 
priority issues for each country: enhancing labor law implementation, improving the 
budget and personnel needs of the labor ministries, strengthening the judicial system for 
labor law, establishing protections against discrimination in the workplace, eliminating 
the worst forms of child labor, and promoting a “culture of compliance.”41   
The Bush Administration claimed that the Central American nations already 
upheld relatively high labor standards due to their compliance with international norms.  
The White Paper cites a study by the International Labor Organization that demonstrated 
that provisions in the constitutions and legal codes of every CAFTA country largely 
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conformed to all of its fundamental labor standards.42  Nonetheless, this insight did not 
assuage the apprehensions of CAFTA’s critics, who emphasized its possible liabilities for 
labor rights.  CAFTA does not obligate signatories to approve stronger labor standards 
than those already in place.  Indeed, the threat of penalties for inadequate enforcement 
could discourage countries from adopting improved laws if their governments cannot 
guarantee that they could enforce these new laws either. 
CAFTA critics contended that the agreement’s language was not tough enough to 
have a positive effect on labor rights.  One report by the International Labor Rights Fund, 
commissioned by the U.S. Labor Department, called the working conditions in the 
CAFTA countries “dismal,” and that systemic deficiencies frustrated attempts to enforce 
existing labor laws.  Dissatisfied with these negative findings, the Labor Department tried, 
unsuccessfully, to suppress the report, and upon its public release, one department 
spokesman derided the report as “rife with unsubstantiated and unverifiable claims, 
questionable statistical data, and biased statements of findings and conclusions.”43 Such 
obfuscation did not ultimately sway the Congressional vote on the legislation, as the 
Senate approved CAFTA a day after the media reported the story.  
Civil society groups in the U.S. and Central America also renounced the 
agreement for its weak labor rights protections.  Human Rights Watch claimed that the 
agreement did not require that countries comply with international labor standards – 
rather, it exhorted them to “strive to ensure” compliance – nor did it create any impetus 
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for them enforce their existing laws.  “CAFTA provides little meaningful incentive, 
however, for parties to improve protections for workers’ human rights.”44  Congressional 
Democrats also criticized a lack of explicit guarantees of rights to unionize and to 
prohibit child labor and employment discrimination.45  The substance and veracity of 
such arguments will be explored in detail in the subsequent chapters, as the labor 
provisions of CAFTA will be a significant component of this thesis.  
 Apprehensive of entering into an obviously asymmetrical trade relationship, the 
Central American negotiators requested technical assistance in executing many of the 
conditions of the agreement.  Chapter 19 committed the parties to coordinate trade 
capacity building projects that would help these governments develop the capabilities to 
handle these trade and non-trade related obligations and to benefit from trade 
liberalization. Each country submitted a National Action Plan detailing its individual 
needs, which could be met through technical or financial assistance.  During the Senate 
debate, the Trade Representative’s office consented to supporting $40 million in labor 
capacity building projects in order to secure Democratic votes.  The provisions of this 
allocation were to fund projects to strengthen labor enforcement by the Central American 
trade ministries and to underwrite monitoring of working conditions by the International 
Labor Organization.  While the Administration heralded this authorization as 
substantiating its attention to labor conditions in CAFTA, outside observers remained 
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skeptical that the relatively paltry allocation would be sufficient enough to render them 
effective.46  
Trade capacity building engaged a number of different actors in the CAFTA 
negotiation process.  Additional projects receive funding from other U.S. federal agencies, 
the private and non-profit sector, and regional organizations and development banks, 
through coordination by a Trade Capacity Building Working Group.47 Projects vary from 
programs to help Central American businesses to take advantage of new opportunities to 
expand their market abroad, to build or purchase modern infrastructure, and to develop 
the rural agricultural sectors.48 
 After President Bush first announced his intention to sign a free trade agreement 
with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua in January 2002, 
negotiations of CAFTA from start to finish lasted over two years.  They occasioned nine 
separate rounds between January and December 2003, with Costa Rica appealing for 
additional meetings with the American delegation.  The U.S. began separate discussions 
to negotiate a separate free trade agreement with the Dominican Republic in January 
2004, but in March of that year, the two countries announced that they would attach that 
agreement to the pending CAFTA agreement, as the Dominican Republic was willing to 
accept the framework laid out by CAFTA.49  On May 29, 2004, the U.S. and the Central 
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American countries formally signed the trade agreement in Washington D.C., with an 
additional ceremony held in August to incorporate the Dominican Republic.50 
Once the presidents of each country party to CAFTA signed the agreement, they 
submitted it to their respective legislative branches for ratification.  El Salvador blazed 
ahead by first ratifying CAFTA in December 2004, followed by Honduras and 
Guatemala the following March.  The Dominican Republic and Nicaragua affirmed their 
participation in the fall of 2005, while Costa Rica delayed its decision until after a 
popular referendum narrowly approved CAFTA in October 2007.  The trade agreement 
entered into force in stages, depending on the ratification schedule of each country: 
throughout the year following March 1, 2006, the U.S. implemented CAFTA with all 
parties except Costa Rica, where implementation occurred on January 1, 2009.  
In the United States, controversy over CAFTA protracted the legislative decision 
to approve the agreement.  Pursuant to the Trade Promotion Authority, Congress could 
only approve or reject the trade agreement as signed by the Executive without inserting 
amendments.  Strident opposition from Democrats due to the labor and environmental 
provisions in the treaty complemented the outcry from populist Republicans who feared 
that CAFTA would cost American jobs in a reprise of NAFTA.  In June 2005, the Senate 
approved the legislation with a vote of 54 to 45.  The House of Representatives decision 
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in July endured some parliamentary drama, as the Republican leadership kept the vote 
period open beyond the customary limit to garner last-minute support – CAFTA finally 
passed with a miniscule 217-215 margin along mostly party lines.51   
 
Because of the divergent implementation dates, the availability of data describing 
the economic effects of CAFTA for each participant ranges.  Since they are all different 
countries, the data is not uniform, but the overall similarity in the Central American cases 
enables us to make comparisons and draw conclusions about the impact of CAFTA on 
the whole region. Between 2006 and 2009, U.S. exports to CAFTA countries (including 
the Dominican Republic) have increased by $3.1 billion, or 18 percent, and imports from 
that region have increased by $750 million, or 4 percent.52  One analysis by the U.S. 
Agency for International Development determined that industrialization through CAFTA-
related initiatives has failed to reduce rural poverty, even while employment in the 
agricultural sector has declined in relative terms.  In fact, rural poverty has actually 
increased across the region.  USAID thus determined that “the agricultural sectors are ill-
prepared to compete under CAFTA-DR or in the global economy.”53  Other studies have 
corroborated this finding.  Overall, many of the claims argued by CAFTA proponents 
have yet to come to fruition – unemployment has not dropped substantially, nor have 
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prices for normal consumer goods.54  One major difficulty, however, is in isolating the 
effects of trade liberalization on these economies that are already subordinated to the 
world market.  Therefore, one must be skeptical of all studies linking economic indicators 
to CAFTA.   
The 2009 financial crisis in particular affected Central America, and its negative 
consequences may have overshadowed any strides made through trade liberalization.  
Extensive trade and financial integration with the United States through CAFTA exposed 
Central America to the crash emanating from that economic powerhouse.  According to 
one estimate, during the crisis a 1.0 percent drop in U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
correlated to a 0.7 to 1.0 drop in Central American aggregate economic activity.55  As 
more in-depth assessments of the economic indicators for El Salvador and Costa Rica 
will demonstrate, the crisis reversed positive growth trends in the region.  Its impact on 
other social measures already altered through CAFTA, however, is still open for debate.   
 
Procedures 
 This thesis will evaluate the effects of CAFTA to the democratic political 
institutions in Central America.  Without any conventional methodologies to consider this 
topic, I have developed my own procedure for its analysis.  In Chapter 2, I will provide a 
theoretical foundation to this study in which I consider definitions of democracy, political 
liberalism, and their relationship to market capitalism and economic development.  With 
                                                           
54
 The Stop CAFTA Coalition, “Introduction,” in DR-CAFTA Year Two: Trends & Impacts 
(Washington, D.C.: Stop CAFTA Coalition, 2007), 7.  
55
 Andrew Swiston, Spillovers to Central America in Light of the Crisis: What a Difference a 
Year Makes  (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, February 2010), 4.  
28 
 
 
 
this theory I will construct my methodology, basing myself on the Democratic Audit, a 
framework that categorizes four distinct dimensions of democracy that the trade 
agreement has influenced.  To demonstrate the validity of my model, in Chapter 3 I will 
apply the methodology to Mexico after the implementation of NAFTA, a case with a 
wider body of literature to demonstrate the effects of that trade agreement on its 
democratic transition.   
 In the substantive sections of my thesis, I will apply my methodology to two 
selected case studies, El Salvador and Costa Rica.  In both cases, I will consider evidence 
from a variety of primary sources to determine the effects that CAFTA has had thus far 
on these countries’ democracies.  The political institutions in El Salvador, as I allege in 
Chapter 4, experienced a weakly positive effect because of CAFTA.  Costa Rica is more 
difficult to assess because of the short duration of its implementation, as I explain in 
Chapter 5.  I determine that as a policy itself, CAFTA had a positive effect on democracy, 
while its textual obligations have had an indeterminate effect thus far.  In Chapter 6, I 
reflect on the two case studies, drawing also from the NAFTA example, and I provide 
comparisons and conclusions from them.  I finally offer some recommendations for the 
use of my methodology to appraise future trade agreements. 
 El Salvador and Costa Rica are both particularly strong cases to consider the 
effects of CAFTA.  As a strong advocate for the agreement and the first country to 
implement CAFTA, El Salvador is an obvious choice, especially given the longer length 
of time that the agreement has been in force there.  Costa Rica, on the other hand, offers a 
peculiar case because of its distinctive political history and democratic stability.  The 
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prolonged ratification period culminating in a nationwide referendum on CAFTA 
ratification also makes Costa Rica remarkable; still, as I will show, my methodological 
framework is strong enough to assess this unusual episode. 
 The Dominican Republic does not share the same history and social context as 
Central America, even though their economies are similar.  Thus, I did not include it in 
my analysis.  Nicaragua and Guatemala would also provide some lessons, but there is a 
greater dearth of data and analysis of CAFTA’s impact in these countries.  The 2009 
constitutional crisis in Honduras, in which the army deposed President Manuel Zelaya in 
a coup d’etat, complicates the exercise of the trade-democracy methodology because of 
the sudden abrogation of democracy in that country.  In fact, the U.S. threatened to 
suspend its commercial privileges immediately after the coup, which disrupted foreign 
investment and trade.56  For these reasons, Honduras does not serve as an adequate case 
currently for this study. 
In closing his remarks at the Heritage Foundation, Robert Zoellick maintained 
that, “it would be a mistake of historic proportions if we turned our back on these 
struggling democracies” by not ratifying CAFTA.57  Now, almost five years after the U.S. 
Congress approved the agreement, it has already left a mark on the democratic 
institutions in Central America.  Determining the magnitude of these consequences – and 
indeed, the truth of the Administration’s claims – will become the fundamental objective 
of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Theory and Methodology 
Before embarking on an in-depth analysis of the effects of CAFTA on Central 
American democracy, it is essential to consider the theoretical foundations of the various 
aspects involved.  A democracy encompasses a number of different factors, even some 
that may seem only indirectly or tangentially related to economic changes.  However, 
CAFTA has had such a transformational experience in Central America that it has left an 
impact to some extent on all these factors.  In this chapter, I will discuss the scholarship 
on democracy and its link to the economy to construct the methodology I will employ 
throughout the rest of this work.  First, I will review the modern definitions of democracy 
itself, in particular the work of Joseph Schumpeter, and show how a narrow definition 
fails to capture the political questions to be addressed in this study.  Next, I will consider 
the relationship between market capitalism, free trade and political democracy, offering 
some general theories of how liberalizing trade might impact a country’s political 
institutions.  I will then proceed discuss the theoretical underpinnings of civil society, one 
particular dimension of democracy studied in this thesis.  I will then ultimately use this 
theoretical background to explain the Democratic Audit. 
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A General Definition of Democracy 
Since the ancient Greeks proposed a system of government based on popular rule, 
philosophers have pondered the definition of democracy.   Aristotle offered the first 
essays on democracy in Politics, and up through the twentieth century, political theorists 
such as Locke, Mill, Rousseau and others have contemplated the role of government as a 
tool to express popular will.  Collectively their writings are known as the “classical 
definitions” of democracy.  It is outside the scope of this paper to define them all, 
especially as their qualitative explanations often fail to capture specific arrangements of 
institutions and processes that occur in modern democracies.  In addition, they often do 
not address the relationship between democracy and capitalism, the central theme of this 
thesis.  A review of modern theoretical literature should begin with Joseph Schumpeter’s 
landmark Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, which serves as a key twentieth century 
text for comparative analyses of political economy.  In it he connects the political 
variables of democracy with economic variables that frame a market or command 
economy.  From this foundation we will launch our discussion of the relationship 
between democracy and trade. 
Schumpeter first defines the classical definition of democracy as “that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common 
good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who 
are to assemble in order to carry out its will.”1  However, he criticizes this explanation for 
its reliance on some semblance of “common good,” an amorphous notion not easily 
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standardized.   Furthermore, the definition supposes that “‘the people’ hold a definite and 
rational opinion about every question” and thus, in a democracy, they select 
representatives to legislate their opinions into policy.2  Schumpeter rejects this claim and 
posits that, “the role of the people is to produce a government, or else an intermediate 
body which in turn will produce a national executive or government.”3   Note that this 
claim downplays actual decision-making while emphasizing the election of legislators 
themselves to make the decision.   From this basis Schumpeter concludes that “the 
democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in 
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote.”4  He articulates what would come to be the rational voter argument, 
suggesting that each person voted based on personal preferences.   A variety of 
motivations, then, would explain the majority’s decision for casting ballots.5 
Schumpeter’s ultimate definition of democracy is therefore remarkably limited. 
He circumscribes the political system itself to emphasize elections alone as its hallmark.  
Ultimately, then, the strength of a democracy should be considered only in light of its 
capacity to hold free and fair elections to form a government.  Thus, in his 
characterization, “extraneous” concepts about civil liberties, civil society, and the 
institutional rule of law then do not determine a democracy, since they have nothing to do 
directly with votes. 
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If we employ Schumpeter’s strict definition of democracy, then this entire 
question of democracy in Central America post-CAFTA is moot.  Every country in the 
region currently possesses a functioning electoral process to some extent to select 
leadership.  The free trade agreement made no changes to voting procedures in the 
country, and therefore did not affect democracy in the Schumpeterian sense.  Nonetheless, 
because a democracy in fact encompasses more than mere vote-getting, we can 
reasonably argue that the agreement had an impact on other institutions that comprise 
democracy.  
The Schumpeterian model is still useful to consider in light of this assumption.  
His definition reduces democracy to a duality between “present” and “absent.”  
Democracy, instead, should be considered along a gradient of sorts.6  In particular, the 
political institutions that uphold the democracy are essential to measure because of this 
gradient.  Even when a country exercises an electoral process considered relatively fair, 
the ability of the political class mandated to secure a functioning society depends on the 
strength of the government institutions and civil society to preserve and protect civil 
liberties, the hallmark of a liberal democracy.  Rhetoric about expanding democracy is 
empty unless the legislature enacts the proper regulations, the executive bureaucracy 
carries them out adequately, and the judiciary adjudicates violations.  Institutions such as 
parties, bureaucratic agencies, and civil society organizations, accepted as legitimate by 
the population, facilitate a functioning democracy. 7 
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Popular legitimacy serves to support state institutions.  A democratic system must 
perform effectively to satisfy the expectations of the majority of the electorate and also 
subdue any powerful anti-democratic groups that might threaten the regime.8  If society 
determines that the existing political institutions are appropriate and can adequately 
uphold liberal ideals, it deems these institutions legitimate.9  Without legitimacy or public 
faith in their capacity, the institutions will fail to achieve their objectives.  This is 
particularly true with regards to the rule of law and the public organizations that swore to 
protect it.  Endemic corruption and lax enforcement of laws that undermine the business 
climate reduces popular legitimacy of regulatory bodies and the judicial system. 
Scholars spend careers attempting to construct a definition of democracy, and this 
paper does not intend to embark on this task either.  It must suffice to point out that 
theoretical approximations of democracy often fail to capture the essence of the real thing, 
especially considering the plethora of democratic experiences across the world and 
throughout history.   
The Central American Free Trade Agreement obligates more than just trade law 
adjustments: it mandates that the Central American countries reform their labor, 
environmental, administrative and government procurement laws.  These are political 
issues that affect government institutions, and the enactment of CAFTA had 
consequences to their strength and effectiveness.  In El Salvador, as we will later see, the 
trade agreement and its accompanying programs entailed certain strengthening in terms 
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of the judiciary and labor standards.  The results of these attempts, then, will be studied 
through the Democratic Audit.    
 
Capitalism and Democracy 
CAFTA intended to expand market capitalist reforms in Central America with an 
aim to also further democracy.  A capitalist society generally refers to one that maintains 
a competitive, market-driven economy wherein private individuals or firms largely 
control the means of production without the inference of the state.10  Profit, then, is a 
guiding motive of all members of the society.  The notion that capitalism functions best 
under conditions that allows personal choice and freedom would suggest that liberal 
democracy, which is a political system founded on upholding individual liberties, is its 
corresponding political system.  Jochen Hippler calls democracy, “nothing but the 
application of the capitalist, free-market form to politics: parties and politicians are the 
providers of services who have to compete for customers (voters); votes are money and 
voting is buying.”11 
Even Marx accepted the link between liberalism and capitalism.  In a liberal 
democracy, the presumed political equality of every citizen could be premised on limited 
state influence and acceptance of economic inequalities.  Together, this produces, “…a 
political system in which the majority of citizens could be co-opted into supporting an 
order in which capitalists remained dominant.”12  This conclusion allowed Marx to 
                                                           
10
 See, for example, Cunningham, 46 and Dahl, 167. 
11
 Hippler, 18.  
12
 John Peeler, Building Democracy in Latin America, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Inc., 2009), 17. 
36 
 
 
 
develop his notion of a communist society that rejected the inequalities fundamental to 
capitalism.  In the literature, scholars tend to contrast capitalism with socialism, “where 
the presumption that guides political and economic policy is to achieve substantial social 
equality and to promote cooperation.”13 
Seymour Martin Lipset laid the groundwork for subsequent theories linking 
economic development and capitalism with democracy.   Recalling that political 
philosophers harkening as far back as Aristotle have asserted that only in wealthy 
societies could the population participate in the political system without resorting to 
demagoguery, Lipset demonstrates empirically that average wealth, degree of 
industrialization and urbanization, and levels of education are higher for more democratic 
countries.14  Increased wealth is causally related to democratic development in part 
because it serves to improve the social conditions of the working class and helps 
consolidate a middle class.  A strong middle class, in turn, tends to support economic and 
political stability – the central goal articulated by CAFTA supporters.  He suggests that 
“the poorer a country, and the lower the absolute standard of living of the lower classes, 
the greater the pressure on the upper strata to treat the lower classes as beyond the pale of 
human society.”15  Yet Lipset’s argument seems rather dated, suggesting pervasive, 
pathological discrimination among the elite class.    
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Lipset observed that with increased wealth, the most powerful social groups had 
greater sources of income and means to provide for themselves independent of the state.16  
Meanwhile, the lower classes could benefit from greater redistribution of wealth in terms 
of social programs and better labor standards, and they would be less tempted by radical, 
undemocratic ideologies.17 
Robert Dahl says that “polyarchal” democracy has never endured in a nonmarket-
based economy, and likewise democracy has only endured in countries with market 
economies.18 He then suggests that economic growth, stimulated by a market economy, is 
more favorable to democracy because improvements in standards of livings reduce areas 
of conflict. Successful market economies thus tend to engender pressure for 
democratization.19  Market capitalism also creates a property-owning middle class 
interested in education, personal freedoms, the rule of law, and political participation: 
“the middles classes, as Aristotle was first to point out, are the natural allies of 
democratic ideas and institutions.”20  Although he qualifies his argument that economic 
development is hardly unique to democratic countries, he concludes that market-based 
systems tend to improve development and render the circumstances for democratization.  
The relationship between capitalism and democracy is not necessarily bi-
directional: “capitalism is a necessary – though not sufficient – condition for democracy 
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but democracy is not a precondition for capitalism.”21  Democratization must occur 
inherently through political processes, but the political factors involved at times coincide 
with economic factors.  Francis Fukuyama points out that economic development, a 
factor denoted by Lipset, is even less likely a cause of democratization than a market-
based economy itself.  Some underdeveloped economies, such as Costa Rica and India, 
have nonetheless sustained substantive democracies, while Nazi Germany and Japan 
during the 1930’s managed high economic growth while under undemocratic 
conditions.22  Indeed, the record of countries sustaining undemocratic regimes but rapid 
growth is substantial; China since Deng and Russia since Putin are two notable examples.  
The Heritage Foundation publishes its annual Index of Economic Freedom to 
provide quantitative measurements to levels of market capitalism around the world.  
Economic freedom refers to the individual ability to make economic decisions unfettered 
by state interference.  Ten specific freedoms weighted equally comprise the index: 
business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, government size, monetary, investment, 
financial freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption and labor freedom.23 The 
editors demonstrate using multi-year analysis of their published indices that higher levels 
of economic freedom are correlated to higher per capita gross domestic product (GDP), 
and that GDP grows faster in freer economies.24  The elements of economic freedom are 
closely associated with liberal democracy, as “an individual who is economically free can 
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fully control his or her labor or property.  This economic component is related to … 
political freedom.”25  While the government must exist to protect property rights and 
enable the market to function, the Index of Economic Freedom describes any additional 
state involvement in the economy as an infringement on liberty.   Applying these 
premises, any policy – including one generated by a trade agreement like CAFTA – that 
seeks to open any economy and in essence advance its freedom will lead to economic 
growth, higher standards of living and greater political freedom.  The components of 
CAFTA in particular have an effect on several of the specific freedoms listed by the 
Heritage Foundation.   
On the other hand, just as he outlines the argument that capitalism supports 
democracy, Dahl offers some reasons why market economies hinder it. Market capitalism 
requires extensive government regulation and enforcement of laws, contracts, and 
property rights in order to maintain competition.26  By sanctioning the government’s 
minimal role in the market without firm restrictions on it, the state can easily begin to 
expand its function. Yet without oversight, self-interested economic actors have no 
incentive to consider the common welfare, especially if personal and societal interests are 
in conflict.  A totally unfettered market will render harm on some social sectors, yet the 
state, the institution responsible for its supervision, may impose some regulations 
considered undemocratic. Those who oppose government economic policies must still 
obey them.  Many civil libertarians hence argue that the democratic government will 
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encroach on personal freedoms and liberties because of its enmeshment with the 
economy.     
This reasoning is a practical rather than theoretical critique of capitalism and 
democracy. More convincing on the purely theoretical level is the question of inequalities 
generated by a market economy. The capitalist land-owning class has a stake in 
democratic change, and they often seek to consolidate power in their interests, rendering 
undemocratic shifts.  This reasoning is particularly key in light of the question of a free 
trade agreement’s political effects, given that free trade frequently exacerbates wealth 
disparities, at least in the short term.  Because of profit-driven competition for resources, 
a capitalist system invariably creates inequalities among those who benefit and those who 
do not from the market.  Consequently, this translates into political inequalities.  
Therefore, a market-based democracy favors the class that controls capital in terms of 
privileges and power: “citizens who are economically unequal are unlikely to be 
politically equal.”27  In underdeveloped countries like those in Central America, 
historically the elite landowners who comprise a narrow minority of the population 
command authority over the majority because of the political resources generated by their 
assets.  This phenomenon conflicts with the theory of a democracy in which each citizen 
possesses the same opportunities for self-determination.  As Peeler notes, “capitalism and 
liberal democracy are increasingly in tension because the former inevitably generates 
inequality, while the latter presupposes equality.”28  
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Although the connection between economic development and political freedom 
has been established, the impact of democracy on social welfare is more ambiguous.  
Dahl suggests that human development is one justification for supporting democracy.  
This element can be empirically considered across democratic and non-democratic 
regimes or among different democracies of similar strength.  Of course, as Dahl notes, 
the qualities that determine a measure of human development vary, and it is difficult to 
accurately quantify them.29  The World Bank and the United Nations do have 
standardized human development indicators, and the preponderance of their usage in 
academic and applied research renders these measures relatively authoritative.   Human 
development includes estimations of poverty and standards of living, phenomena that are 
directly affected by the economy, a component of which is trade.   
Nonetheless, economic growth does not always translate into better living 
conditions for every member of the population, and the inequalities of capitalism can 
cripple some sectors of society.  Although democracies tend to fund social services at a 
higher rate than do non-democracies, the conclusion that such welfare programs produce 
higher living standards is more tenuous.30  Peeler compares the per capita GDP growth 
rates, Gini coefficients (a measure of income inequality), and the UN Human 
Development Indicators over the period 1990-2005 in several democratizing Latin 
American countries that also underwent predominately neoliberal, market-based 
economic campaigns.  He observes that the neoliberal reforms were associated with 
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slowing economic growth and aggravated wealth disparities but also improved social 
conditions.  “…There is some evidence that democratic governments have at least been 
able to mitigate the worst effects of neoliberalism.”31 
 
Globalization and Democracy as Foreign Policy  
Although democracy is a domestic notion, generally referring to a system of 
government within a specific country, it has become a key objective for foreign policy.  
The idea that democracies tend to safeguard peace between one another more than non-
democracies is the principle of democratic peace theory, which has become a guide for 
many foreign policy decisions around the world.  More powerful nations have sought to 
export democracy abroad through military actions to preserve fragile democracies and to 
establish democracy in a new setting or through instruments of soft power to promote the 
cultural values of a liberal society. 
A country’s transition to democracy may not rest solely on external forces, but in 
many instances foreign influences have been significant catalysts in the process as long 
as other preconditions are present.32  Of course, in several cases Western countries and 
the United States in particular have backed authoritarian regimes over democratically 
elected governments.  A plethora of examples are in Latin America, including the 
American support of the 1973 coup against Salvador Allende in Chile and of the Contras 
against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua in the 1980’s.  To this day, the U.S. 
aligns itself with democracies only when those governments are in the American interest.   
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Especially since the fall of the Soviet Union and the global shift toward market 
economies, exporting capitalism is intertwined with exporting democracy.  In fact, a 
proliferation of market democracies is the stated ultimate goal of U.S. foreign policy for 
both humanitarian and self-interested reasons.33  Given the relationship between these 
economic and political systems, it is simple to observe how foreign policymakers have 
conceptualized it as normative; that is, that this relationship should drive policy decisions.  
The case that former Trade Representative Robert Zoellick made – that free trade under 
CAFTA would support Central American democracies – epitomizes this fact.  By 
expanding economic freedom and decentralization to Central America, the United States 
is reinforcing political freedom through democracy in these countries through its foreign 
policy decisions. 
Through economic globalization, capitalism has flourished.  Reduced barriers to 
trade and foreign investment, improved methods of communication and transportation, 
and rapid technological innovation has opened up international competition for resources 
and enabled enterprises to extend their operations and influence across national borders.  
Yet globalization may not afford such benefits to political democracy.  A reduction in the 
state’s control over its country may inhibit it from adequately safeguarding civil liberties 
that could be potentially exploited by multinational corporations.  The entrenchment of 
foreign heavyweight companies in underdeveloped countries with weaker labor standards 
or judicial systems can further undercut the political institutions’ capacity in a David and 
Goliath-like conflict.  In other instances, the smaller recipient country’s government may 
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enact one policy counter to the interests of the people in order to preserve ties with the 
foreign country and to avoid risks of capital flight.34  
International businesses tend to support democracies that protect the rule of law 
and enforce commercial property rights that safeguard their profits.  The need for 
transparency and accountability in international commerce can foster greater government 
attention to strengthening its political institutions.   If popular resistance builds against a 
government seen as aligned with foreign capitalists instead of with native interests – 
regardless of the veracity of that claim – the businesses may lean to support a suppression 
of democracy.35  Additionally, if a government over-regulates foreign investment to 
shield workers and the environment from deleterious business activities, the foreign firm 
is more likely to pull out of the country and thus eliminate the advantages from 
globalization there altogether.36  
On the other hand, globalization could promote democracy in that it engenders 
economic development and capitalism.  The theories noting the beneficial relationship 
between the systems have already been discussed.   Free trade and liberal capital flows 
supposedly reallocate international resources to their most efficient manner through 
Ricardian comparative advantage, and likewise democracy allocates political power to its 
most efficient use.37  On a social level, by lowering barriers to communication, 
globalization opens exposure to democracies around the world and helps create a network 
of transnational civil society to defend political freedoms.    Additionally, globalization 
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can undermine the undemocratic political authority of the elite classes because 
decentralization of economic policymaking reduces the role of the state, earlier under 
command of the elite.  Liberalization will improve the standing of the popular classes 
while guaranteeing political stability, so the upper classes can still maintain their social 
positions but with less arbitrary influence.38  It is valuable to remember that globalization 
is an exogenous phenomenon that has occurred in part due to fortuitous and 
indiscriminate processes, while liberalizing trade and capital flows is a deliberate 
economic and foreign policy action.  Yet these policies harness the expansion of 
globalization to a specific end, so it is logical and appropriate to attribute some of the 
political and social consequences of globalization to calculated international politics.   
Market capitalists allege that liberalizing international trade helps solidify the so-
called democratic peace.  Economic interdependence renders conflict less likely because 
of the increased damage caused through severing bilateral ties.39  Peace-seeking is a 
natural goal for deepening economic integration; it served as a primary motive for the 
European Union, and it also was a goal for CAFTA in further integrating the historically 
war-torn Central American states.  Yet trade does not merely affect international 
relationships: economic theory declares that international trade increases aggregate 
income but alters the distribution of wealth within a country.  For this reason, domestic 
politics come into play as some sectors compete for advantages from liberalizing trade, 
while others detrimentally affected by trade will lobby to maintain government 
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protectionism.  Such competition takes place within a representative democracy 
comprised of various interest groups.  McDonald even argues that by transforming the 
domestic distribution of power based on wealth, trade reduces the influence of social 
groups interested in warfare while simultaneously strengthening the influence of those 
groups that benefit from peace and trade.40  Domestic welfare programs to compensate 
for the short-term structural losses and adjustments in the economy further promote 
stability and democratic rights under conditions of globalization.41  
Through an empirical study of 127 countries over 26 years, Li and Reuveny try to 
ascertain the relationship between democracy and economic globalization – the latter by 
examining the aspects of trade openness, foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio 
(financial) investment inflows and the spread of democracy.  The evidence they find is 
mixed: “trade openness and portfolio investment inflows negatively affect democracy. 
[…] FDI flows positively affect democracy, but the effect weakens over time.  The 
spread of democratic ideas promotes democracy persistently over time.”42  Trade’s 
tendency to reallocate income distribution and expand inequalities explains its negative 
impact on democracy, according to the authors.  They also conclude that opening up a 
country to foreign financial flows compels it to enhance its institutions and enforcement 
of the rule of law, but this positive outcome is outweighed by the vulnerability to rapid 
capital flight that can lead to financial collapses.  Finally, the communication opened 
through globalization exposed civil society groups in the democratizing nation to global 
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ideas and methods of democracy, thereby bolstering their capabilities through 
information to demand change.43    
The conclusions that Li and Reuveny draw offer important predictions for the 
present analysis as well.  One can postulate that globalization, exemplified by CAFTA, 
has and will continue to make the Central American democracies liable to injury through 
augmented income inequalities and over-reliance on investment from abroad, namely 
from the United States.  At the same time, however, globalization may beneficially 
impact their political institutions and reinvigorate their civil societies, a claim that 
supports my initial hypothesis.  These variables are part of the Democratic Audit that 
shall be performed.   
 
Civil Society and Democracy 
Just as a liberal system of government can encourage economic growth and 
market capitalism, it also supports the inclusion of varied interests in the political realm.  
Formally outside the realm of the state and the economy, popular organizations exist in 
democratic societies that express the will of ordinary citizens.  Collectively referred to as 
the “civil society,” this assortment of groups ranges from diffuse grassroots associations 
pressing for local change to hierarchical advocacy machines that lobby at a national or 
even international level.  Larry Diamond has defined civil society as “the realm of 
organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, 
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autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or a set of shared rules.”44  More 
than just encompassing the body politic, civil society places citizens in the public square.   
Indeed, these are the groups that facilitate social movements that have effected grand 
change across the world.  Political theorists have hailed the civil society as a bulwark of 
democracy because it represents popular opinion and engages the citizenry in political 
decision-making.  The level of vigor among the civil societies in Central America during 
the negotiation and after ratification of CAFTA serves as one of the key dimensions in 
tracking the political effects of the agreement through the Democratic Audit. 
Alexis de Tocqueville contemplated the role of the civil society in Democracy in 
America, observing how the active participation of American citizens in voluntary civic 
organizations helped stimulate democracy.  His descriptions laid the groundwork for 
further theoretical notions of civil society.  In the 20th Century, Lipset presages the 
argument that civil society is a key instrument of democratization.  His so-called 
“intermediate organizations and institutions which can act as sources of countervailing 
power [against the state]” are associated with increased wealth.45  They can be sources 
for new ideas or means to channel citizen participation.  Civil society organizations also 
legitimize and express political activism in ways that are appropriately heard by 
policymakers.  They can lobby on behalf of particular policies or for the political system 
itself, serving to uphold democracy in fact by questioning it in a public forum.46   
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Civil society is distinguished by its relationship with the state.  As an intermediary 
between private citizens and their government, which purports to act in their will under a 
democracy, civic organizations present the interests of individual classes of people in a 
way that is separate from legislative representation.  Unless the state co-opts civil society 
in a corporatist scheme, per se, civil society organizations can act relatively 
independently in the public sphere, sharing a diversity of ideas and seeking some 
objective from the state, such as policy changes, benefits or compensation for damages. 
In a democracy in particular, civil society acts as a check on state power and abuses: 
“indeed, a vibrant civil society is probably more essential for consolidating and 
maintaining democracy that for initiating it.”47  It offers a means for citizens to 
participate in their government while bypassing customary channels.  Political parties, for 
example, can become insulated from the actual tenor of the public and support 
minoritarian programs while offering the people no opportunity to voice their discontent.  
By focusing citizen concerns – even outrage – civil society groups can offer a stronger, 
united voice with greater leverage to exert over the state.   
The practices that civil society organizations use for influence range vastly, and 
groups disagree on the appropriate methods to employ depending on the circumstance.  
Public protests, demonstrations and violence pose the greatest immediate challenge to the 
state, and often most clearly demonstrate solidarity in opposition.  This type of public 
mobilization, though, can backfire and enable greater repression of civil society.48  Such 
has been the case for social movements against authoritarian regimes across Latin 
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America, but even after the region’s democratization.  Public protests, for example, were 
key methods employed by anti-CAFTA coalitions.  However, democracies permit larger, 
freer expressions of citizen opinion, and civil society organizations have adopted more 
legitimate means to become incorporated into the normal public discourse.49 
  Freedom of association lets citizen groups often form informal or formal 
networks, thus integrating civil society even more.  Some organizations distribute 
independent, alternative information that can often contradict the mainstream media, 
especially if the press seems closely associated with the state or parties.50  Think tanks, 
chambers of commerce and professional business groups, student coalitions, human 
rights watchdogs, and labor unions are common examples of civil society organizations 
that spread information about government programs and policies. Economic reforms 
requiring a broad base’s backing have often sprouted new civil society actors that engage 
citizens for or against the policy by providing information on its predicted 
consequences.51  Once a policy has been passed or defeated, then, these organizations 
often have still empowered ordinary citizens to remain involved in public affairs, thus 
sustaining the civil society as long as supporters do not become disillusioned with the 
mission.52 
Increasing economic freedom and decentralization should theoretically encourage 
the cultivation of civil society.  By minimizing the space occupied by the state, economic 
liberalization empowers private organizations, both for-profit and non-profit enterprises, 
                                                           
49
 Peeler, 130. 
50
 Diamond, 10.  
51
 Ibid., 11.  
52
 Tarrow, 170-3. 
51 
 
 
 
to provide more efficient ways to provide services to the community.  “Neoliberalism 
sees [non-governmental organizations] as a vehicle for democratization and as a means to 
strengthen civil society.”53   A capitalist society consists of rent-seeking organizations 
competing for profits, and social groups can arise and develop in the marketplace, 
independent of state control.  Berger says that “capitalism creates space and opportunity 
for civil society,” contrasting it with socialism, in which such a space is absent because of 
the preponderance of the state in society.54  The “capitalist class,” the so-called owners of 
the means of production, need not be democrats themselves, “for it is the consequences of 
capitalism, not the motives of capitalism, that create the space for democracy.”55  
In Latin America, social movements arose after the 1980’s to counter neoliberal 
reforms taking place across the region.  Interestingly, many movements and their 
associated organizations sought to devolve power from the state, much like the economic 
plans themselves, but not to an extent that decentralization vitiated certain social sectors.  
Instead, the Latin American civil society called for increased popular participation, more 
egalitarian policy decisions, and greater accountability to enhance the new democracies.56  
Social cleavages rendered by economic reforms especially revitalized the civil society in 
these countries.  Trade unions and agricultural cooperatives, organizations frequently co-
opted or subjugated by the earlier authoritarian regimes, recognized new chances to take 
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advantage of the democratic space and to speak out against market reforms that would 
marginalize the social sectors that they represented.57  On the other hand, large masses of 
the population unincorporated in the capitalist economy, such as rural farmers, have only 
managed to coalesce into small, informal civil society groups that may vocalize their 
members’ concerns but have no real influence on politics.58  As we shall observe in the 
civil society sections of the El Salvador and Costa Rica chapters, CAFTA provided the 
catalyst for these smaller groups to establish inter-organizational relationships and begin 
to build a stronger coalition.    
Overall, theories of social movements and civil society tend to be rather vague 
unless they include clear examples of such organizations.  Fortunately for the application 
of the Democratic Audit, the indices pertaining to the civil society allow us to isolate 
certain characteristics and factors that particularly influenced the cultivation of a 
country’s civil society. 
   
Constructing and Adapting the Democratic Audit   
This thesis will attempt to measure the political effects to Central American 
democracy caused by CAFTA.  Therefore, it is necessary to employ a standard construct 
by which to appraise them.  Beetham attempts to perform a “Democratic Audit” by using 
an index that will become crucial for this thesis.  After considering the numerous 
classical and more recent theories of democracy, Beetham concludes that they all agree 
that democracy refers to a type of decision-making process.  From this principle he 
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asserts that popular control and political equality are fundamental; “[democracy] claims 
that such decision-making should be … subject to the control of all members of the 
collectivity considered as equals.”59  The principles of popular control and political 
equality inform his democratic audit by serving as general standards.  He further breaks 
down these two standards to construct measurable criteria.  Political control is separated 
into four audit dimensions: (1) popular elections for the legislature and the head of 
government; (2) open and accountable government and institutions; (3) guaranteed civil 
and political rights or liberties, and (4) civil society.60  Beetham visualizes these 
conditions as equal-sized components in a single pyramid, as each one is necessary for 
survival of the whole.  Any democratic audit must consider the two principles of 
democracy that Beetham outlined: “a complete democratic audit should examine each 
segment in turn, to assess not only the effectiveness of popular control in practice, but 
also the degree of political equality in each area.”61  
Beetham’s Democratic Audit consists of answering thirty discrete questions, or 
“indices,” grouped into the four audit conditions.  The Democratic Audit is a very useful 
standard for this thesis.  As a broad characterization of democracies, it can be applied to 
different contexts around the world.  Furthermore, it dissects and systematizes the distinct 
elements incorporating liberalism and democracy, thereby considering more than just the 
qualities offered by Schumpeter.  The four conditions are continuous, which further 
allows for a better evaluation of an external impact to the democracy.  
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 For this thesis, I have adapted Beetham’s four dimensions to help consider the 
effects of an external trade agreement on a democracy.  The dimensions in my 
Democratic Audit are: Electoral Processes, Open and Accountable Institutions, Civil and 
Political Liberties, and Civil Society.  Below are listed the indices that I consider most 
relevant to the analysis at hand.  I determine “relevance” based on how I believe that a 
trade agreement and its consequent changes in economic structure and development, 
political institutions and civil society development can have an impact on a democracy. 
In this sense, I consider the way that CAFTA has affected or altered the index question, if 
at all.  Many specific indices I will not consider, as trade agreements would have no 
impact whatsoever on a particular characteristic of a democracy.  Nonetheless, I will still 
consider the consequences to the four general dimensions of democracy, even if a 
particular index is not affected.  The four dimensions thus serve as the major scheme 
from which I will evaluate the cases of NAFTA in Mexico as an exemplar and then 
CAFTA in El Salvador and Costa Rica.   The indices, then, serve to elaborate certain 
points.  While it would be difficult to score the impact of the trade agreements on the four 
dimensions without some quantifiable standard, at the end of each section I will provide a 
concluding assessment of the implications.  I will assert that the agreement has had a 
positive, neutral, negative or indeterminate effect to the specified dimension.62  My four 
ratings will allow me to pronounce a general grade in the conclusion of each chapter.    
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Below, I have reiterated the four dimensions that I will consider and the particular 
indices I have selected to help clarify my evaluations.  I also show how I have adapted 
certain dimensions for use in an analysis of trade agreements.  My adaptation of the 
methodology is original and necessary because this is not the author’s intended use of the 
Democratic Audit.  However, it provides a simple categorical framework that includes 
four major elements of democracy.   The four dimensions can further be divided into two 
groups upon which a trade agreement will have a different impact.  For the Electoral 
Processes and Civil Society dimensions, CAFTA and similar agreements do not specify 
any statutory changes, but they do leave an impact as a phenomenon and policy issue for 
public debate.  For the Open and Accountable Institutions and Civil and Political 
Liberties dimensions, the agreements and side negotiations did include certain textual 
stipulations with an effect on these conditions.  In my case studies, I will recognize and 
distinguish between CAFTA as a policy itself and as a document with certain language.   
 
Electoral Processes 
• How effective a range of choice and information does the electoral and party 
system allow the voters?  In my analysis, I consider how the political parties dealt 
with the free trade issue. 
 
• What proportion of the electorate actually votes?  Did CAFTA influence voter 
participation or behavior at all? 
 
Open and Accountable Institutions 
• How systematic and open to public scrutiny are the procedures for government 
consultation of public opinion and of relevant interests in the formation and 
implementation of policy and legislation?  In terms of CAFTA, this question deals 
with how the government sought popular opinion on the trade agreement.  The 
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text of the accord also seeks to improve government openness through its 
procurement laws.   
 
• How accessible to the public is information about what the government does?  
This question is related as well to issues of corruption and institution building, in 
addition to the issues in the aforementioned index.   
 
In this case, I use the term “institutions” differently from general “democratic 
institutions.” Here, I refer to government agencies and organizations, rather than the 
traditions and dimensions of an entire democracy.  In this dimension, I will measure the 
quality of democracy using quantitative indicators, the laws passed by the national 
governments to implement the trade agreement, and individual case examples. 
 
Civil and Political Rights 
• How clearly does the law define the civil and political rights and liberties of the 
citizen, and how effectively are they defended?  The trade agreement and the 
accompanying capacity building projects intended to improve labor and 
environmental rights.  Given the significance of labor rights to the civil liberties 
of the citizenry, this question is one of the most important of the indices analyzed. 
 
• How well developed are voluntary associations for the advancement and 
monitoring of citizens’ rights, and how free from harassment are they? This 
question as well deals with the labor rights question, especially with regards to the 
rights to voluntary unionization and collective bargaining.   
 
• How effective are procedures for informing citizens of their rights, and for 
educating future citizens in the exercise of them? Certain recommendations of the 
White Paper included improvement of mechanisms to inform laborers of their 
rights. 
 
As I have noted earlier in this thesis, one of the strongest complaints against free trade is 
its tendency to disrupt domestic labor practices.  Because of the vital importance of labor 
rights to one’s personal civil liberties, especially in countries with poor records on labor 
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standards, I will narrow my investigation of civil and political rights to specifically how 
the trade agreement affected labor rights.  CAFTA language also more specifically dealt 
with this theme, so the evidence is more substantial and related to initiatives undertaken 
because of the agreement.  I can be more conclusive in my evaluation of civil liberties by 
adapting this dimension in this manner. 
 
Civil Society 
• How widespread is political participation in all its forms; how representative of 
different sections of society is it; and how far is it limited by social, economic or 
other factors? In this sense, this questions addresses which sectors of the 
population does that civil society represent, and how capable it is in advancing its 
cause.   While a trade agreement entails nothing about non-governmental 
organizations, many groups were involved in the ratification process and have 
flourished on account of CAFTA. 
 
• How far do the traditions and culture of society support the basic democratic 
principles of popular control and political equality?  In my analysis, I will not 
consider a transformation of traditions, which can be generational, but rather how 
the civil society approaches the democratic process itself.   
 
 
A potential problem with the Democratic Audit, however, is that Beetham intends 
for his it to be assessed for the United Kingdom.  He belies his earlier criticism of 
Schumpeter and his apologists, who also based their definitions of democracy on Western 
European states.  Can the Democratic Audit serve our purposes in considering four 
relatively nascent and fragile democracies in Central America?  I would argue that they 
do, using an assertion made by Beetham himself: while cross-national comparisons can 
be valuable, the context of each country is particular to that nation’s history and political 
system.  Differences in political institutions, for example, among countries do not mean 
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abandoning generalizable criteria.  “What matters is not that all should conform to a 
single model, but how far the distinctive arrangements of each can meet the democratic 
criteria, which have been specified in intentionally generalizable terms.”63    
Beetham concludes that similarities in context do of course allow for a better 
cross-national assessment.  For this reason, an evaluation of Central American countries 
is especially appropriate for the Democratic Audit because of their common historical 
and political experiences.  The Democratic Audit will be the standard through which we 
will judge the political effects of CAFTA on the Central American signatories.  Because 
of the clear linkages discussed between democracy and market capitalism, it is possible to 
study the means by which an initiative to develop the latter will also develop the former.  
In the next chapter, I will test my methodology by employing Democratic Audit to 
analyze how NAFTA has affected Mexico. This successful use of the Audit will 
demonstrate its legitimacy as a tool to study CAFTA and the two selected case studies, El 
Salvador and Costa Rica.  Using primary research and data analysis, we will see how the 
trade agreement has affected any number of the specified Audit indices in addition to 
entire dimension themselves. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Mexico and NAFTA: A Test of the Democratic Audit 
The four dimensions of the Democratic Audit – the electoral process, open and 
accountable institutions, civil and political liberties, and an active civil society – can 
serve as qualitative indicators of the state and health of a democracy.  They also can be 
used to gauge changes generated by external forces, a free trade agreement for instance.  I 
argue that trade agreements can have such a positive effect on the political system.  In 
order to reinforce this hypothesis and apply the reviewed theoretical literature, I will 
demonstrate how the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has affected 
Mexico, namely by strengthening its democratic institutions.  This will act as a test of the 
methodology and show that it works to review the link between similar free trade accords, 
like CAFTA, and domestic politics.  The consequences of NAFTA have been well 
investigated, and although certain aspects of the Mexican example distinguish it from the 
Central American cases, this example can provide a standard to create and test my 
methodology.  The similarities in the two agreements and in their circumstances prove 
the validity of this test.  From the conclusions I draw from studying NAFTA, I can more 
adequately apply the methods to the Central American countries, El Salvador and Costa 
Rica, I have selected using the Democratic Audit. 
 NAFTA is particularly relevant, as it was the first trade agreement of its kind that 
the United States signed with a major trading partner in the developing world.  While a 
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preponderance of its content dealt strictly with trade, it still nonetheless established a new 
definition of economic integration, and even transforming the entire notion of national 
sovereignty.1  Because NAFTA and the events and dialogue that accompany it 
encompass issues of labor, government services, the environment and social restructuring 
besides economic integration, George Grayson called NAFTA a turning point in 
international treaties.   “...[T]he NAFTA agreement broke the mold of international trade 
discussions and guaranteed that any future negotiations would be viewed and reviewed 
by an increasing broad array of social actors.”2  This wide range of voices will become 
crucial in the negotiations and implementations of CAFTA a decade later.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, NAFTA served as a template from which to base the 
CAFTA negotiations.  Much like CAFTA, the text of NAFTA itself ranges from 
language governing the phasing out of tariffs on agricultural and manufacturing goods to 
provisions on financial services.  Over the first ten years, most import tariffs were 
eliminated, and the average Mexican tariff fell from 12.0 percent in 1994 to 1.3 percent in 
2001.3  The law also permitted the U.S. and Canada to access Mexico’s financial services 
market.  Particular to government and institutional reform, the accord equalizes 
government procurement procedures, improves intellectual property laws, and creates 
compatible health and industrial standards.  Finally, the law creates a dispute arbitration 
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mechanism to resolve investment and business conflicts.4  These sections are particularly 
important in testing the institutional rule of law variable given in measuring the trade 
agreement’s political effects.   Notice the similarities between this content and the 
language of CAFTA described in Chapter 1; these parallels facilitate a comparison of 
NAFTA and CAFTA and the use of the same methodological procedures for both.  
Grayson has called the relationship between economic growth and political 
democracy a “leitmotif of NAFTA – specifically the belief that trade-impelled perestroika 
would stimulate a glasnost in a political system long characterized by authoritarianism 
and manipulation”5 (emphasis added).   The evidence of this relationship can be observed 
in the process of democratization that did occur after NAFTA’s implementation.  The 
NAFTA case is imperative to the rest of this thesis as it provides a clear instance in which 
a trade agreement had an influence on politics in that country.  Following NAFTA as a 
prototype, the content of CAFTA includes comparable sections to integrate trade between 
the United States and Central America.  Therefore, reviewing NAFTA and Mexico can 
provide a significant background to my evaluation of CAFTA.  The successful 
application of the Democratic Audit to an analysis of the effects of NAFTA on Mexico 
offers a structural framework from which a similar analysis can be conducted using 
CAFTA and El Salvador and Costa Rica.   
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The Roots of NAFTA  
 The history of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) regime in Mexico 
consists of oscillations between economic nationalism and globalization.  Much like their 
peers throughout Latin America, the PRI governments in the mid-20th Century sustained 
a model of import-substitution industrialization that limited foreign influences.  
Restrictions on foreign direct investment blocked mainly U.S. corporations. 6 
 The inward, state-directed economic model helped consolidate the PRI’s 
authoritarian reign.  Corporatism assured that the PRI could manage and circumscribe 
social and economic sectors to consolidate the authority of the presidency.7  
“Mexicanization” of enterprise gave the state a hand in directing industry through public 
investment and ownership.8   This historical involvement of the state in the Mexican 
economy is significant to this analysis; the economic decentralization and openness 
engendered by free trade under NAFTA helped lead to the growth of political pluralism 
and democratization that the country subsequently experienced.   
 Mexico’s “miracle” growth under import-substitution did not last forever, and by 
the mid-1970’s, it became evident that the domestic production of goods that were 
available for better quality from abroad was relatively inefficient.  In 1982, the economy 
collapsed as a consequence of falling oil prices, high interest rates and a monumental 
current account deficit.9  Under President Miguel de la Madrid, Mexico initiated an 
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austerity program that highlighted privatization of publicly owned corporations.  He also 
spearheaded the country’s entry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
in 1986, a first step to liberalizing the economy.10  
 De la Madrid’s handpicked successor, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, arrived in office 
amid accusations of rampant electoral fraud.  The alleged illegitimacy of the 1988 
election became a rallying cry among civil society later for greater political change in 
Mexico as NAFTA was under debate and then again after it came into effect.  Despite 
lacking a solid mandate, Salinas embarked on a bold economic project to build on de la 
Madrid’s initial reforms, which garnered him more popular support personally than his 
party enjoyed.11   Salinas promoted a package that consisted of constraining the state’s 
role in the economy and promoting greater competition through privatization and 
liberalization. Initiatives under de la Madrid and Salinas led to the privatization of more 
than 900 state-run companies, and Salinas spearheaded a constitutional reform that 
allowed for greater private ownership of the ejido land plots, one of his most significant 
domestic economic achievements.12 
 Free trade was his most substantial goal: “President Salinas himself formulated 
much of his domestic agenda around the concept of NAFTA and its ultimate approval.”13  
Salinas accelerated his predecessor’s trade liberalization project by eliminating almost all 
import permits, which were used to protect domestic industries and sustain the import-
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substitution model.  Trade liberalization reduced the burden of importing manufactured 
goods at high prices and lowered costs throughout the economy.  Noted scholar of 
Mexico Sidney Weintraub interprets Salinas’s action as a means to “…create a whole 
new set of vested interests in the new policy,” purportedly a coalition that would 
eventually support a full-fledged trade agreement.14  Recognizing the importance of 
foreign capital to fund Mexican recovery, Salinas lifted the tariffs in part to allay 
concerns in the U.S. government and the American financial sector of Mexico’s 
stability.15  From 1988, Salina’s election, to 1994, the year NAFTA came into force, 
foreign investment in Mexico increased by 350.1 percent.16   
 Salinas managed to insert free trade, already a goal for the Americans, as a topic 
in his negotiations with the U.S. on Mexican debt reduction.17  President George H.W. 
Bush, with whom Salinas had fostered a close relationship, committed himself to 
realizing a trade agreement with Mexico and Canada in 1991.  In order to sell the plan to 
the Mexican electorate, Salinas made “new nationalism” the hallmark of his 
administration, in which he preserved the spirit of Mexican nationalism that buttressed 
the old PRI economic model while dramatically shifting its characteristics.   Because 
privatization and trade liberalization were key objectives for the nation, they qualified as 
“nationalistic.”18  The issue of national sovereignty still remained central to Salinas’s 
plan, as, in his eyes, not taking part in the rising global economy meant stagnation and 
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weakness, effectively a loss of sovereignty.19  By couching his project in the language of 
national interest, Salinas managed to gain Mexican popular support behind NAFTA and 
also to render free trade as a plank of the PRI platform.   
 The approval of NAFTA sought to nourish the progress of trade agreements 
across Latin America.  Chile, for example, expressed interest in joining NAFTA as means 
to expand its own export market, thus expanding the geographic range of integration 
beyond simply North America.20 President George H.W. Bush considered NAFTA the 
first step in the process of creating the Free Trade Area of the Americas.  A decade later, 
George W. Bush, in championing free trade with CAFTA, also saw this agreement as 
another step in establishing the FTAA.  
 Opening up trade with the U.S. and Canada, however, certainly would expose 
Mexico to political changes.  Although Salinas carefully considered that pushing NAFTA 
through would generate more popular support for the PRI government, outside analysts 
already made predictions that the days of the closed, authoritarian regime were numbered.  
Writing in 1993, Weintraub declared, “I am convinced that Mexico’s economic opening, 
including the establishment of free trade in North America, will stimulate political 
opening.”21  Even though Salinas had overcome the anti-PRI sentiment that arose after 
his fraudulent election and regained public confidence through his NAFTA campaign, 
Weintraub says that the external pressure for democracy would compel greater political 
openness. 
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 Of course, not everyone was so sure of this outcome; at the same time, Poitras and 
Robinson affirmed that Mexico achieved liberalizing trade “…without allowing that 
degree of political change and become so fluid that the state would be unable to use its 
impressive levers for managing the economic transition.”22  These authors still regarded 
the NAFTA negotiations as a turning point in the PRI system by creating a new coalition 
to maintain presidential power – sidelining the more populist trade unions in favor of 
neoliberal elite business interests.23 In the long run, though, they do suggest that 
“economic liberalization could create independent centers of power that a weakened, 
fragmented (and not just smaller) state would find harder to control,” although they 
remain skeptical that the PRI would relinquish any of its authoritarian control. 
  In the end though, Weintraub was proven correct; as I shall explain, economic 
liberalization rendered many unintended consequences for the PRI government that 
eventually opened the system up to new criticism, both domestic and foreign.   The U.S. 
media and the Zapatista uprising, both compelled by the NAFTA debate, played a special 
role in influencing the Mexican system. Confidence in Salinas did not translate into 
renewed popular support for his political party, even after his successor, Ernesto Zedillo, 
won the 1994 election, and the PRI was forced to adopt new political rules.   In the 
Mexican system, increased economic competition gave rise to political pluralism.   
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The Effects of NAFTA on Mexican Democratization 
 Almost immediately, NAFTA had an impact on the Mexican political process.  
The Salinas government had to establish certain institutional reforms as a condition of the 
trade agreement and in response to the criticism to which Mexico was subjected by 
attaining greater integration with the U.S.  In this way it reacted both to NAFTA’s 
language and to its nature itself as a transformational policy.  Concerns over NAFTA’s 
economic and social consequences strengthened Mexican civil society, shown above all 
in the uprising of the Zapatista movement in Chiapas.  Government responses in 
particular to Zapatista demands had a pluralizing effect on democracy.  This highlights 
the indirect role that NAFTA as a phenomenon, by triggering the EZLN revolt, had on 
Mexican politics.  Such unexpected civil society consequences will furthermore become a 
variable considered in the Central American cases after CAFTA.  The evidence of all 
these factors’ effect on CAFTA can be evaluated through the lens of the Democratic 
Audit. 
 Grayson has enumerated six distinct ways that NAFTA has contributed to 
political openness in Mexico.  NAFTA has: 1) increased the size of the middle class, 2) 
increased demand for electoral competition, 3) decreased political authoritarianism, 4) 
decentralized the economy from state control, 5) weakened the power of corporatist trade 
unions, and 6) eroded the culture of bribery and corruption.24  His observations fit within 
the categories laid out by the Democratic Audit as well –specifically, the dimensions of 
electoral processes (number 2), open and accountable institutions (numbers 4 and 6), 
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political and civil liberties (number 3), and civil society (number 5).  This 
characterization helps frame the use of the Democratic Audit as a tool.  In a number of 
ways, often indirectly, NAFTA shaped the political process in Mexico and helped in 
some part contribute to that country’s democratization. 
 
Economic Performance 
  In order to analyze the political effects of trade, by definition an indirect 
consequence of economic liberalization, one must first consider its actual economic 
effects.  In the later studies of CAFTA and Central American countries, the economic 
performance will also be considered for contextual purposes.  The effects of trade on 
output, wages, standards of living and income distribution are significant as these 
variables result in real benefits or challenges to a population.  How a country’s people 
responds to economic changes is key in determining how they will react in the political 
process. 
 The economic growth promised by NAFTA proponents took a few years to begin 
on account of two major factors that coincided with the accord’s implementation.25  
Immediately after NAFTA came into effect on January 1, 1994, the Zapatista guerrilla 
movement took up arms against the government, leading to fears that political instability 
would stymie foreign investment. The peso’s crash later that year also triggered a severe 
banking crisis and recession, which, due to the strengthened relationship between Mexico 
and the U.S. resulting from NAFTA, prompted Washington to authorize a rescue loan 
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package to its trade partner.  By 1996, however, the Mexican economy was in recovery.  
Using econometric analysis, Lederman et al. determined that, excepting 1995, NAFTA 
significantly increased Mexico’s economic growth.  Furthermore, Mexico’s GDP per 
capita in 2002 would have been 4 percent lower without the agreement.26 
 Since NAFTA, trade as a proportion of Mexican GDP has skyrocketed from an 
average of 37.0 percent in the period from 1986-1993 to 75.7 percent from 1994-2001.  
Foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP has also tripled over the two periods.27  
Lederman et al. also compare two different estimations of the Gini coefficient (a measure 
of income inequality) for Mexico and conclude that overall levels of inequality have 
decreased since NAFTA has been in effect.28  While the authors do not attribute any 
portion of this change to the trade agreement itself, the case can be made that the larger 
economic and social conditions in Mexico under which NAFTA operates has 
redistributed wealth.   
 After the peso crash, employment and real wages in Mexico dropped significantly, 
but these numbers recovered quickly thereafter.  Between 1993 and 2003, the percentage 
of working-age Mexicans employed increased from 84 to almost 98 percent.29  Many of 
these jobs were created out of the trade and investment induced by NAFTA.   Mexican 
firms also that have received foreign investment or export products to the U.S. also tend 
to pay their workers higher wages than their counterparts that have not taken advantage 
of the trade agreement.  Real wages for the maquiladora and non-maquiladora 
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manufacturing sectors fell initially because of the “tequila crisis,” but they have returned 
to nearly their 1994 levels.30  Because of the crisis, one cannot implicate NAFTA in the 
decline in wages; actually, one could argue that the rebound took place faster because of 
investment and trade stimulated by NAFTA helped revive businesses.  Nonetheless, the 
fact that real wages have failed to actually improve since NAFTA calls into question if 
Mexico has experienced increases in standards of living.31   
 Disparities in trade that NAFTA did not fix, however, have manifested 
themselves in some ways to the detriment of Mexican workers.  U.S. agricultural 
subsidies, for example, kept prices of sensitive commodities such as corn artificially 
lower than domestic Mexican corn, a staple product in that country’s diet.  Influxes of 
cheaper American corn to Mexico may have benefited consumers in that country, but it 
impaired the livelihoods of farmers who could not sell their corn on the market.  Between 
1993 and 2003, the percentage of Mexican laborers employed in the agricultural sector 
fell from 26 to 16 percent, but not all of those workers who left their original occupation 
managed to find another one.32  Dumping corn exports cost Mexican farmers US$6.6 
billion alone, or US$38 a ton.33   This has forced more than a million farmers off of their 
land in Mexico in search of a more lucrative job, sometimes in the U.S.  In this way, 
NAFTA has contributed to illegal immigration from Mexico in the U.S.  
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 These economic changes construct the milieu in which further discussion of 
NAFTA will be made.  Mexico has significantly opened itself up to international 
influence because of the amount of commercial interests involved in the country.  Any 
change in income and wages regardless of the direction of its shift – has had an effect on 
Mexican voters’ pocketbooks and livelihoods.  Given that income levels are a factor in 
voter preferences,34 it then seems reasonable to suggest that NAFTA would have an 
impact on one’s political attitudes and decisions.   
 
Electoral Processes: the 1994 Zedillo Election 
 The first dimension considered in the Democratic Audit is Electoral Processes.  In 
the Mexican case, the first presidential contest held after implementation of NAFTA 
demonstrates a crucial example in which the trade agreement influenced the democratic 
institution of elections. A movement toward democracy had already started after 
Salinas’s election in 1988, but reforms made after NAFTA accelerated this process.  That 
year, when the opposition candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas may have either actually won 
a majority of the vote or lost to Salinas by a much narrower margin than officially 
declared, showcased a “new democratic culture based on the popular vote.”35  
Constitutional changes in 1990 and 1994 created the Federal Electoral Institute and the 
Federal Electoral Tribunal to organize, monitor and adjudicate elections.  These 
institutions helped improve citizen confidence in the electoral system.36  
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 U.S. criticism of the Mexican government also motivated Salinas to enact his 
constitutional changes.  Sensitive to business groups concerned about investing in a 
potentially unstable state and to other lobbies alarmed that the U.S. would deepen trade 
relations with an authoritarian regime, the U.S. Congress paid close attention to the 
political process in Mexico during and after the NAFTA debate.  In particular, Salinas 
responded out of pressure from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to push his 
electoral agenda.37 
 An array of external circumstances rendered 1994 election one of the most 
noteworthy in Mexican history.  Of these explanations, two of them can be directly 
ascribed to NAFTA. The January 1st Zapatista uprising, induced by the implementation of 
NAFTA, sparked widespread fear among the population about political instability, even 
as many Mexicans sympathized with the Zapatista calls for political accountability.38  
Meanwhile, the assassination of the original PRI candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, 
pushed the Mexican electorate further toward supporting stability, represented by the 
ruling party.  Finally, expectations of economic development borne out through NAFTA, 
a fundamental rationale when Salinas has promoted the agreement, meant that many 
voters were afraid that a president from an opposition party would undermine reform.39    
 After hastily scrambling to select a candidate, Salinas chose Ernesto Zedillo, a 
minister in Salinas’s cabinet.  Zedillo promised a program to build on the achievements 
of economic liberalization while ensuring that its benefits trickled down throughout 
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society.40  In his eventual victory, he captured 50 percent of the vote, a noticeably tiny 
margin for a PRI candidate but one achieved through credible means.  The August 
election highlighted the ability of the PRI to reinvent itself under extraordinary 
circumstances as a legitimate party that would ensure stability and continuity.41  The first 
presidential election after Salinas’s electoral reforms, it was considered the cleanest and 
fairest in decades because of the presence of observers at polling booths, the monitoring 
by the Federal Election Institute, and the quick vote count.  “These innovations 
contributed to imbue the electoral process with an unprecedented degree of credibility.”42  
Certain systemic circumstances did favor the PRI’s victory: the party spent an exorbitant 
amount of money on its campaign and commanded significantly greater domestic media 
attention than did the opposition parties.43  Yet the incredibly high turnout, especially 
among rural and first-time voters, meant that more Mexicans were exposed to democracy.  
Even if they voted for the PRI, their introduction to the political process “…provided a 
base for future opposition growth.”44   
 However, as Dresser points out, “clean elections are a necessary condition for 
democracy but they are not sufficient.  Mexico must confront other structural issues.”45  
For this reason, the electoral process is only one dimension among all the political 
indicators considered in this Democratic Audit.  Nonetheless, it is clear that NAFTA as a 
policy itself contributed to a cleaner election by attracting external attention.  The 
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criticism of the PRI’s reign in U.S. media during the NAFTA debate led to its intense 
scrutiny of the 1994 vote, and the U.S. also dispatched official observers to examine the 
procedures at the ballot box on Election Day.  These factors helped grant credibility to 
Zedillo’s narrow victory.  In both instances, it is highly unlikely that the U.S. would have 
paid such close attention to the election had the trade agreement not been in place.  Camp 
alleges that this active interest is connected in part to the NAFTA proceedings.46  By 
emphasizing electoral authenticity and a more legitimate democratic process, the U.S. did 
risk involving itself more in Mexico’s political arena.47  Economic integration through 
NAFTA thus tied the countries together politically as well.   Because it entailed greater 
legitimacy in the election effort, NAFTA had a positive effect on the electoral processes 
in Mexico.  It is important to remember that the policy issue, not its stipulations per se, 
rendered this effect; this same phenomenon will be shown in the Salvadoran and Costa 
Rican cases. 
 
Open and Accountable Institutions 
 The Democratic Audit also includes changes in the institutions and rule of law in 
a country after implementing the trade agreement.   Liberalization of the economy 
through NAFTA generated greater liberalization in the authoritarian PRI regime.  Many 
of the reforms to institutions established by Zedillo after he entered office came as a 
result of the language of NAFTA or promises he made in the election.  PRI dominance in 
government institutions meant that no separate actor, either an opposition party or 
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external organization, could moderate its influence.  New commercial regulations could 
conceivably enforce the rule of law, decreasing corruption and improving government 
transparency. 
Prior to NAFTA, significant and comprehensive private property ownership rights 
were absent from the Mexican constitution, specifically articles 25-28.   The trade 
agreement includes concrete reforms in the state regulatory system by forming a more 
formal legal structure for trade, including mechanisms for dispute settlement.  In addition, 
intellectual property provisions were added to mitigate issues of piracy in the services 
markets.48  Similar legal conditions are also present in the CAFTA language.   
In his presidential campaign, Zedillo placed an emphasis on developing a culture of laws 
to sustain economic activities, probably a result of NAFTA-related investment.  After his 
election, Zedillo kept many of his promises, and he made government accountability a 
central precept of his administration by pledging to reform the judiciary and to reign in 
corruption.49  Within the context of a public longing for peace and stability, he managed 
to unite all political actors behind his democratic project.50  His intent to decentralize 
authority seemed to reflect the larger economic decentralization experienced because of 
NAFTA.   Zedillo introduced a significant shift to the Mexican political process that 
advanced democracy.  According to Camp, Zedillo’s decentralization program consisted 
of the following: implementing a PRI primary instead of handpicking political successors, 
granting state governors greater autonomy, splitting the party apparatus from the state, 
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and strengthening institutional checks and balances.51  These projects decimated the 
structural advantages that the PRI had enjoyed for decades.  Camp argues, “there is no 
question that he paved the way for Fox’s electoral victory [which ended the 71-year PRI 
hegemony in 2000] by changing the Mexican presidency’s substance and tone.”52  
 How much of Zedillo’s reforms can be attributed to NAFTA?  As will be 
discussed next, the trade agreement mandated certain institutional reforms both explicitly 
in the text and implicitly by opening up Mexico to foreign investors and their concerns.  
Above all, NAFTA provided a context within which Zedillo managed to stimulate 
democratic reform.  Freer trade meant a freer exchange of ideas, and Zedillo had to 
respond to the pressure already felt by his predecessor to alter the governmental structure.  
The state had already lost much of its authority through privatization and liberalization, 
and political decentralization naturally followed economic decentralization. 
 The new tools instituted through the agreement notwithstanding, NAFTA may not 
have actually had a significant impact on institutional performance in Mexico.  Lederman 
et al. used a factor-analysis comparing levels of corruption, law and order, and 
bureaucratic quality in Mexico to those in similar Latin American countries.  They found 
that although these variables did improve in Mexico after 1994, the institutional 
improvement was not statistically significant, as other countries not party to NAFTA saw 
similar levels of improvement.  “Thus NAFTA alone is unlikely to contribute to the 
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institutional development of Mexico outside the specific areas covered by the 
agreement.”53   
 While these data are striking, as they challenge the hypothesis that NAFTA would 
improve political institutions, they also show the limitations of quantitative analysis to 
judge a particularly qualitative problem – effects on the political process.  Although 
statistics on corruption and rule of law will be used in the CAFTA analyses, their 
correlation to the trade agreement will not be considered because of the inherent 
difficulty in determining causation.  Instead, they will be used as the measures of 
economic and financial climate within which political changes, perhaps compelled by 
CAFTA, operated.54  This problem recalls the challenge of measuring indirect versus 
direct consequences of free trade.  While NAFTA may not have directly caused 
institutional reform (a measurable quantity), its content or – more importantly – the 
politics in approving it and maintaining U.S. investment after integration has occurred is 
something that must be considered qualitatively, through analysis of events rather than 
figures.  Lederman, Maloney and Servén recommend that the Mexican government 
pursue policies to combat corruption and improve institutions.55  In actuality, NAFTA has 
indirectly contributed to these phenomena.  For example, the increase foreign direct 
investment and foreign commercial operations led to demands within the U.S. business 
community for greater transparency in Mexico.  While no measurable decreases in 
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corruption can be attributed to these demands, they did set a tone within the private sector 
to improve contract enforcement.56  In fact, pursuant to the trade agreement, Mexico had 
to amend and strengthen 21 economic and financial laws.57   
 Foreign complaints about obstacles to economic information led President Fox to 
pass the 2003 Transparency Law; these objections from business-owners can be traced all 
the way back to NAFTA’s implementation and peso devaluation later that year.58  These 
events highlight the role that NAFTA played in creating demand for a better regulatory 
state.  The investment climate stimulated by NAFTA did contribute in part to improving 
institutions and the rule of law. 
This brief analysis of Mexican institutions demonstrates that NAFTA had a 
positive effect on government institutions as both a policy and as a document that 
mandated institutional reform.  As Zedillo may have initiated many reforms in reaction to 
provisions of the agreement or to external factors, it is unclear that the extent to which 
NAFTA affected their process of transformation.  Still, a creation of a better regulatory 
framework has allowed commerce and, likewise, pluralism to flourish. 
 
Civil and Political Liberties 
 As noted in the previous chapter, the Democratic Audit dimension of Civil and 
Political Liberties has been adapted to focus specifically on labor rights, due to the 
constraints inherent in selecting a free trade agreement as a catalyst for democratization.  
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The issue of labor standards in Mexico after NAFTA could be the subject of an 
exhaustive investigation; what follows is only a cursory review through which we can 
still glean fundamental points about the implementation of the agreement’s labor 
language.  In both NAFTA and CAFTA, the issue of labor rights protracted the treaty 
negotiation, and certain provisions were drawn up to help protect workers possibly 
displaced or taken advantage of as a consequence of trade liberalization.  The 
effectiveness of this language will be the core of this section and its counterparts to 
follow. 
NAFTA’s text itself only made general references to labor rights.  During 
negotiations, though, the parties decided to open an ancillary consultative session to 
discuss a side deal on labor rights to pacify trade unions and non-governmental 
organizations.   Once signed, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
(NAALC) would be administered by the standing Commission for Labor Cooperation.  
Unlike the regulations set up by CAFTA, the labor side agreement did not develop any 
punitive measures for labor violations, such as the imposition of fines or trade sanctions.  
The NAALC does not enforce the labor laws; rather, it provides a forum for discussion 
and international evaluation of adherence to domestic labor laws.59  
 In the years since NAFTA’s implementation, Mexican performance on labor laws 
and standards has not improved as much as was hoped.  In terms of the employment data 
discussed I the section on economic results, Hufbauer, Schott and Orejas have alleged 
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that “NAFTA has had mainly a positive effect on the Mexican labor ledger.”60   Yet 
actual labor laws and standards have not experienced the same heartening successes as 
the socio-economic indicators.  While Mexico’s constitutional and criminal code tends to 
have strong labor standards, enforcement of these laws is incredibly lax.  Since NAFTA 
did not help support any programs to monitor labor laws, the agreement could not 
possibly serve to amend this structural challenge.  Child labor has not significantly 
dropped, and the budget for the Secretary of Labor and Welfare has not substantially 
increased.61  Employment in the maquiladoras, whose dangerous labor conditions are 
notorious, has certainly increased, and while they may pay slightly increased wages, there 
is little evidence that their conditions have improved. 
An assessment of the NAALC in 1997 demonstrated that although the institution 
seemed strong, it was relatively untested, as few cases had been brought before it.  
Because of its limited scope and tools at its disposal, the NAALC has demonstrated little 
impact on the labor situation in Mexico.62  In addition, arbitrating alleged violations to 
the side agreement through NAFTA’s dispute mechanism is futile as, “there are no 
common standards, administrative barriers create serious difficulties, and potential 
remedies are weak.”63  Without a strong framework or independent oversight body, the 
NAALC lacks the authority to police labor abuses, and so far parties to the agreement 
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have been reluctant to use it.  A study by Human Rights Watch showed that by 2001 the 
NAALC had handled twenty-three petitions that either the Canadian, American or 
Mexican governments had violated some aspect of the NAFTA side agreement.  Without 
any oversight though, the offending governments have rarely addressed these challenges 
through mediation or actual policy procedures.64 
 In terms of organized labor, the power to unionize has expanded since NAFTA, 
but not necessarily because of the trade agreement’s provisions.  Instead, incidents 
relating to the fragmentation of the PRI’s consolidation on power had more to do with the 
ability of independent unions to develop, while the “official” corporatist union lost 
members – one of Grayson’s conclusions about NAFTA’s political effects.  A 2001 
Supreme Court ruling, though declaring mandatory union membership unconstitutional 
surely accelerated the decline in membership.65  NAFTA, though, has forged some cross-
national ties that have helped strengthen workers organizations.  Under NAFTA, 
American unions can file complaints against Mexican enterprises for violating labor 
contracts, and vice versa.66  This gives a formal, legal means for foreign non-
governmental organizations to get involved in the political process in Mexico and thus 
has exposed the country to greater criticism – much like the informal but still influential 
U.S. media had done during Zedillo’s election.  
 The underwhelming performance of labor standards obligates me to declare that 
NAFTA has had a neutral effect on Civil and Political Liberties in Mexico.  It is 
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important to recall that the labor language composed during the NAFTA negotiations was 
executed through a side agreement, which did not have the same force of law as the trade 
agreement itself.  In this way, NAFTA’s labor provisions are far weaker than those in 
CAFTA, which are embedded in the actual content.  Future treaty negotiations to 
improve NAFTA could include additional content on labor rights.  Gallagher and Wise 
recommend that such language would require signatories to consent to the International 
Labor Organization’s core labor standards, set up greater enforcement mechanisms, and 
increase the funding of the NAALC.67  Note that the first two recommendations actually 
form the basis of the labor provisions in the CAFTA accords. 
 
Civil Society and the EZLN 
 An active civil society is a key condition to the success of a democracy.  Because 
civil society groups give voice to popular attitudes and beliefs, their participation in 
politics serves to democratize the debate.  In fact, one of the most significant 
consequences of NAFTA has been to ignite grassroots movements to shape the political 
process.  While the civil society consequences of the trade agreement were not 
considered in its negotiation, they nonetheless mattered in the political process.  By 
integrating Mexico with the United States and Canada, NAFTA became the first free 
trade accord that exposed a country without a well-developed civil society to two 
countries with such conditions.68   This could have consequences ranging from inspiring 
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new social movements to even, as Robey suggests, changing the social family culture.69  
Ultimately, NAFTA contributed to the rise of a variety of non-governmental actors, 
which together managed to achieve a democratic opening within the government and 
greater political pluralism within society.    
 Above all, the uprising of the Zapatistas (EZLN, Zapatista National Liberation 
Army) in southern Mexico demonstrates the way that NAFTA has influenced civil 
society.   On January 1, 1994, the day that NAFTA came into effect, a group of rebels 
suddenly seized control of three towns in Chiapas before retreating into the jungle.  
Taking advantage of the international press they received, the insurgents announced their 
resistance to the trade agreement, which they believed would unleash additional hardship 
and misery on the indigenous populations of Mexico.70  The Zapatistas called for 
democracy beyond the procedural level, the status quo favoring the PRI that constrained 
full electoral participation by the Mexican population.71  They demanded rights for 
participation across all areas of social, economic and political life.   
 Salinas first responded to the Zapatista uprising by deploying the military, and 
within a week, over 145 people had been killed in skirmishes with the rebels.  The 
popular outcry against state oppression forced Salinas to consider more pacific tactics, 
and after reorganizing his cabinet, he called a truce and initiated negotiations with the 
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rebels.72  This response shows his obligations to responding to the popular will, a 
hallmark of a democracy.  Accepting an EZLN demand, Salinas presented some electoral 
reforms, the first sign that the social movement had had an effect on politics in Mexico.   
His project consisted of prohibiting the use of government funds in campaigns and 
imposing spending limits, establishing an office to prosecute electoral fraud, guaranteeing 
equal attention to political parties by the Mexican media, and recognizing the role of 
foreign election observers in the upcoming vote.73  These rules were intended to 
circumscribe techniques by which the PRI had historically managed to win elections.  
Salinas could also undercut popular sympathy for the Zapatistas by guaranteeing a more 
peaceful and credible election procedure.74  By refusing to launch a military assault on 
the Zapatistas and by directing these democratic changes, Salinas sought to surmount 
accusations of authoritarianism that dogged the Mexican government during the NAFTA 
debate and to ingratiate himself further with the U.S.75 In this way, the trade agreement 
indirectly affected the Mexican political process.  As a policy it propelled the Zapatista 
insurrection that prompted this policy overhaul, and opened the door to U.S. criticism of 
the PRI regime, which then influenced the Mexican political landscape.   
 Peace negotiations disintegrated as the federal elections neared, but a military 
sting against EZLN leadership after Zedillo took office reactivated the mediation process, 
culminating in the 1996 San Andrés Accords.  Although the armed forces agreed to limit 
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their presence in Chiapas, their offensive still sparked battles against the guerrillas.76  
Testimony later revealed widespread human rights abuses on the part of the military in its 
assault, and the manner in which Salinas and Zedillo handled the Chiapas crisis divided 
the Mexican citizenry.  While many criticized the military’s repression of the rebellion, 
others recognized the threat to the nascent democracy that an anti-democratic guerrilla 
movement could have,77 especially one whose motto was “rule by obeying.”     
 Interestingly, the EZLN movement triggered some level of pluralism within the 
government as well as throughout the Mexican society.  Before the uprising, many 
analysts had warned the Mexican military that, in the case of a domestic political 
disturbance, its strategy could incite accusations of human rights violations.  According 
to Camp, as a result of the Zapatista rebellion, the military began to invite members of the 
opposition party PAN to lecture at the War College, a first for an institution that had 
shunned alternate opinions and viewpoints.  This new perspective gave legitimacy within 
the military for the PAN and shifted attitudes to become more accepting of pluralism and 
alternatives.78 
 The EZLN may have contributed to expanded partisanship in Mexico.  Although 
opposition parties like the PAN and the PRD had started to command greater legitimacy 
and authority after the 1988 election, the Zapatista rebellion forced them to cooperate 
                                                           
76
 Chris Gilbreth and Gerardo Otero, “Democratization in Mexico: The Zapatista Uprising and 
Civil Society,” Latin American Perspectives 28, no. 4 (2001), 15.  
77
 Hernández Chávez, 330.   
78
 Camp, interview with author.  
86 
 
 
 
with the PRI.  Unlike in the past, however, such cooperation meant actually contributing 
to the political debate, rather than being co-opted and shut out by the institutional party.79    
 Most importantly, the Zapatistas inspired sympathetic political movements that 
sought to exert power through both violent and non-violent means.  First, civil society 
groups mobilized immediately after the EZLN emerged in Chiapas to protest the 
military’s repression of the guerrilla group and to answer the Zapatista call to advocate 
for human rights.80 In 1996, the People’s Revolutionary Army (EPR) emerged in a small 
village in Guerrero and proceeded to attack towns across the region of southern Mexico 
before President Zedillo deployed the Mexican military to defeat them.   Although they 
announced a unilateral ceasefire and today pose little threat to the Mexican state, the EPR 
still represented a violent social movement in opposition to the economic priorities of the 
government.81  In addition, “neo-Zapatista” networks have sought to challenge the 
institutional authority of the state and compel democratization, even after Zedillo initiated 
his electoral reforms.  Many grassroots organizations inspired by the EZLN have 
participated in the political process by monitoring local elections, and in 1999, they 
united to propose and promote a referendum on indigenous rights.82  The process by 
which they organized communities behind their referendum “…demonstrated the 
EZLN’s capacity for political mobilization and embodied a networked popular education 
campaign.”83  After Vicente Fox won the 2000 election, these groups remained in the 
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political sphere by advocating for an additional extension of civil rights to 
underrepresented indigenous communities.84  
 Solidarity with the Zapatistas spread throughout the world once the guerrillas 
began to disseminate their political communiqués through the media and the Internet.   
Several world leaders announced their support of the indigenous movement, and 
networks of human rights groups abroad protested in front of Mexican consulates or 
advocated for their governments to press Mexico to comply with the San Andrés 
Accords.85  This attention from abroad further pressured the Zedillo administration.   
 This strong evidence allows us to call, perhaps ironically, the effects of NAFTA 
on the civil society dimension positive. All of these civil society groups in one way or 
another are responding to the social and economic changes instigated by neoliberalism 
and NAFTA.   Their demands for justice go beyond a rejection of free trade; however, 
they reject the authoritarian structure of power that provided the PRI with its sustained 
rule and that shut out other opposition voices.  These civil society organizations’ 
emergence expresses the concept of democratization from below, complementing the 
institutional reforms made for the same ends.    
 The results of NAFTA for civil society are one of the strongest indicators that the 
trade agreement affected the Mexican political process.  The treaty emblemized a 
political ideology that aroused marginalized voices.  After CAFTA we will see similar 
reactions, perhaps less violent, but still formidable to oppose market capitalism.  It may 
seem counter-intuitive that the rise of anti-NAFTA forces indicates how NAFTA helped 
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bring democracy to Mexico, but the civil society that opened up evolved to become a key 
actor in the process.  Just as NAFTA provoked the Zapatistas, it led to the rise of more 
non-violent social movements that sought to promote greater political participation, a key 
element of democracy.86  Gilbreth and Otero argue that “the social movement sent in 
motion by the Zapatista uprising has been a driving force in Mexico’s democratization, 
even more significant than opposition parties … [it] has encouraged higher levels of 
political activity and inspired a deepening of the democratic debate.”87  The Zapatistas 
mobilized groups of people to become active in Mexico politics and demand for 
democracy, but once they achieved reforms, they did not retreat.  Instead, these civil 
society organizations continue to advocate on behalf of citizen rights, especially as 
globalization spawn by free trade erodes the structures of power and authority.  In that 
way, they have helped foster and protect democracy in Mexico even more. 
   
Caveats with the Mexico Case 
 NAFTA fostered more than just trade; it also cultivated a historic transformation 
in the Mexican political system.  While many of these changes were not explicit 
directives of the accord, the context laid out in negotiating a free trade agreement forced 
the Mexican government to adopt new electoral rules, create stronger institutions and 
improve the rule of law.  In addition, it activated a civil society base to press for change 
in the PRI regime.  This satisfies the general democracy dimensions of the Democratic 
Audit.  Based on my grades – positive for electoral processes, positive for open and 
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accountable institutions, neutral for political and civil liberties, and positive for civil 
society – I can argue using this framework that NAFTA had a relatively positive effect on 
Mexican democracy.   Because three out of four dimensions were positive and the fourth 
did not detract from any of the others, it seems reasonable to conclude that overall the 
effect was generally positive.  I will similarly give an overall grade of CAFTA’s 
performance in the subsequent chapters.   
 Mexico provides an interesting case study into how a trade agreement can affect 
the political process, but considering it as a standard warrants mentioning one significant 
caveat.  During the implementation of NAFTA and during its successive six years, 
Mexico was under a de facto authoritarian regime.  The PRI government employed 
undemocratic tactics, including electoral fraud and intimidation, to sustain its 
uninterrupted, institutionalized reign.  Although NAFTA did have a significant effect on 
Mexico’s democratization, the agreement helped propel the transition from an 
authoritarian pseudo-democracy to a more pluralistic, procedural democracy.   
 In contrast, the five Central American states already enjoyed pluralist, multi-party 
democracies when CAFTA was implemented.  Although the democracies have suffered 
significant challenges, especially with regards to partisanship and representation, none of 
them possess a system comparable to the PRI regime in Mexico.  This factor, 
nevertheless, does not detract from the use of Mexico as an example with which to apply 
the Democratic Audit.  
  In addition, because of the agreement’s longer life span, it has spawned more 
scholarly research into its political effects, while CAFTA, as a relatively new event, has 
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not produced as much information.  However, just as NAFTA itself served as a model for 
CAFTA, a study of NAFTA and the Mexican political system can serve as a model for 
CAFTA and the individual Central American political systems. The Mexican case can be 
perceived as the extreme of a spectrum of cases in which a trade agreement helped 
transform, both directly and indirectly, the actual political structure.  Because NAFTA 
had such a pronounced effect, it can be used as a standard against which the Central 
American examples can be compared.   Above all, this chapter has demonstrated the 
strength of the Democratic Audit as a methodological tool.  Its dimensions help 
categorize and differentiate the different elements of a democracy that can, and are in fact, 
affected by international trade agreements.   
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CHAPTER 4 
El Salvador 
Now that the Democratic Audit has been established as an appropriate method to 
consider the effects of a trade agreement on democratic institutions, we can turn to the 
substantive case examples for this research.  El Salvador is an ideal Central American 
country to study the effects of CAFTA, as the agreement has been in effect the longest 
there, and its historical and political context is similar to many of its neighbors.  CAFTA 
became a major force in strengthening Salvadoran democracy, but through several 
indirect, unexpected means. 
 It is impossible to study Salvadoran politics and economics without offering some 
context of its brutal past.  After sustaining years of repressive governance, in 1980 a 
coalition of leftist insurgent groups united behind the Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front (FMLN) to resist the authoritarian right-wing military regime.  The U.S. 
fueled the government and the National Renewal Alliance (ARENA), a violent 
paramilitary group aligned with state-sponsored death squads, in their attempts to 
suppress the resistance movement, which itself received financing from Cuba and the 
Soviet Union.  A civil war between the government and the FMLN ravaged El Salvador 
for twelve years, as the armed forces directed a campaign ostensibly to root out rebels but 
one that committed massive human rights violations against the public.  The protracted 
war left hundreds of thousands dead or missing.  Ultimately, a belated global uproar over 
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the conflicts raging across Central America led to a peace process mediated by Costa 
Rican president Oscar Arias.  During the Salvadoran peace accords of 1992, the ARENA 
and the FMLN were converted from armed factions to legitimate political parties, but a 
legacy of violent confrontation has continued throughout the country’s fragile 
democratization.  Both parties have had to relinquish some of their earlier goals: although 
the FMLN gained access to the political process, the ruling ARENA party has frustrated 
its substantive objectives. Likewise, the ARENA has had to accept a broadening of the 
political spectrum to accommodate its former arch-nemesis.1 The enmity between these 
parties was evident even a decade later during the CAFTA debates.   
 After the first democratic elections in March 1994, the presidency remained under 
ARENA control until 2009, while the FMLN and other parties on the Left fared poorly in 
national elections.  The ARENA presidents spearheaded a pro-market economic model in 
the style of the Washington Consensus with support from elites in the banking and 
maquila sectors, often sidelining non-business or “popular sector” non-governmental 
organizations as potentially subversive political rivals.2  Their policies involved financial 
liberalization, privatization of state resources and cultivation of a special relationship 
with the United States.3  The substantive reduction in trade barriers and protections for 
foreign investment, for example, made El Salvador one of the most open economies in 
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the region even before the negotiation of CAFTA.  Cuts in agricultural tariffs from as 
high as 230 percent to 15 percent, accompanied by preferences granted through the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative, helped boost the Salvadoran export sector, which experienced 
the fastest annual growth in the hemisphere during that decade.4  Even before the signing 
of the trade agreement, the U.S. was by far the largest source of non-fuels imports to El 
Salvador, consisting of 47.5 percent in 2000.5  The U.S. is the recipient of 57 percent of 
Salvadoran exports and is El Salvador’s largest trade partner.6  For its pro-market and 
pro-U.S. reforms, former U.S. President George W. Bush called El Salvador “one of the 
really bright lights in Latin America.”7 
 In its political campaigns, ARENA tried to demonstrate how its economic 
approach had brought considerable growth to El Salvador.  An FMLN victory, then, 
would immediately stymie any progress.  The Right amassed popular support through 
such alarmist tactics; in the 2004 election, the presidential candidate and eventual winner, 
Antonio Saca, stoked popular fear that if his opponent won, the United States would cut 
off the trade preferences that El Salvador enjoyed and would suspend immigrant 
remittances to the country, a financial asset that comprised a significant portion of the 
economy.   
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 Negotiation of CAFTA was a central pillar of the ARENA doctrine.  Under the 
leadership of President Francisco Flores and his successor, Saca, El Salvador became 
perhaps the most ardent supporters of the agreement in Central America.   Flores, an 
American-trained politician, had allied El Salvador even further with the United States 
and had implemented dollarization in 2001.  Polls also showed that during the initial 
negotiation and ratification stages, the Salvadoran public generally supported the 
agreement as well: a poll taken in 2003 revealed that 43 percent believed that free trade 
would help combat poverty, yet the campaign mounted thereafter by the opposition to the 
government’s stance eroded the public’s faith in trade.8   
 According to Flores and other proponents of free trade, CAFTA would manifest 
significant benefits for El Salvador.  Because of the major liberalization executed in the 
1990’s, CAFTA did not represent a directional shift in tariff policy in El Salvador.  
However, advocates took care in noting that protection for sensitive agricultural products 
would not be affected in the short term, responding to one major criticism of the pact.9  
The overall impact, though, extended beyond mere tariff-level changes because of the 
almost transformational economic impact of the treaty.  Beyond the general economic 
arguments for the entire region that were discussed in Chapter 1, advocates posed certain 
El Salvador-specific claims.  Additional trade liberalization would boost annual 
economic growth above prevailing rates.  In particular, foreign direct investment (FDI) as 
a share of the Salvadoran economy would increase substantially, following the regulatory 
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reforms.10 CAFTA would also secure duty-free access for the Salvadoran clothing and 
textile market, by far the country’s largest export commodity to the United States.11  
Employment would increase due to greater demand for unskilled labor, which would 
create an overall reduction in poverty.12  Although one study suggested that relative 
wages for unskilled workers would actually decrease, it predicted that CAFTA would not 
be at fault; in fact, the composition of the Salvadoran labor force was such that inequality 
would increase regardless of trade liberalization.13   
 The enthusiasm with which El Salvador embraced CAFTA also enabled it to 
emerge as the leader in ratifying the treaty.  Notwithstanding some obstacles by anti-
CAFTA civil society groups, which will be discussed later in this chapter, the pact was 
approved with relative ease.  In December 2004, the ARENA party, now under the 
direction of President Saca, formally introduced the treaty in the Congress, which was 
ironically under majority control by the FMLN.  However, a bloc of right-wing parties, 
composed of ARENA, the Party of National Conciliation (PCN) and the Christian 
Democratic Union, united to pass the bill over the objections of the FMLN, which 
opposed the bill. The final vote tallied 45 to 32.14  On March 1, 2006 – a few months after 
the initial deadline – El Salvador became the first Central American country to 
implement CAFTA.  
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Initial Economic Effects  
 Because CAFTA has been in force for only four years in El Salvador, it is 
difficult to assess its long-term impact on the national economy, unlike the case of 
NAFTA in Mexico.  However, El Salvador offers perhaps the best example among the 
five Central American participants in CAFTA because it ratified the agreement the 
earliest relative to its neighbors.  In addition, studies have already demonstrated a notable 
impact partly because of the immediate changes implemented.    
In the past four years, the initial effects have been mixed, as table 4.1 (available at 
the end of the chapter) demonstrates.  The Salvadoran economic secretary under 
president Saca, Yolanda Mayora, declared in an interview with the Associated Press: “El 
Salvador is the (member) country that has benefited the most from this accord, and the 
country whose exports to the U.S. have had the greatest growth.”15  In 2006, the first year 
that the agreement was in force El Salvador experienced its highest growth rate since 
1993.16  In that year, its non-traditional exports, which consist of the entire export sector 
minus textiles and coffee and comprise half of all exports, increased by 68 percent from 
$240 million to $404 million.17  Agricultural exports in the first year increased 85 percent 
to a sum of $297 million.18  In the first year, 29 new international businesses have opened 
in the country and nine had expanded their operations.19  Furthermore, more than 350 
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Salvadoran businesses were exporting products to the U.S., including 60 new 
companies.20  Some of the trade capacity programs through USAID have helped train 
1,500 Salvadoran businesses in export facilitation.21 
 Proponents billed free trade as a means for El Salvador to diversify its agricultural 
sector and expand its nontraditional industries, but in the few years of implementation, 
traditional exports like coffee and sugar increased, while nontraditional products like fruit 
has made little change to the export market.  These sectoral shifts are noticeably different 
than one might expect, as manufacturing has remained relatively stagnant while 
agriculture has grown as a percent of the whole economy.  This fact undermines the 
notion that trade will actually help industrialize the country; instead, free trade may have 
made El Salvador more reliant on an industry that will not in the long run promote 
development. 
In most respects, it seems that CAFTA has boosted employment in certain sectors:  
since 2002 the unemployment rate dropped from 7.2 percent to 5.9 percent.22  The U.S. 
embassy in El Salvador asserts that since CAFTA’s implementation, investment from the 
United States has generated more than 18,000 jobs in El Salvador directly and almost 
35,000 indirectly.23  However, much like the study cited earlier predicted, real wages, 
measured on an index, in El Salvador have dropped significantly, from 100.9 in 2005 to 
93.3 in 2008.  While neither total unemployment nor real wages across the economy are 
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directly related to the trade agreement, they provide an interesting context, as together 
they suggest that overall Salvadoran labor force has risen but to the detriment of worker 
wages.   
 As an economy already closely linked to the United States, El Salvador was 
exposed to greater repercussions from the 2008 U.S. financial crash because of CAFTA.   
The global recession has hit El Salvador particularly hard; its economy contracted by 2.9 
percent in 2009.24  A decline in immigrant remittances, which previously accounted for 
some 10 percent of the Salvadoran economy, and in investment from U.S. business 
community was in large part responsible for the contraction.  Although growth is 
expected to revive slightly in 2010 spurred by a recovery in the U.S., forecasters have 
still predicted investment below 2006-‘08 levels.  Had El Salvador not signed a trade 
agreement with the U.S. that exposed it further to such negative economic consequences, 
one can speculate to what degree the Central American nation would have been insulated 
from the global recession, given that prior to 2006 it still possessed a relatively open 
economy.  Nonetheless, it is safe to conclude that CAFTA facilitated even more financial 
linkages with the U.S. that additionally exposed El Salvador to the economic situation 
there.  As we will consider in the next section, the voting behavior by the Salvadoran 
public in the 2009 presidential elections revealed that they arrived at this conclusion as 
well.   
 Above all, as some commentators have pointed out, CAFTA has in a sense 
revamped the entire business culture in El Salvador.  The trade agreement opened new 
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niches in the market for small and medium sized businesses in El Salvador and in the 
United States to develop cross-national linkages. A more diversified economy helps 
provide stability and strength to El Salvador; as one U.S. official has claimed, “[business 
owners there] have diversified themselves, they have not stayed with the same old thing, 
sugar or coffee; rather they have changed, more than anything, their mind.”25 The 
improved legal protections for entrepreneurs and investors have also placed a new focus 
on the judicial process.  How successful these institutional changes, however, are the 
topic of the coming sections.  Organized by the four dimensions of the Democratic Audit, 
the analysis will allege that CAFTA has had a weakly positive impact on the politics and 
institutions of El Salvador.   
 
Electoral Processes Dimension: The 2009 Funes Election 
 The March 2009 national elections in El Salvador will be remembered for the 
historic victory of Mauricio Funes as the first president elected from the FMLN.  That a 
moderate left-wing candidate could defeat the long-standing ARENA regime, the 
purported patrons of a stable Salvadoran state, and without any bloodshed represents a 
momentous step forward for democracy in that country.  In retrospect, many political 
analysts attribute the outcome to a nationwide rejection of ARENA, but the actual 
narrative is more complicated, involving the more centrist character of Funes and his 
message of change.   The role that CAFTA, as a symbol of the economic liberalism 
adduced by ARENA, played the election is peculiar, as in reality neither major candidate 
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called for its renegotiation.  Nevertheless, as a policy approach, it had an impact on the 
questions also posed in the indices of the Electoral Processes dimension of the 
Democratic Audit.  This justifies the application of the 2009 elections to this thesis.   
CAFTA always served a political role for ARENA, so it is not far-fetched to suggest that 
these elections would incorporate trade and its implications as a subject of debate.  
Ratification of such a transformational agreement as CAFTA would cement the 
ARENA’s position as the party of pro-market growth and could serve to thwart any 
future attempts by a leftist FMLN administration to nationalize industries or implement 
land reform, given the property and investment rights and dispute negotiation dictated by 
the accord.26  The rhetoric espoused by the Marxist establishment at the top of the FMLN 
underscored the right’s fears of this from occurring. 
The March 2009 vote was the first presidential election since the ratification of 
CAFTA and potentially could have been an unofficial popular referendum on the free 
trade agreement.  Indeed, the outcome of the election generated a dramatic shift in the 
Salvadoran democracy: for the first time since the 1992 peace accords established a 
democracy (and, in reality, ever – given the dominance of conservative elites in 
Salvadoran politics even before then), the FMLN candidate won the presidency.  Yet the 
candidate, Mauricio Funes, broke the tradition of FMLN candidates or leaders who were 
leftist ex-guerrillas from the civil war.  Instead, Funes was a center-left political neophyte 
– he was originally a television journalist – who until 2008 was not even a member of the 
                                                           
26
 Cori Madrid, “El Salvador and the Central American Free Trade Agreement: Consolidation of a 
Transnational Capitalist Class” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 8 (2009): 
206.   
101 
 
 
 
FMLN.  His unusual background and pro-business vision distinguished him from his 
party, a fact that made him attractive to the public.  That the party leadership had chosen 
an outsider demonstrates that the FMLN understood that its Marxist, leftist bent 
exemplified by its 2004 candidate Schafik Handal – the former leader of the Salvadoran 
Communist Party – was politically unpalatable to the Salvadoran public.27   Catering to a 
more moderate electorate required a candidate hailing from the center-left.   
 Popular discontent with the direction of the country under the ARENA regime 
drove the historic election.  The FMLN had already displaced ARENA as the majority 
party in Congress after the legislative elections the January preceding the election.28  
President Saca’s close relationship with the United States and his enthusiasm for passing 
CAFTA put him at odds with much of the Salvadoran public, whose opinions toward the 
trade agreement had diminished since it was first initiated.   ARENA and its candidate, 
Rodrigo Ávila, were seen as responsible for the failing economy and for not achieving 
much success against the widespread crime in the country.29 In a nationwide poll taken 
by the Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP) in May 2009, 55.2 percent 
noted a negative change in the country since Saca was elected in 2004, and in particular 
66.0 percent said that the economy had worsened.30    
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The economy was a primary issue in the campaign.  A full 83.1 percent of 
respondents in the poll said that the new president should change the economic policies 
of his predecessor, which reveals an overwhelming rebuff of the ARENA neoliberal 
reforms whose centerpiece included DR-CAFTA.31  Regardless of this lack of popular 
support for the agreement, ARENA and independent rightwing groups alleged that, if 
elected, Funes would annul El Salvador’s participation in DR-CAFTA.32  They also said 
he would renounce monetary dollarization and align the country with Hugo Chávez and 
radical leftism.  These contentions were reinforced by the warnings of some 
Congressional Republicans in the U.S. that an FMLN victory would jeopardize 
Salvadoran immigration and could force the Congress to block remittance flows, a 
significant revenue source in the Salvadoran economy.33  ARENA also had a significant 
financial and organizational advantage over the FMLN; indeed, many analysts consider it 
the best-organized party in Latin America.34  
The Mauricio Funes depicted by the ARENA differed greatly from the man 
himself.  Funes was not even a member of the FMLN when he secured the presidential 
nomination, and he promised to govern more along the lines of center-left Brazilian 
President Luiz Inácio Lula de Silva, rather than Chávez.  He publicly consulted business 
groups to highlight his commitment to pro-market policies.  During the election, he 
pledged to seek a close relationship with the United States and to maintain CAFTA, 
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saying that abandonment of the treaty would be traumatic to the economy.35  In an 
interview just after his election, he declared that “we can’t get mixed up in repealing 
CAFTA, nor can we reverse dollarization because that would send a negative message to 
foreign investors,” despite the fact that “large majorities of [El Salvador’s] citizens reject 
key policies that define, in many ways, the relationship between El Salvador and the 
United States, specifically CAFTA…”36  The Salvadoran people still saw him as an agent 
of change.  Out of ten reasons for why the FMLN won the election, 50.0 percent of 
respondents to the May 2009 IUDOP poll said for a change to improve the country or for 
its candidate.37 
International observers have declared the election transparent and fair.  
Representatives from the two main political parties and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal 
were stationed at every polling location, and the U.S. National Democratic Institute 
helped support the independent ballot counts by each party.38  The peaceful transition of 
power, which allayed fears that violence between the once warring factions would erupt, 
showed a strengthening of the democracy.39  Despite having run a harshly negative 
campaign, Ávila quickly conceded his defeat rather than protest the vote and call for a 
recount in the close election, which handed Funes a narrow 51.3 percent to 48.3 percent 
victory.40  Importantly, the people themselves considered the election clean, by a margin 
of 77.3 to 19.3 percent in one poll.  58.1 percent said that the presence of national and 
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international observers at the election had “a lot” of influence on the transparency of the 
election.41  Voter turnout was relatively high at nearly 62 percent of the population, 
slightly lower than in the 2004 election but significantly higher than during the 1990’s.42  
The 2004 election, in which Saca defeated Schafik Handal, took place after negotiations 
for the free trade agreement had began, but more analysis is needed to determine if this 
had had an impact on Saca’s victory.   
As President, Funes has tried to forge a middle course to improve Salvadoran 
institutions.  He has engaged conservative leaders and business representatives, including 
appointing an economic cabinet to honor his pro-market campaign promises.  In addition, 
he has implemented fiscal policy recommendations to reduce the debt from the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank.43 
Recognizing the four years of CAFTA’s implementation in March 2010, he even urged 
Salvadoran businesses to take advantage of opportunities granted by CAFTA, which he 
called an “important instrument for commercial exchange.”44   In fact, his centrist tactics 
toward the economy have earned him strident criticism from the left wing of his party, 
which is still largely dominated by Marxist ex-guerrillas.   
The political considerations of DR-CAFTA presented a significant piece to the 
Funes election.  There is no empirical indication that the free trade agenda primarily 
drove voters to the polls, but the economic situation was still a predominant theme voiced 
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by voters.  They rejected the ARENA-led economic liberalization and privatization for 
two decades that had not produced the growth and poverty reduction promised.  On the 
other hand, they still supported a candidate who respected free trade, property rights and 
economic stability.  Perhaps most noteworthy with regards to CAFTA and its effect on 
electoral politics was the very absence of it as a point of contention between the two 
major candidates, even while the general public expressed dissatisfaction with the 
agreement.  Despite this, ARENA lost its control over the Salvadoran executive partly 
because it had presented itself as the party of market capitalism and alliance with the 
United States.   
 The 2009 presidential election provides the test for the Democratic Audit’s 
Electoral Processes dimension.  A peaceful transition of power between competing 
parties is a hallmark of democracy, and the transition to an FMLN regime helped 
strengthen Salvadoran democracy in that way.  As an issue, CAFTA participated in the 
election insofar as support or rejection of it as an element of the ARENA economic 
policy helped compel voters to the polls.  The evidence that the agreement itself 
improved Salvadoran democracy is tenuous, but the case can be made that it in part 
inspired a significant electoral result.   Therefore, I allege that CAFTA has had a positive 
effect on the electoral processes in El Salvador.  
Still, a vote for Funes did not equal a vote against DR-CAFTA, since he supports 
the agreement.  What explains the contradiction between the popular discontent with free 
trade and the vote for a free trader?  One could argue that the Salvadoran people valued 
stability above all else, and that renouncing CAFTA now would have more detrimental 
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effects to the economy.  Furthermore, more obviously, there simply was no alternative 
candidate on the ballot who was more wary of market economics.  However, these 
suggestions are mere speculation and would require empirical exit poll research to 
determine their validity.   
 
Open and Accountable Institutions 
 A functioning market democracy cannot operate without strong state institutions 
in place to govern and regulate the system, and as a treaty with political and economic 
implications, CAFTA has proposed several initiatives to enhance the institutions in El 
Salvador.  Fortunately for this assessment, more quantifiable data exists to study the 
strengthening of laws and agencies, but actual results are more challenging to determine 
in this case.  In this section, we will consider statutory changes mandated by the CAFTA 
content, trade capacity projects and the overall developments in business regulation 
across the economy since implementation.    
 Data by the World Bank can help first offer a perspective to Salvadoran 
institutional quality since CAFTA has gone into force.  The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators consider many of the political variables, such as accountability and stability, 
needed for successful economic development.   While these statistics are less related to 
trade, they still offer a look at the state of Salvadoran democracy.  The conclusions drawn 
from the Governance Indicators are mixed.  In the period between 2003 and 2008, 
percentile measures of accountability, government effectiveness, and rule of law have 
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decreased.45  The latter may have more to do with the sharp rise in gang-related violence; 
while this is a transnational phenomenon, it has little correlation to free trade.   On the 
other hand, regulatory quality – the ability of the government to implement sound 
policies to sustain commercial development – has increased ten percentile points from 
50.7 to 60.9, the sharpest change of all the measures.46  This improvement inspires some 
confidence, as administrative regulations are most related to reforms mandated by the 
trade agreement.  Overall, while it is difficult to tie CAFTA to El Salvador’s performance 
on the World Governance Indicators, they still provide some context to the environment 
in which more liberalized trade operates.  They demonstrate that in many ways El 
Salvador has not experienced immediate institutional strengthening except in terms of its 
regulatory quality.  These regulations, however, form the crux of the forthcoming 
analysis of CAFTA’s role in creating open and accountable institutions.   
 In order to prepare the institutions for CAFTA, El Salvador had to pass certain 
initiatives to increase their accountability.  These initiatives in the text immediately 
increased the accountability of the Central American governments, and El Salvador is no 
exception.  By the end of December 2005, the Legislative Assembly had passed the 
twelve laws required before the agreement could be implemented.  The bundle of laws, 
passed by a coalition of right-wing parties led by ARENA over the objections of the 
FMLN, consisted of regulations dealing with subjects ranging from government 
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procurement, intellectual property, telecommunications, sanitation regulations, and the 
penal code.47 
 The statutory changes to state institutions executed as part of the CAFTA content 
accompanied programs sponsored by the United States to improve the labor standards in 
El Salvador.   The trade capacity programs negotiated alongside the trade pact included 
several initiatives that dealt with the ability of the state to protect the rights of workers.  
Since these are some of the most pertinent liberties in a country like El Salvador, the 
strength of state institutions to uphold labor rights will comprise the bulk of this 
subsequent section. 
 While labor laws themselves will be appraised in the dimension of Political and 
Civil Liberties, one aspect of CAFTA’s capacity building projects served to improve the 
accountability of the government.  In fiscal year 2006, the Bush Administration 
committed $8.24 million to Labor Justice System Modernization, a program spearheaded 
by the U.S. Department of Labor to train judicial personnel in all CAFTA countries on 
national labor laws and the application of labor standards through workshops.  After the 
initial training sessions, the program developed in consultation with the countries’ 
Supreme Courts a strategy to improve the adjudication of labor rights cases.48  Trade 
capacity appropriations have also funded offices in the Salvadoran Ministry of Labor to 
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educate the public on their rights as workers.49  Strengthening the Ministry in these ways 
has allowed for greater accountability in terms of labor rights, because mere unawareness 
of protections granted impunity to more corrupt employers.  
 The White Paper, introduced in Chapter 1 as the informal term for the Trade and 
Labor Vice Ministers’ report on The Labor Dimension in Central America and the 
Dominican Republic, made several country-specific recommendations to improve labor 
rights.  One trade capacity project in El Salvador supported by White Paper proposals 
includes a program to improve compliance with paying into the national pension fund.  
This sought to address a long-standing corruption issue in which management deducted 
money from laborers’ paycheck to pay into the social security system but then failed to 
actually transfer the money.  Then, the employee would be unable to request health care 
services covered by social security even though the money had been deducted.50  The 
pilot program helps workers to verify the proper transfer of the salary deductions to the 
correct agency and guarantee that their health benefits are properly distributed.51  
Attempts to fix this corrupt practice have received high reviews, and it serves as an 
anecdotal example of a means to improve transparency with a government institution.  
One detrimental consequence of market capitalism to democracy noted in Chapter 2 was 
its tendency to concentrate economic power in the hands of a few investors or 
corporations, which often skews the balance of domestic power in their interests away 
from the majority of the population.  Furthermore CAFTA has minimized the role of the 
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state in economic affairs.  While it is difficult to find data on CAFTA’s effects to income 
distribution, one can consider the size of the largest multinational firms in Central 
America and their influence on the state.  Ten of the largest twenty-eight corporations in 
Central America come from El Salvador, and many of these groups have established 
domestic lobbying groups to protect their interests.  Furthermore, they have created joint 
ventures with foreign companies, which grants these Central American enterprises more 
leverage in the business community.  Meanwhile, the state’s ability to regulate their 
international ties has decreased because of reductions in tariffs and subsidies as specified 
by the agreement.  This dynamic has served to weaken the state while strengthening the 
standing of large agro-businesses and maquilas.52   
In terms of intellectual property enforcement, the “Ley Fomento y Protección de 
la Propiedad Intelectual” stipulated 108 reforms to Salvadoran law, including 32 new 
provisions that have granted special protections to foreign patent owners, ignoring certain 
regional conventions on intellectual property to which El Salvador is party.  These 
include granting multinational corporations greater access to Salvadoran biodiversity.53  
The law also increases punitive measures against pirated media, a significant business in 
the informal sector, which weakening patent protections for domestic companies.54  In 
sum, these regulations tie the hands of the state and give special privileges to foreign 
companies.   
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As discussed at length in Chapter 2, one crucial function of a government in a 
market economy is to protect and regulate the economic framework to let capitalism 
flourish and inhibit undue commercial preferences.  The parts of CAFTA that dealt with 
such regulations therefore affected the power of state institutions to supervise the 
economy.  Three indicators in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2010 survey serve to 
consider this relationship between political institutions and the economy: “registering 
property,” “protecting investors,” and “contract enforcement.”  El Salvador has seen 
some improvement in terms of its institutional capacity to oversee its economy.  
Registering property titles helps people defend their property from illegal seizures and 
corruption and helps bring poorer entrepreneurs into the formal economy.55  Yet in the 
years since CAFTA has been in force in El Salvador, property registration has not 
simplified.  The time to register property did drop significantly between 2005 and 2006, 
from 52 days to 33 days, then to 31 days in the subsequent years.  The expedited process 
is almost certainly attributable to CAFTA, which went into effect in 2006.  However the 
cost as a percentage of property value to register property has increased slightly, which 
has caused El Salvador to slip relative to other countries on a ranking of the ease and 
strength of property registration rights.56   
The investment rights clauses of CAFTA have promoted financial integration, as 
the provisions remove barriers to capital mobility and mandate minimal regulation of 
foreign capital while they erect protections for investors.  “The presence of legal and 
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regulatory protections for investors explains up to 73 percent of the decision to invest.”57  
Unfortunately, data before 2006 is unavailable, so it is impossible to gauge any changes 
generated by the agreement.  Interestingly though, the strength of investor protections in 
El Salvador have remained the same in the five years that the survey has collected data 
for this indicator.   
The Doing Business survey also measures the effectiveness of judicial institutions 
to resolve commercial disputes and enforce contracts.   Contract enforcement is a 
cornerstone to the functions of a solid capitalist economy, for economies with weak 
regulations will often foster corruption and unaccountability.   Notably, since the 2004 
iteration, the survey has measured no difference in the Salvadoran state’s ability to 
enforce contracts: the time to adjudicate a dispute is lengthy (786 days, ranking it thirtieth 
in the world), and neither dispute cost nor the number of procedures has shown any 
change (19.2 percent of the cost of the claim and fifty, respectively).58  These data 
suggest that DR-CAFTA has had no impact on El Salvador’s institutional capacity to 
monitor contract enforcement.   
 Despite the attention placed on institutional reform, CAFTA has not delivered 
many of its promises.  It appears that the new laws may not have substantively improved 
the quality of Salvadoran institutions, as demonstrated in the relatively unaffected 
business climate figures just reviewed.  The goals also contradict themselves to some 
extent: while seeking to enhance the power of the state to regulate the economy in one 
regard, CAFTA has also reduced its ability to oversee international investment and 
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entrepreneurial rights. Still, critics should not place full blame on CAFTA and its 
negotiators for not generating such a nationwide shift in only four years.  The efforts to 
improve the legal and institutional framework in El Salvador will take an entire shift in 
the culture of laws and business.  A country with such a violent history and recent 
democratization can only be expected to take time in creating a state that will secure the 
market without encumbering it.  Exogenous political factors such as the significant crime 
problem may also play a role in the somewhat uninspiring changes.  Given this context, I 
will conclude that CAFTA has had a neutral effect on El Salvador’s Open and 
Accountable Institutions dimension, the second condition in the Audit.  
 
Political and Civil Liberties 
 This particular dimension in the Democratic Audit entails the greatest number of 
specific indices deemed relevant to the relationship between DR-CAFTA and democracy 
in Central America.  El Salvador’s experience in the past four years with personal 
liberties has been quite controversial, especially as state security measures have 
intensified due to the crime problem.  However, the transformative trade agreement has 
also presented serious challenges to Salvadoran society.   Because of these mixed results, 
I will suggest that CAFTA has had a neutral effect on civil and political liberties in El 
Salvador.  
  Before ratification of CAFTA, El Salvador maintained remarkably tough labor 
standards relative to its position as a poor, developing country without consolidated 
democratic institutions.   At the behest of the five Central American Ministries of Labor 
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before signing the accord, the International Labor Organization (ILO) compiled a report 
of the employment regulations in their countries.   The ILO found that the Salvadoran 
constitution recognizes the rights of private employers and workers to establish, join, and 
leave unions, but it does limit the formation of public sector unions.  Certain laws in the 
legal code also prohibit unfair labor practices that restrict this freedom of association, 
including an employer withholding wages from or dismissing unionized employees.  The 
law also forbids discrimination, notably against pregnant women, and effectively 
abolishes child and forced labor.59  In addition, the White Paper notes that El Salvador 
has ratified six out of eight of the ILO conventions considered fundamental legal rights.  
The fact that the country has not ratified the conventions on the “Freedom of Association 
and Right to Organize” and on “Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining” 
distinguishes it from its neighbors, which have otherwise ratified all the conventions 
named.60  Overall, the ILO notes that since the 1994 Peace Accords, El Salvador has 
made major strides in improving its labor standards, but it does express some concern 
about the difficulty faced by government employees to form unions.61  Furthermore, the 
ILO called for El Salvador to address its concerns regarding illegal worker dismissals and 
anti-union hiring practices.62 
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 One of the most heralded chapters of CAFTA was its inclusion of labor rights as a 
key feature.  While this section was largely discussed in Chapter 1, it is necessary to 
briefly review certain strictures in the text that applied in particular to El Salvador.  
Because the agreement obligates all signatories to enforce current law and bans relaxing 
any regulations in order to promote international trade, proponents argued that El 
Salvador would not backtrack on its commitments to labor rights.63  In addition, rather 
than instituting new regulations, the state would need to upgrade its monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms in order to meet the standards set by CAFTA.  Rather than 
calling on signatories to impose sanctions on violators of labor laws, the accord requires 
that they assess fines determined by dispute settlement panels.  Advocates asserted that 
monetary remuneration served to punish offenders while not damaging the entire country, 
the presumed consequence of trade sanctions.64  During ratification in El Salvador, the 
Consejo Superior del Trabajo joined with eight union federations and 73 individual 
unions to declare that, “the mechanisms established in the FTA’s labor chapter will 
strengthen the rule of law and promote enforcement of labor laws now in force.”65  The 
apparent backing of labor organizations contrasted with the large fears by groups in El 
Salvador and the United States that CAFTA would undermine labor rights.    
 The existence of labor protections in Salvadoran law, however, does not 
automatically mean that labor standards are upheld.  In order to improve enforcement, the 
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United States initiated trade capacity projects that assisted the Labor Ministries in Central 
America.  In one project, the U.S. Department of Labor distributed $14.94 million in 
fiscal years 2006 to 2009 to the Cumple y Gana programs in the Ministries that target 
discrimination in the maquila sector.  The Labor Ministries used these resources to 
sponsor trainings for labor inspectors and for employers and to create informational 
websites and materials for the public.  Additionally, the project strengthened local 
Worker Rights Centers to advise labors on national labor standards and provide legal 
services.66  One such organization in El Salvador that has received these funds includes 
the University of Central America’s Human Rights Institute.67  An additional $3.98 
million was earmarked for Labor Ministries to enforce laws against discrimination and 
harassment of women in the manufacturing sector.  Out of a $27 million appropriation to 
combat child labor, the Salvadoran government specifically received funds to eliminate 
this abuse within a specified timeframe.  The Department of State’s Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor has been authorized to award funding to non-
governmental organizations that will train selected industries throughout Central America 
to promote responsible labor practices.68  Finally, the Department of Labor provided 
$2.98 million for monitoring programs related to ILO recommendations. 69  Although 
these funding numbers include projects sponsored throughout Central America, it is the 
programs themselves, rather than the relative appropriations, that are important for this 
analysis.   
                                                           
66
 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “CAFTA-DR – Labor Capacity Building.” 
67
 Gass, 5. 
68
 Ibid., 6-7. 
69
 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “CAFTA-DR – Labor Capacity Building.” 
117 
 
 
 
During preparation for ratification, El Salvador made some committed efforts to 
achieve results on its labor rights.  Backed by the trade capacity projects, the government 
has increased its employment of labor inspectors and improved the process to file 
complaints.  The Labor Ministry also provides free legal assistance for workers to file a 
union registration form and has opened field offices in free trade zones to monitor labor 
standards in maquilas.70  However, the capacity of these initiatives to protect labor rights 
is unknown, and one always must be cautious that such changes pay only lip service to 
actual systemic reform. 
The trade capacity projects have sought to improve labor rights in El Salvador and 
its regional partners by boosting enforcement.  Through programs to provide better 
monitoring infrastructure and to initiate public awareness campaign, these corollary 
agreements to DR-CAFTA try to institute systemic labor improvements.  In theory, these 
actions should fit within the Democratic Audit’s indices dealing with the public 
awareness of their rights and the government’s ability to protect them.  As demonstrated, 
these projects meant to improve just those two factors.    
The success of these programs however is still up in the air.  Unfortunately for 
this thesis, it is still too early to make resounding conclusions on the labor rights aspect of 
the trade agreement beyond the immediate changes implemented.  Few formal studies 
have been published on the actual effects of CAFTA to labor rather than only the 
perceived effects.  One concern raised has been that those members of the informal 
economy, a significant portion of the population, still persist without the protection of 
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formal labor laws.  Any laborer displaced because of trade liberalization that has had to 
find employment in the informal sector thus has been thrust into this extralegal realm.71  
The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), a prominent think tank and 
non-profit political organization, recently disseminated a comprehensive analysis of the 
labor situation in Central America after the implementation of CAFTA.  The paper 
asserts that despite the efforts made by the text itself and by the accompanying trade 
capacity projects in improving labor standards, there has been relatively insignificant 
progress.  The Salvadoran government has boosted the budget of the Ministry of Labor 
over the past three years, earmarking money in particular for increased labor inspections.  
The government has also disseminated information about labor rights, but the ILO has 
advised that the state drastically accelerate this process and to conduct investigations on 
labor violations, which still occur with relatively high frequency.72  Although the White 
Paper was drafted jointly by the Central American ministries, WOLA is concerned that 
the governments’ enforcement has not improved, partly because the workers and 
employers still do not know the extent of their rights.  Personal interviews have 
consistently revealed that labor rights have remained under-administered.73 In fact, 
intimidation and even violence against labor organizers in Central America have 
persisted.  
The judicial system has not fared as well as hoped either.   In terms of the 
adjudication, governments have relied more on mediation outside the courtroom rather 
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than criminal prosecution, which labor rights advocates say undermines their ability to 
obtain fair and legal decisions.74  An initial reason for optimism arouse when El Salvador 
ratified the pending ILO Conventions, one of the recommendations issued before the 
government signed CAFTA.  Nonetheless, in October 2007 the Constitutional Chamber 
of the Salvadoran Supreme Court declared unconstitutional an article in one of the 
conventions recognizing the right of public sector employees to unionize – which was 
one of the major apprehensions of the ILO in the first place. The decision thus abrogated 
the process already instigated by six public sector associations to receive formal state 
recognition.75  
As the WOLA report proposes, earnest attempts to use CAFTA as a means to 
advance labor rights in Central America may not have rendered the positive effects 
intended.  The organization blames paltry appropriations by the U.S. government for the 
failure: “the U.S. tax dollars funding the projects to implement the White Paper 
recommendations, which supporting some novel and commendable organizations and 
projects, are insufficient to resolve the long-standing labor problems and impunity that 
plague the region.”  Unfortunately for this analysis, WOLA did not provide a detailed 
account of the state of labor rights in El Salvador specifically, but it is presumed that the 
situation in that country resembles those in its neighbors.  Also, this report serves as the 
only investigation of CAFTA’s actual impact on labor rights in Central America, so any 
substantive conclusions about this part of civil and political liberties are dubious.  Clearly 
more impartial assessments are needed, especially over a longer time span. 
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 Given the inadequacy of primary documentation on the effects since CAFTA 
came into force in El Salvador, it is challenging to offer substantive conclusions in the 
Political and Civil Liberties dimension.  The mixed evidence presented allows me to 
argue that the effect of CAFTA in this dimension has been neutral. The trade capacity 
projects have enacted several positive plans to improve the institutions and protections of 
workers, which gives some credence to the belief that side negotiations to trade 
agreements may contribute benefits to developing countries.  However, the WOLA report 
on the actual effects is cause for some apprehension.  The report recommended a 
substantial increase in U.S. funding for labor rights to offset any damages incurred by 
CAFTA-related business ventures.  Short of this rather lofty goal, a larger systemic shift 
must occur to create a culture that values workers rights.  Similar to the situation for 
government institutions, well-intentioned laws and initiatives cannot transform an entire 
culture that has historically been antithetical to labor standards.  Nonetheless, they form a 
necessary first step in the right direction, and nothing from this assessment should be 
construed as a rejection of labor rights language as a component of trade agreements.  
 
Civil Society: The Negotiations and Pacific Rim Mining Debates 
The final Dimension presents a different challenge to the use of the Democratic 
Audit.  As unlike in the previous two sections, this question cannot consider the content 
of CAFTA.  Instead, the trade agreement must be considered more as a force or entity 
itself to which civil society reacts.  In this case, the specific provisions are less important 
than the entire issue, similar to the public’s reaction detailed in the Electoral Processes 
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Dimension.  Much like NAFTA and the rise of the Zapatista movement in resistance, in 
El Salvador civil society has developed and solidified in a democratizing process to 
oppose CAFTA.  An impressive coalition of voices has coalesced and transcended 
national boundaries to confront this entrenchment of market capitalism.  Religious groups, 
academic associations, women’s and rural workers’ organizations, labor unions and many 
others have demonstrated with varying degrees of success.76  The civil society dimension 
in El Salvador will be considered through two different topics: the negotiation of the 
agreement and the recent challenge posed by the Pacific Rim Mining Corporation. 
 The CAFTA negotiations themselves were relatively closed to outside voices, 
which provoked widespread suspicion and rejection of the agreement itself by civil 
society groups.  These organizations perceived free trade as a force that jeopardized the 
already scant political rights to the rural and indigenous communities in the region. 
Furthermore, it would undermine the gains of the 1992 Salvadoran Peace Accords that 
guaranteed the supremacy of the state and the national constitution to govern over the 
territory.77  During negotiations, the Salvadoran government under President Francisco 
Flores consulted the business sector, whose leaders created an ad hoc working group to 
promote the trade agreement.  Domestic interests also collaborated with the American 
Chamber of Commerce of El Salvador, an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.78  
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On the other side, two major coalitions emerged to criticize CAFTA.  Although they 
employed different strategies, the relative successes and failures of these civil society 
groups taught them important lessons to strengthen this dimension of Salvadoran 
democracy.  These groups are the Iniciativa CID and the Foro Mesoamericano. 
 The Iniciativa CID fused a number of non-governmental organizations, including 
foundations and even small business lobbyists, into a political faction that engaged the 
CAFTA negotiators.  The FUNDE, a development foundation and member of CID, 
produced analyses and reports on the agreement’s implications to development in order to 
influence its content and to minimize any damaging impact to the vulnerable sectors of 
the Salvadoran population.79  FUNDE then mobilized other allied non-governmental 
organizations. CID members participated in side room consultations during the different 
rounds of negotiation.  Their presence lent greater credibility to civil society 
organizations as groups with a broad base of support and with a stake in the national 
dialogue.  They had to combat a stigma across Central America that non-governmental 
organizations represented narrow social sectors and had little to offer in an international 
debate of this magnitude.80  Responding to the CID, the Salvadoran Ministry of Economy 
developed a Citizen Participation Program to arrange sessions with negotiators, business 
leaders, and civil society members.   
 Yet despite the ostensible inclusiveness of the Salvadoran ratification debate, the 
CID was in some ways marginalized in the final debate.  Their call for a moratorium on 
the agreement, whose negotiation they argued was being unfairly expedited, was widely 
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ignored as the government pushed ahead.81  In the end, they were unable to halt CAFTA, 
but their larger impact on the democratic process should not be discounted.   By 
occupying a legitimate space at the negotiating table, the Iniciativa CID proved to the 
Salvadoran government and the business community that civil society could be a 
responsible partner.  Their emphasis on policy analysis and forging a coalition gave them 
legitimacy.  In turn, the CID members themselves, while dismayed at this outcome in 
particular, learned valuable skills in working across disciplines.82  This lesson is 
significant for any democratic society in which non-governmental organizations want to 
express a popular sentiment and influence policy-making.   
 In the CAFTA debate, the Foro Mesoamericano took the more grassroots 
approach.  The Foro, also known as the Bloque Centroamericano, used direct action and 
protests to both generate street-level confrontation with the government and to effect 
more systemic change and persuade the population about the dangers of CAFTA.  The 
Foro itself arose out of popular discontent with the Plan Puebla-Panama, a program 
proposed by the governments of Mexico and Central America to construct infrastructure 
and promote regional trade.   The Foro held meetings across the region of grassroots 
activists with increasingly high numbers of participants, many of them hailing from El 
Salvador.  The Salvadoran Movimiento Popular de Resistencia-12 (MPR12) and the Red 
Sinti Techán were networks of small rural organizations and reform cooperatives on the 
one hand and of more professional non-governmental organizations with focuses on 
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women’s issues, the environment and consumer protection.83  These two groups adopted 
the voice of the Foro in El Salvador.  As the CAFTA debate began to take hold, the Foro 
Mesoamericano expanded its advocacy to a denunciation of free trade in general, and it 
mobilized resistance to the negotiations.   
 In El Salvador, the MPR12, the Sinti Techán, and their affiliated groups declared 
that CAFTA represented the investment and business interests exclusively.  As a 
coalition, these groups represented a novelty in Salvadoran civil society – they united 
small mass membership organizations into a “network of networks,” which gave a more 
potent voice to local popular groups that could take advantage of strength through 
numbers. In October 2002, the local groups staged a number of simultaneous roadblocks 
on large, cross-country thoroughfares in the first anti-CAFTA mobilization in El 
Salvador.84  Members of the Foro Mesoamericano did not resort to the same tactics as the 
Iniciativa CID, as they scorned any action “inside” the debate and instead resorted to 
public confrontation through marches.   
 After President George W. Bush’s reelection, President Antonio Saca, himself 
only recently elected but endorsing an economic policy consistent with his predecessor’s, 
formally introduced the treaty in Congress and urged a speedy ratification.  The MPR12 
in turn prepared for its final battle, and on the morning of ratification, protestors occupied 
the legislative chamber until security forcibly removed them.  In the same day as debate 
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opened, the leadership forced a midnight vote on the treaty in order to stave off any anti-
CAFTA mass mobilizations.85 
After El Salvador’s Congress ratified the agreement, the coalition of activists did 
not surrender; rather, they directed their energies toward Costa Rica, the last pending 
signatory and the setting for major civil society resistance to CAFTA.86   Although the 
eventual outcome was not in the Foro’s favor, much like with the CID the long term 
impact for civil society development is important.  In fact, some analyses of the 
negotiation debate have revealed that the officials may have extended more opportunities 
for the CID “…in order to tamp down charges of exclusivity and enhance international 
legitimacy” out of response to the more rowdy tactics of the MPR12.87   
Furthermore, the Foro Mesoamericano has fostered relationships within El Salvador and 
across Central America that could conceivably produce a significant voice to confront the 
ruling business elites.  Because international trade has to some extent subverted the 
sovereignty of the national state, transnational networks can give activists who cannot 
influence their own state better tools for pressure.  While the movements did not win this 
battle, it is arguable that their coordination instituted a better mechanism to express 
discontent in the future.88    
Even the political parties adopted unique methods to try and forestall the passage 
of the agreement.  When CAFTA formally came into effect, the FMLN and its subsidiary 
groups for Salvadoran immigrants in the United States organized an email campaign to 
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its supporters to call their local representatives or consuls and express their opposition to 
the agreement.  The message employed language familiar to grassroots organizations in 
the United States, providing a prepared statement and list of telephone numbers for 
participants to use in their call.89 
Given the political context, it is doubtful that CAFTA could have been defeated in 
El Salvador.  After years of continuous ARENA leadership, pro-market economic 
policies, and a close alignment with the United States, the chance for El Salvador 
suddenly to change direction and abandon liberal market policy seems slim.  What is 
remarkable, then, is that the civil society organizations actually managed to insert itself in 
the debate as much as they did.  While the networks of activists did not stop the passage 
of CAFTA, they may have achieved a larger goal – shaping popular opinion.  The 
Salvadoran citizenry, once largely in favor of free trade, shifted overwhelmingly during 
the ratification process; since 2006 a majority has expressed disapproval to it.  In that 
year, half of respondents concluded that CAFTA would exacerbate poverty, up from 28 
percent who answered a similar question in 2003.90   
 The CAFTA debate in El Salvador is notable in that it did not spawn new civil 
society groups as much as mobilize existing groups to foster working relationships with 
one another.  These social movements, such as the MPR12 and the Red Sinti Techán, 
united from diverse backgrounds to campaign against a collective force they perceived as 
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a threat to their individual missions.  In addition, the transnational nature of CAFTA 
encouraged similar cross-border civil society collaboration.   
The most significant outcome of this experience for civil society may be the 
opportunities for the groups to learn better strategies to state their grievances in a 
democracy.  El Salvador, like its other neighbors except Costa Rica, has a relatively 
young tradition of peaceful democratic expression.  Until this debate, lobbying and use of 
political influence were relatively unheard of as tactics, as opposed to outright protests, 
sometimes accompanied by violence.91  This relatively new strategy on the part of civil 
society may signal a positive development in the democratic process.  While the 
organizations in the Iniciativa CID were unable to avert CAFTA, they did learn new 
approaches to expressing their concerns in the public forum.   This in itself is a reason for 
optimism, as in the future, civil society organizations can employ these peaceful means to 
influence the policy debate with greater success, much like their peers in consolidated 
democracies.  
Turning back to the Democratic Audit, the experience of these non-governmental 
organizations in the Salvadoran ratification debate fits within certain indices of the Civil 
Society Dimension.  As the groups joined into stronger unified networks, they managed 
to demonstrate that the civil society represented a variety of actors in the country, 
especially the smallest local groups that historically lacked a voice in Salvadoran politics.  
Therefore CAFTA as an existential phenomenon contributed to the extent of the civil 
society representation, one of the specified indices.  The question of if the civil society 
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has consolidated its support of democratic principles is more debatable.  Certain civil 
society groups also began to adopt tactics that are more common to basic democratic 
principles, such as participating at the negotiating table as a stakeholder.  On the other 
hand, the Foro Mesoamericano took some rather populist means by sponsoring protests 
and even obstructing the legislative process, a markedly undemocratic activity.  
Nonetheless, popular demonstrations are part of a democratic society; the alternative is 
repression, a cornerstone of illiberal authoritarianism.   Above all, the establishment of 
the cross-organizational and transnational relationships serves as the primary example 
that civil society in El Salvador developed in a positive direction after the CAFTA 
negotiation and ratification debate.   
 
As CAFTA has gone into effect, civil society groups in El Salvador that oppose 
neoliberalism have maintained their activism, but they have redirected their energy to 
monitoring the implementation of the agreement.  Many non-governmental organizations 
have published reports of the effects of the trade agreement on the economy and the 
society.  Its environmental impact has promoted some outcry, as civil society groups fear 
that the intellectual property regulations would grant preference to foreign patent-holders 
and enable them to exploit endangered natural resources through deep-sea fishing, for 
instance.92  One of the most significant and well documented examples is the civil society 
response to a challenge to the sovereignty and power of the Salvadoran state.  The dispute 
with Pacific Rim Mining Corporation, a Canadian firm, over its proposed El Dorado gold 
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mining operation has surfaced through provisions in CAFTA, and the case highlights a 
role that civil society participates now.   
Pacific Rim Mining filed a lawsuit against the Salvadoran government after the 
state forced it to suspend its activity on environmental grounds.  Beforehand, Pacific Rim 
had considered its project to mine for gold at El Dorado its primary asset.  The El Dorado 
operation covers 144 square kilometers in the department of Cabañas, the second poorest 
province in the country with 55 percent of the population living under the poverty line.93  
El Salvador is not known for its mining industry; in fact, mining contributed less than 0.2 
percent to the Salvadoran economy in 2006.94  A few projects to extract gold were 
undertaken in the late 19th century and again in the 1940’s, but because of technological 
deficiencies, extraction was abandoned.   In 2002 Pacific Rim Mining Corporation 
acquired the El Dorado project after it merged with another firm that had explored the 
mining potential of the site.95  While the firm claims the project would generate 
Salvadoran jobs, it would mostly require unskilled labor in risky conditions.  As Pacific 
Rim began its initial construction in the site in 2004, the Saca government tacitly 
accepted its proposal for a permit.  After its review, administration officials returned the 
application with comments but no formal decision.  This delay did not stop Pacific Rim 
from continuing its projection until March 2008, when the Salvadoran state announced 
that it would “…revise the legal framework of mining exploration and extraction,” 
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effectively halting the project.96  This was a response to the public outcry boiling over the 
project and fueled by organized civil society complaints.  As the dispute developed, 
Pacific Rim officially suspended its activities to prepare the El Dorado site for gold 
extraction, citing concerns over its investments there.97   
 On April 30, 2009, Pacific Rim formally filed suit against El Salvador.  The firm 
alleges that the Government has failed to fulfill its obligations to Pacific Rim, while the 
enterprise has abided by the domestic investment and environmental regulations and by 
investment rules in CAFTA.  The Corporation has cited the “investor-state” dispute 
system in CAFTA, which grants foreign investors the right to take El Salvador for 
damages before the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, an 
arbitration affiliate of the World Bank. The Salvadoran government, it argues, failed to 
respect the permit process commenced by the mining company nor did it respect its rights 
to invest in the project.98 The state violated the principle of “national treatment,” which 
prohibits El Salvador from discriminating against foreign companies and by offering 
preferences to a domestic company.99  In reaction, El Salvador cites its national laws 
dealing with investment, mining, and the environment to assert the primacy of the state 
over foreign investors.  Pacific Rim seeks damages of $100 million from El Salvador, a 
claim that is twice the amount of U.S. foreign aid to that country.100  As a Canadian 
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company, Pacific Rim itself does not have legal jurisdiction to file suit under the 
settlement clauses in CAFTA.  However, its subsidiary Pacific Rim Cayman LLC is 
based in Las Vegas, Nevada, which the firm contends grants it standing under CAFTA’s 
dispute clauses.  
The Pacific Rim case reifies the question of transnational investment rights.  On 
one hand, CAFTA has forged a greater relationship between states and private enterprise 
and provides a means to protect business interests from populist or nationalist whims.  On 
the other, it could be perceived as empowering foreign investors with unwarranted 
privileges to subvert national sovereignty.  The state may little authority to regulate 
against a foreign private entity; thus by signing CAFTA, El Salvador has conceded this 
power to the international legal structure.   
Beyond the legal question of sovereignty, civil society groups have denounced the 
environmental degradation that the El Dorado mine would impose.  Mining is a 
notoriously harmful industry to the nearby area, and critics of the project pointed to the 
use of cyanide to extract gold.  Runoff from the project could also pollute local rivers, 
which provides a major supply of potable water to the rural population.  An American 
geologist who analyzed the Environmental Impact Assessment that Pacific Rim had 
submitted to the Salvadoran government contended that the company did not provide 
adequate information to state regulators or the general public on the impact of the project 
on water resources.101   
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 The civil society uproar against the Pacific Rim mining project has significantly 
framed the political debate.  The well-organized popular associations tied to more 
professional non-governmental organizations have used this environmental challenge to 
reemphasize their claim that trade agreements endanger the Salvadoran public.  With the 
state powerless to regulate foreign investors and with a supra-national court being the 
required mechanism to dispute the problem, they claim that CAFTA has undermined 
national sovereignty.  The influence of the civil society has been evident in the earlier 
political decisions to reject the Pacific Rim petition to begin operations.  Former 
President Saca had established an initial agreement with the mining company to let the 
firm begin exploratory operations in order to attract its investment, but fears of popular 
discontent led his administration to table the proposal formally in 2008.102  Pacific Rim 
claims that ARENA anxiety over the imminent 2009 election was a crucial reason by 
Saca reneged on the permit. In an interview, the firm’s board chairwoman also accused 
the civil society organizations of prevarication: “the anti-mining lobby are telling people 
lies, that they’re going to have two-headed babies and their cows are going to die. And 
meanwhile we have to lay off people who will go back to extreme poverty.” 103  Civil 
society groups have been able to take advantage of popular suspicion of mining projects: 
in one poll, 85 percent of respondents believed that mining companies damaged the 
environment.104  Since taking office, President Funes has repudiated the Pacific Rim 
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initiative, having said, “it’s very simple: my government will not authorize any extractive 
mining project.”105 
The non-governmental organizations even declared that the mining operation 
could jeopardize the grant El Salvador receives from the United States Millennium 
Challenge Corporation.106  A coalition of anti-mining groups delivered its first official 
rejection of mining in El Salvador in February 2008, and since then they have 
implemented additional strategies to block Pacific Rim.  The Salvadoran Conference of 
Catholic Bishops has also joined the opposition, stating that “mining causes irreversible 
damage to the environment and the surrounding communities.”107  Together, a number 
faith-based, environmental and community organizations have coalesced into the Mesa 
Nacional Frente a la Minería Metálica.  La Mesa is currently lobbying for a national ban 
on mining in El Salvador and a general revision of CAFTA’s investment rules.  While 
still an informal group, La Mesa now consists of self-acknowledged members and has 
begun to adopt many characteristics and tactics of non-governmental organizations, such 
as sponsoring protests and disseminating press releases.  For their activities, the Institute 
for Policy Studies, a progressive American think tank, awarded the coalition its annual 
Letelier-Moffitt Human Rights Award in October 2009.108 
 The Pacific Rim challenge has provoked more than political debates; recent 
violence against anti-mining activists has threatened the free expression and security of 
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civil society in El Salvador.  Broadcasters for an independent radio station that has been 
critical of the mining project received death threats. During the summer of 2009, a La 
Mesa leader, Marcelo Rivera, disappeared and was later found dead in a well and 
exhibiting signs of torture.  Since then, two activists and members of the Cabañas 
Environmental Committee – a constituent organization of La Mesa – were gunned down.  
The link between these three murders and their anti-mining advocacy is unequivocal, and 
many activists have accused Pacific Rim of conspiracy.109  The company denies the 
“wrongful” and “false” allegations, but fears of further intimidation continue to spiral.  
 It is premature to draw conclusions about Pacific Rim saga, as the controversy 
will continue until the World Bank reaches a decision in the lawsuit.  However, an early 
assessment of the situation suggests that the civil society organizations have had some 
influence on the policy.  Their public condemnation of the project led President Saca, an 
erstwhile support of the project, to retract his administration’s endorsement and to avert a 
potential electoral disaster.  The power of networks, already observed in the ratification 
debate, provoked the formation of La Mesa, which, while still a loose affiliation of non-
governmental organizations, has begun to establish a permanent voice.  It remains to be 
seen if the civil society can mobilize greater political participation and action among the 
general public, an index question of the Democratic Audit.  Nevertheless, we can suggest 
that through the Pacific Rim challenge, CAFTA has unleashed a civil society backlash to 
neoliberalism.  The problem has provided a concrete example for CAFTA critics to cite 
in advocating their position.  Two civil society groups – one being the Red Sinti Techán – 
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that consolidated their voice and influence during the CAFTA ratification debates have 
recently managed to convince the Supreme Court to hear their case that the investment 
arbitration sections of the trade agreement are unconstitutional and undermine national 
sovereignty.  A victory for them would generate a movement to have the Supreme Court 
declare the entire trade agreement unconstitutional in addition to automatically voiding 
any claims that Pacific Rim Mining has in the country.110 
 The irony of the civil society impact of CAFTA is that the trade agreement has 
fostered a greater democratic voice based on its opposition to trade.  Surely the 
proponents of trade liberalization as a means to promote democracy did not intend for 
this outcome, but regardless, the issue has galvanized organizations representing 
marginalized voices to take a stand against the prevailing political interests.  A 
democracy depends on the expression of all sectors of society, and a network of non-
governmental organizations can achieve that.  For this reason, I conclude that in the Civil 
Society Dimension, DR-CAFTA has had a positive effect to democracy in El Salvador.   
 
Conclusions 
 Based on my analysis using the Democratic Audit, I maintain that DR-CAFTA 
has provided a weakly positive effect to democratic politics and institutions in El 
Salvador.  This conclusion derives from my aforementioned examination of the four 
dimensions.  Electoral Processes experienced a positive effect; Open and Accountable 
Institutions experienced a neutral effect; Civil and Political Liberties experienced a 
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neutral effect, and Civil Society experienced a positive effect.   Subdividing the Audit 
into the two classifications, based on the way CAFTA influenced the dimension, I can 
declare that as a policy phenomenon, it had a strong positive effect, whereas its content 
has had a neutral effect.  
 In El Salvador, perhaps the most interesting issues regarding the implementation 
of CAFTA concern the public’s understanding and acceptance of the treaty.  The 2009 
elections and the rise in support for broad civil society organizations highlight a belief 
that the market capitalist model championed by the ARENA government has not 
accomplished all of its objectives to improve the economic well-being of the country.  
While the institutional changes rendered by treaty stipulations and side agreements, such 
as trade capacity projects, have undoubtedly improved the structure and business climate 
in El Salvador, the public may not interpret this outcome as so beneficial.  The Pacific 
Rim Mining issue can symbolize the entire challenge – popular suspicions that a foreign 
company does not have interests in Salvadoran development may undercut all the actual 
economic benefits that foreign investment brings.  Much like this pending case, one 
cannot offer substantive conclusions over the entire state of Salvadoran politics because 
of the relatively recent implementation of CAFTA.   A whole transformation in the 
institutional and business culture must take place before the laws that the agreement has 
affected can truly achieve success.  Nonetheless, the Democratic Audit employed here is 
a useful standard by which to examine these changes, even after only four years. 
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Table 4.1.  El Salvador Economic Indicators, 2003-08 
Year 
GDP per capita 
growth (rate) Trade Exports Imports FDI a Manufacturing Agriculture 
Real Wages 
(Index) a 
Unemployment 
(Annual %) a 
2003 1.94 70.04 27.07 42.97 0.80 24.32 8.98 103.80 6.90 
2004 1.51 72.91 27.83 45.08 2.30 23.82 9.54 100.20 6.80 
2005 2.72 71.71 26.52 45.19 2.30 22.87 10.50 100.90 7.20 
2006 3.78 74.04 27.18 46.86 1.40 22.41 10.93 97.40 6.60 
2007 4.22 76.20 26.13 50.07 6.90 22.40 12.13 98.00 6.30 
2008 2.09 77.48 27.68 49.80 3.30 21.79 13.18 93.30 5.90 
 
Source (unless otherwise noted): World Bank, World Development Indicators 2010. 
aSource: Inter-American Development Bank, Latin America and Caribbean Macro Watch (2010). 
Note: All data given in percent (%) GDP unless otherwise noted. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Costa Rica 
The second case example we will study is Costa Rica.  This country presents an 
interesting contrast to El Salvador due to its unique political environment and experience 
with CAFTA.  Nonetheless, some notable parallels can be made in comparing the two, 
and we can draw larger conclusions about CAFTA’s influence on democracy by 
considering them together.   
Costa Rica always has been an anomaly among developing countries, especially 
by Latin American standards, and it has managed to sustain economic growth along with 
a formal democracy and social welfare system.  The 1949 constitution enshrined a system 
of competitive, legitimate elections that preserved stability.  The constitution also forbids 
the existence of a standing army, thus eliminating one institution that has destabilized 
political systems elsewhere in Latin America.  Democracy in Costa Rica has further 
cemented itself through the high support of the Costa Rican people.  Historically, the 
citizenry has participated in elections and civil society at a higher level than their peers in 
other developing countries.1  Such high levels of political engagement have often resulted 
in painstakingly slow policy formulation, as lawmakers tend to respond to expressions of 
                                                           
1
 John A. Booth, “Costa Rica: The Roots of Democratic Stability,” in Democracy in Developing 
Countries: Latin America, 2nd ed., ed. Larry Diamond et al. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1999): 445 
139 
 
 
 
citizen sentiment.  This egalitarian gradualism has become a hallmark of Costa Rican 
politics. 
Costa Rica’s successful state-driven development strategy based on import 
substitution faltered by the early 1980’s and like much of Latin America, the country 
defaulted on its international debt.   After it endured its worst economic crisis in modern 
history, Costa Rica began to enact market-based reforms, and this country suddenly 
developed into an icon of the neoliberal movement in Latin America.  The early 1990’s 
saw trade liberalization and currency stabilization, giving Costa Rica relatively high 
growth rates and low inflation.2  At the same time, Presidents Arias and Calderón 
managed to expand the country’s entitlement system, thus juxtaposing the free market 
approach onto the previous state-driven development model.  Yet at the same time, 
political scientists noted a decline in support for the particular Costa Rican political 
system, a plunge in voter turnout at national elections, and increasing rejection of the two 
major parties, the PLN and the PUSC, at the ballot box.3   This democratic ebb is partly 
explained through citizen disenchantment with the politics behind the new economic 
system.  Every major party between 1982 and 2002 endorsed neoliberal economic 
reforms, offering no alternative perspective to a public growing increasingly skeptical 
with the political process.4 
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By 2002, after a decade of gradual market liberalization with mixed results, the 
proposition of a free trade agreement with the United States was particularly 
controversial, as it might have threatened the very core of Costa Rican development.   A 
stark reduction in regulation and government involvement in the economy conflicted with 
the strong state that protected economic and social rights.5  Costa Rica’s strong 
protections of its biodiversity seemed particularly at risk, as the intellectual property and 
investment clauses could denigrate the power of the state to safeguard against 
multinational corporations’ exploitation of the country’s natural resources.6 
Implementation of CAFTA in Costa Rica was far more prolonged than in the 
other Central American states. After initial negotiations took place in the rounds 
organized by each party’s trade ministers, the political leadership in Costa Rica opted to 
withhold formal ratification of the agreement, unlike the ARENA-led government in El 
Salvador that expedited the process.  This decision stemmed from the tradition of 
political gradualism and greater popular suspicion of the agreement. 
 General public disillusionment with the government after the 2002 election of 
President Abel Pacheco threatened to unravel one of his major legislative projects – a free 
trade agreement with the U.S.  Pacheco proved inept in handling a number of corruption 
scandals, and when he pressed ahead with CAFTA negotiations, he engendered greater 
popular disapproval – as the first round of negotiations sparked demonstrations in early 
2003.  
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 To represent Costa Rica, Pacheco appointed a team of technocrats to the Ministry 
of Foreign Trade with more expertise than many of their peers from other Central 
American trade agencies.7  At the negotiation table, the Costa Rican delegates expressed 
hesitations on certain aspects of the text.  The requirement that the state dismantle its 
long-standing electricity and telecommunications monopoly in particular gave them 
pause, as they recalled the mass uproar that had erupted after a similar attempt was 
undertaken just a few years prior.8  Still, later reports revealed that several of the Costa 
Rican negotiators received salaries from a foundation funded in part by the U.S. Agency 
for International Development, leading to accusations of bias.9  As in El Salvador civil 
society groups decried the process as opaque, wherein the text of the agreement was not 
made public until after the Pacheco administration signed it.  Eventually, the delegation 
accepted some provisions most onerous to civil society – privatization of the 
telecommunications industry and enhancement of intellectual property rights seen as 
threatening to the country’s natural biodiversity.  
Costa Rica signed the preliminary agreement on January 25, 2004, a month after 
the other stakeholders, so that it could hold an additional negotiation round with the 
United States.10  It then joined its neighbors in officially signing the agreement in May 
2004.  While every other leader quickly overcame the legislative hurdles to ratification, 
Pacheco postponed submitting the agreement in Costa Rica after the April-May deadline 
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set by the U.S. Trade Representative until the Legislative Assembly passed fiscal reforms.  
Then, an additional corruption scandal that implicated a number of his cabinet members 
effectively paralyzed the Pacheco government.   These scandals fueled citizen disdain for 
the political system, as surveys showed that three out of four Costa Ricans believed that 
corruption was endemic among public officials.11  Because of the outcry against his 
government, Pacheco was forced to postpone ratification further.12  The president tried to 
explain his decision as natural for a country that valued political gradualism: speaking at 
a summit in Panama in July 2005, he said, “we Costa Ricans have a reputation for taking 
things slowly, and this has worked for us down through history.”13  Other internal crisis, 
such as the ethics scandals, obligated the President to relegate one of the highest priorities 
on Costa Rica’s political agenda to the backburner.   
The poor performance of the Pacheco administration on the CAFTA question 
resulted in greater fears that Costa Rica might actually renege on the agreement.  The 
vocal and well-organized opposition to the agreement and his general unpopularity as a 
president seemed to indicate a significant challenge to Costa Rican democracy.14  The 
continued delay meant that the future of CAFTA became a central issue in the 2006 
presidential election.  The election itself will be analyzed in greater detail in the coming 
Electoral Processes Dimension, but it suffices to say now that the pro-CAFTA Óscar 
Arias, the former President, won a narrow victory over his anti-CAFTA opponent.   
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Arias took the reins in advancing the trade agreement.  However, as will be 
evaluated in the Civil Society section, he embraced citizen participation while he still 
spearheaded ratification.  The 2006 legislative elections virtually guaranteed passage of 
the treaty through a bloc of pro-trade delegates from Arias’s National Liberation Party 
(PLN), the PUSC (the Social Christian Unity Party and Pacheco’s party), the Libertarian 
Movement (ML) and two additional one-seat parties.15  Together, these parties banded 
together to grant “fast track” authority to the various bills related to CAFTA.16  
Eventually, under much public pressure, Arias announced that he would put CAFTA to 
an up-or-down vote via popular referendum.  By holding a referendum, Costa Rica is a 
pioneer among countries signing trade agreements, a topic that will be developed later in 
this chapter. After a contentious debate, the referendum passed in October 2007, thus 
officially ratifying CAFTA.  The package of complementary bills then stalled in the 
Legislative Assembly, forcing Arias to request an extension for implementation from the 
other trade partners, set for March 30, 2008.  They eventually passed, and CAFTA finally 
entered force in Costa Rica on January 1, 2009. 
 
Initial Economic Effects 
 The principal difficulty in using Costa Rica as a case study for this analysis is the 
extremely short time span that CAFTA has been in effect there.  One year of 
implementation is too brief to measure long-term economic consequences of 
liberalization.  For this reason, the two dimensions in which CAFTA as a policy role 
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plays a role, not its written content, will figure more prominently in the forthcoming 
analysis.  This challenge will arise in the second and third dimensions we consider 
because of their relationship to the agreement’s text.  Nonetheless, some basic economic 
indicators can begin to show the direction that Costa Rica may take in the coming years.   
 Figure 5.1, available at the end of the chapter, shows data for the same measures 
given for El Salvador in Chapter 4.  During the period of the ratification debates, Costa 
Rica experienced very high economic growth, far higher than El Salvador did.  Trade as a 
percentage of GDP drove the vast majority of the economy even before CAFTA was 
implemented, so it will be interesting to observe the changes after 2009.  Foreign direct 
investment spiked after 2005, but because the complementary investor protections laws 
had not yet been passed, CAFTA-related policies cannot explain this increase.   Recent 
GDP figures showed a contraction by 1.3 percent, but this has more to do with the global 
financial crisis.  Because of Costa Rica’s strong dependence on foreign trade, the U.S. 
recession extended into Costa Rica as well.  Quarterly reports, though, have shown a 
moderate recovery in the Costa Rican economy, attributable in part to the restoration of 
trade.17 
Ultimately, an evaluation of CAFTA’s influence on the Costa Rica economy is 
futile at present.  The general dearth of information will make some portions of the 
Democratic Audit challenging.  Nonetheless, CAFTA as a political issue has still left 
significant consequences to Costa Rica.  Because of the indeterminate results, at this time 
I cannot reasonably offer an overall conclusion on the effects of CAFTA on the politics 
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and institutions.  Instead, I must rely on the differentiation between CAFTA as policy and 
subject of debate and CAFTA as an agreement with specific content on institutional 
reform.   Keeping this bifurcation in mind, I will allege that that the phenomenon of 
CAFTA has had a positive impact and that the text of CAFTA has had an indeterminate 
impact on the politics and institutions of Costa Rica. 
 
Electoral Processes Dimension: The Elections of 2006 and 2010 
 As Costa Rica addressed CAFTA as a major policy matter, its political democracy 
was undergoing a general malaise.  The two preponderant parties, the PLN and the PUSC, 
seemed to offer only staid policy alternatives that did not inspire a relatively disenchanted 
electorate.  Remarkably, though, the trade agreement played a major role in revitalizing 
Costa Rican democracy.  As one of the principal issues in the 2006 and 2010 presidential 
elections, it generated broad debate that reengaged the citizens in their government.  For 
this reason, CAFTA can fit into Costa Rica’s Democratic Audit. The results of these two 
elections and their preceding campaigns demonstrate that CAFTA has had a positive 
effect on the Electoral Process Dimension. 
 The 2002 election of Abel Pacheco, the PUSC candidate, presented a major 
affront to the Costa Rican two-party state.  The newly established Citizen Action Party, a 
breakaway faction from the PLN, won 25 percent of the vote with its representative Ottón 
Solís, a former advisor in the first Arias administration.  Because none of the major 
candidates captured the constitutionally mandated 40 percent threshold to win the 
presidency, the nation held its first runoff election since 1936, with an eventual victory 
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for Pacheco and the PUSC.  Lehoucq describes this election as the collapse of the two-
party system in Costa Rica and the rise of independent third parties with actual leverage.  
“Not since 1974 has the median voter failed to send his candidate to the presidency … 
dissatisfaction with the two-party system thus led the electorate to change the nature of 
presidential competition and activate a multi-party system that [proportional 
representation] electoral laws for the legislature permit.”18 
 At the time, predictions differed on how the 2006 elections would respond to the 
political situation.  A flowering of third parties could either reenergize the system or 
could immobilize any policymaking at all.19  President Pacheco’s decision to sign 
CAFTA but delay ratification posed the crucial question in the election.  Amid a political 
environment devoid of consensus and accomplishments, such a contentious issue could 
have sparked a major unraveling of the system.   
 In the midst of this crisis, former president Óscar Arias (1986-1990) managed to 
provoke the Constitutional Court (Sala IV) into annulling a provision banning reelection.  
The reemergence of Arias, a popular figure and a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize for 
his efforts in mediating the Central American peace accords, was greeted enthusiastically; 
Costa Ricans believed that he would stabilize the political environment and crack down 
on corruption.20  As a member of the PLN and the immediate favorite among the 
presidential candidates, his advocacy of economic liberalism gave hope to CAFTA 
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proponents that his government would certainly pass the agreement if Pacheco’s could 
not.   
The PUSC, debilitated by the corruption scandals and Pacheco’s impotence, 
played a minor role in the campaign21 – a first indication that 2006 would witness an 
exhaustion of the traditional two-party system.   The pluralism predicted after 2002 
election came true, as the field widened substantially to include aspirants from 14 
different parties.  The two chief candidates were Arias (PLN) and Ottón Solís, the PAC 
candidate who had lost to Pacheco four years prior.   
The trade agreement became the pivotal issue in the presidential campaign.22  Arias 
argued for CAFTA, saying that the agreement was a necessary step for Costa Rica’s 
economic development, while Solís and the PAC called for total renegotiation of the 
treaty.23  Solís himself presented President Pacheco with a document listing eleven 
reasons that justified re-negotiation, although the administration rebuffed his demands.24  
Rather than argue against free trade itself, Solís contended that the scheme waged 
through CAFTA in particular would denigrate the country’s unique social model and 
reduce its relatively high standards of living to those of its poorer Central American 
neighbors.25  Results from a poll conducted by the University of Costa Rica showed a 
strong correlation between candidate preferences and attitudes toward CAFTA: 71.4 
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percent of pro-Arias respondents also supported the agreement while only 44 percent of 
intended Solís voters also favored it.26 
 The election was one of the closest that Costa Rica had ever experienced, with the 
PLN mustering only 40.92 percent of the vote against 39.80 for the PAC.  Notably, the 
election broke the historical PLN-PUSC dominance with a third party, the Libertarian 
Movement (ML) taking third place in the results with 8.48 percent and the PUSC coming 
in fourth with just 3.55 percent.27  Because of the Arias’s tight victory over Solís, the 
pending Congressional vote on CAFTA was postponed again until after the Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal completed a manual recount that finalized the results.28  Arias 
officially won by only 18,000 votes, hardly the mandate that he and his party claimed to 
legitimize their completion of CAFTA.  In fact, “ex post analysis attributed the surge of 
support for Solís to a depth of feeling against CAFTA-DR, which had apparently eluded 
detection by pollsters.”29   Nonetheless, the PLN’s supposed prerogative was augmented 
by the PLN’s near sweep of the local elections held in December of that year.   These 
electoral triumphs seemed to demonstrate that a majority of the population supported 
CAFTA, since ratification was such an important part of the party’s platform.  In fact, an 
August 2005 poll taken by the newspaper La Nación noted an increase in support for 
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CAFTA by Costa Ricans to 54 percent from 43 percent the previous November; only 26 
percent of respondents rejected the agreement, down from 38 percent.30   
 As a political issue, CAFTA effected significant shifts in Costa Rica’s electoral 
democracy.  Candidates opposing the treaty were not relegated to minor parties; in fact, a 
new party and its standard-bearer who adopted CAFTA as his central concern just barely 
lost in a contest traditionally waged between the triumphant party and another faction.  
Voters perceived that Solís had a genuine chance of winning and defected from the feeble 
PUSC and from minor candidates in favor of a candidate who once had only been 
projected to win a quarter of the vote.31 Under the rubric of the Democratic Audit’s 
Electoral Processes Dimension, CAFTA had an effect, as it clearly shaped the content of 
the 2006 contest.  What had originally appeared as a guaranteed win for Arias turned out 
to be one of the narrowest margins of victory in Costa Rican history.  In addition, the 
election established the PAC as a legitimate political voice to replace the lackluster 
PUSC and one that offered a new economic alternative for voters.  The results for the 
legislative elections also forced the PLN to reconcile its ratification strategy, as it failed 
to win a simple majority of seats.32  Although the party ended up forming a coalition with 
other parties to approve the treaty, this still proves that tactics in Costa Rican politics 
needed to deal with greater pluralism.   Above all, though, the 2006 election reenergized 
the electorate into participating in their democracy, even if this participation entailed 
denunciation of the prevailing economic agenda.  A greater variety of alternatives for 
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economic policy, illustrated by their CAFTA positions, abolished the equivalency among 
parties that had characterized the system.  As one index in the Electoral Processes 
Dimension indicates, a wider range of options for voters is a key feature in a democracy. 
  This citizen involvement later expressed itself in the historic 2007 referendum.   
The referendum on CAFTA ratification merits extensive analysis, but because of the 
vocal public campaign that preceded it, it will be evaluated through the lens of the Civil 
Society dimension later in this chapter.  It suffices to comment now that the referendum 
passed with a small majority, thus narrowly approving the treaty.  It also generated a 
groundswell of popular enthusiasm that has since been sustained.  As the Electoral 
Processes dimension deals with elections for government positions, we will focus now on 
the recent presidential vote held February 7, 2010.  As the first national contest after the 
implementation of CAFTA, the trade agreement played a large role in the campaign 
discourse.  It also became a means for citizens to convey their attitudes toward the 
outgoing Arias administration, the standard-bearer for the agreement during the 2006 
vote and the referendum.  As other scholarly analyses of the 2010 election have yet to be 
published, this thesis seeks to introduce a new theme to the literature by positing that 
CAFTA had a positive effect on this vote. 
The election featured a wide range of candidates from across the ideological 
spectrum, but as the campaign progressed, three particular individuals took the lead.  The 
frontrunner always was Laura Chinchilla, a member of the PLN and Arias’s former vice-
president.  Representing the ideological center-left, Chinchilla pledged “continuity” with 
the Arias government.  She argued that, “the best thing that can happen to us is to 
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consolidate the work of Mr. Óscar.”33  In keeping with the Arias position, Chinchilla 
endorsed CAFTA as it was ratified and additional free trade initiatives to further Costa 
Rica’s market liberalization.  Her greatest opposition came from Ottón Solís, the leftist 
PAC candidate bested by Arias in the 2006 election, and from Otto Guevara, a candidate 
from the right-wing Libertarian Movement (ML).  The fact that the ML, which had 
secured only about 8 percent of the vote in the previous election, managed to field a 
relatively mainstream candidate exemplifies the transformation from an intransigent two-
party state that Costa Rica has seen to a pluralist, multiparty democracy.  These two 
candidates presented themselves as change agents; their television campaign 
advertisements portrayed Chinchilla as a puppet manipulated by Arias. 
Criticisms of CAFTA and Chinchilla’s support of it came from both sides: 
Guevara argued that the agreement was conservative, saying “CAFTA was not a true 
opening of the market.  There are still some things hidden in the closet that would bring 
in much more investment.”34  He recommended privatizing the national oil refinery 
monopoly and dollarizing the Costa Rica economy to attract more foreign investment, 
effectively endorsing even greater economic liberalization than his opponents on the left 
and center-left.  Solís declared that upon taking office he would dispatch a commission to 
the U.S. to overhaul the treaty, and that it would be the primary topic in a potential first 
meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama.35   
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In a poll conducted three months before the election, 53 percent of respondents 
pledged to vote for Laura Chinchilla, well above the 40 percent threshold.  Guevara, the 
ML candidate, received only 15.7 percent and Solís (PAC), only 12.3 percent, with the 
PUSC candidate barely commanding 1.5 percent.36  Over the next few months, though, 
the race narrowed.  Solís actually accused the polls of inaccuracy and overt prevarication, 
observing that polls before the 2006 presidential contest and the 2007 CAFTA 
referendum had projected outcomes that widely diverged from the actual results.37  Less 
than a month before the election, two smaller progressive parties unofficially withdrew 
their candidates from the race to ally behind the PAC, which they viewed as the most 
viable option on the Left to win the election.  Together, the alliance presented a common 
program that placed renegotiation of CAFTA as its paramount objective.  This late-term 
development sought to stave off further movement to the right among the campaign, 
which narrowed into a contest basically between Chinchilla and Guevara, two pro-market 
candidates.  Furthermore, the alliance tried to consolidate the grassroots anti-CAFTA 
coalitions whose loyalties were split among progressive factions.38  This affair 
emblemizes the importance of CAFTA to the campaign.  In spite of the treaty’s 
implementation, it still served as a point of contention that could rally voters, especially 
on the Left.  All the candidates issued promises on trade, given its significant influence in 
the Costa Rican economy.   
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 The electoral results surprised political analysts who had expected a much tighter 
outcome.  Laura Chinchilla won with 46.8 percent of the vote, avoiding a runoff and 
besting Solís and Guevara, who captured 25.1 percent and 20.9 percent, respectfully.  It is 
worth noting that Solís’s charges against the polls were correct: not only had the most 
recent surveys predicted a runoff, they had placed Guevara ahead of Solís.  The PLN also 
won a plurality of 23 out of 57 seats in the Legislative Assembly, although without a 
majority, it will need to seek coalitions to pass its most contentious projects.39   
The triumphant presidential candidate in Costa Rican elections has tended to 
appeal to the median voter, which until recently resulted in the two major parties drifting 
toward the center.40  In 2010, the centrist Chinchilla, articulating a program of stability 
and continuity, again appealed to the median voter far more than her opponents on the 
ideological right and left. 
Only recently minor parties, the PAC and the ML managed to strengthen their 
position in the political system; the ML more than doubled its share of votes in this 
election since the 2006 contest.   These two factions have fashioned themselves as anti-
establishment alternatives that, while not victorious in this presidential election, will 
continue to be formidable political rivals to the PLN.41  CAFTA and similar economic 
policy thus further opened up the range of ideological alternatives for Costa Rican 
democracy. 
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 The fact that the PLN candidate won the election after that party had associated 
itself inextricably with CAFTA is especially significant.  Voters selected stability over 
change, voicing their support, if not for CAFTA itself, then for its proponents.   
Chinchilla managed to win a larger share of the vote than the agreement itself did in the 
2007 referendum, which barely squeaked by with a majority of votes.   One can speculate 
if Costa Ricans considered CAFTA a settled matter after its approval in the referendum; 
no one could henceforth argue that the trade agreement was approved over the will of the 
people.  If this is the case, voters preferred continuity in policy rather than enduring 
another political fight to renegotiate the treaty. 
At the beginning of the decade, voter apathy started to afflict Costa Rican 
democracy.  Near uniformity among the political parties fostered disinterest that was 
supplemented by poor executive leadership.  Once free trade became a campaign issue, 
CAFTA brought ideological diversity to the country and regenerated citizen enthusiasm.  
The 2006 election featured a razor-thin victory by an established party – with its 
acclaimed representative – over a new one, when ordinarily such parties gain small shares 
of the vote in their first nationwide elections.  These two parties contrasted on the 
principal campaign question, free trade.  The next election expanded pluralism even more 
by pitting three candidates against each other over the products of the Arias 
administration, whose legacy will be defined by the agreement.  Costa Rica clearly 
experienced major developments in its Electoral Processes Dimension through the policy 
question posed by CAFTA.  Therefore, I can safely conclude that CAFTA had a positive 
impact on this dimension. 
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Open and Accountable Institutions  
 Similar to the often plodding developments in electoral politics, Costa Rican 
political institutions has been characterized by gradual and methodical change, a principle 
invoked even by President Pacheco in postponing CAFTA’s ratification.  The 
participatory nature of the democratic process has in fact handicapped the ability to 
spearhead major reform.  Public sector reform has frequently encountered structural 
obstacles that delay the realization of initiatives.  Particular to Costa Rica is its reliance 
on autonomous public institutions to coordinate domestic and social policy.  More than 
100 such institutions administer and regulate banking, pensions, and health care.42  The 
Costa Rican Institute of Electricity (ICE), funded in part through telephone and utilities 
charges, was heavily involved in the telecommunications industry, and its privatization 
was a major source of contention in CAFTA negotiations.  Clark notes that, “there is little 
popular feeling in Costa Rica that government institutions and services that are mistakes 
that ought to be dismantled.”43  During the 1990’s, subsequent administrations sought to 
privatize large public institutions, but union opposition and incoherent measures stymied 
their intentions.44   Partisan gridlock in the Legislative Assembly and the short electoral 
cycle in Costa Rica – which included until 2006 only one-term presidencies – 
discouraged opportunities to execute transformational projects.45   
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The piecemeal approach to policymaking is quite evident in the CAFTA 
proceedings, which took an extended period of time just to achieve ratification, and then 
implementation generated additional legislative battles.  The plans that address the 
government institutions, as mandated by the text and the side agreements, especially 
demonstrate this quality.  Institutional reform was always a controversial point for Costa 
Rica’s involvement in CAFTA, given the importance of its welfare state to its historic 
development strategy and to popular opinion.  Regardless, CAFTA presented an 
extraordinary opportunity to privatize Costa Rican institutions.  This section will consider 
the impact of privatization in the so-called implementation agenda of CAFTA – the 
institutional and legal reforms associated with implementation.  The reforms were mostly 
based on statute: because of Costa Rica’s delay in adhering to the accord, its government 
could not take advantage of the U.S. trade capacity projects to modernize its institutions 
dedicate to labor rights.   Still, the time frame has been too short to make any substantial 
assessments.  Despite the preliminary evidence and the large case study of 
telecommunications reform upon which I will rely, I suggest that CAFTA has had neutral 
effect on Open and Accountable Institutions in Costa Rica. 
Unlike with the case of El Salvador, it is more difficult to use indicators and 
standards to gauge the development of institutions in Costa Rica, mainly because of the 
recency of CAFTA in that country.  In fact, at the time of this writing the World Bank has 
not published a revised edition of its Worldwide Governance Indicators that includes 
updated 2009 figures.  The lack of data associated with CAFTA notwithstanding, we can 
still draw on the Indicators to establish context.  Between 2003 and 2008, ratings of voice 
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and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, and rule of law in Costa 
Rica have all decreased.46 Note that while this time period does not include any years 
while CAFTA has been in effect, it does span the years of its negotiation and debate in 
the Costa Rica public forum through the Arias election and the referendum.  While 
CAFTA’s content could not have had any impact on these indicators, it is still safe to 
argue that the agreement entered into force amid a nationwide decline in institutions.  
 The Ease of Doing Business surveys from the World Bank also can provide some 
basic context, although no recent data is available to illustrate any shifts in the 
commercial environment post-CAFTA implementation.  We will again consider three 
indicators for political institutions and entrepreneurship: “registering property,” 
“protecting investors,” and “contract enforcement.”  Between 2006 and 2010, the cost of 
registering property has dropped by only 0.2 percent of the property value, and the time 
and number of procedures required has stayed the same – 21 days and 6 procedures.  As 
in El Salvador, investor protections have remained the same across the time period.  
Contract enforcement did improve after 2007, when the cost of dispute resolution nearly 
halved from 46.8 percent to 24.3 percent of the claim.47 
 This background information suggests that the business environment was 
relatively stable as CAFTA came into force.   It is arguable that the many changes 
obligated by the treaty will change the environment in some way, but it is too early to 
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issue conclusions.  After CAFTA was ultimately ratified as a treaty, the Legislative 
Assembly had to pass a bundle of thirteen laws considered vital for the country’s 
incorporation into the treaty.  These laws addressed issues of patent, government 
procurement, and regulatory reform, among others.   A number of sensitive provisions 
dealt with telecommunications reform, which will be assessed in detail in a moment.  One 
law, the “Ley de la Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor,” 
established a Commission on Competition to safeguard the rights of foreign and national 
businesses to operate in the freer market.48   
 During the implementation period after the referendum had passed and President 
Arias affirmed the treaty as law, anti-CAFTA members of the congress used 
parliamentary tactics to block votes on complementary bills.  Their legislative sabotage 
succeeded in forcing President Arias to extend his deadline for implementation from 
March 1, 2008.49  In the end, though, free trade prevailed and the legislature approved the 
final bill, regarding intellectual property, in November 2008, leaving only a few pending 
regulatory modifications before actual implementation.50 
Even after implementation, some laws to accompany the trade agreement 
remained unapproved.  For example, legislative discord had precluded the passage of a 
provision on copyright protection, known as the 14th Amendment.  Until its adoption, 
though, the U.S. continued to bar additional Costa Rican sugar imports.  The former 
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Minister of Foreign Trade derided the U.S. action as an attempt to delegitimize the 
credibility of Costa Rica as a trade partner.51 
Costa Rica has sustained high institutional integrity going into CAFTA, although 
its degree has declined somewhat in the past years.  The 13 implementation laws 
certainly will have an impact on the business climate due to the protections for 
investments and property rights, so we will expect to see improvement among the Ease of 
Doing Business measures.  Unfortunately, none of the aforementioned data provides any 
information on the quality of the institutions themselves.  Government procedures and 
transparency may not have experienced any enhancement due to the CAFTA ratification 
debate, and the lack of recent data makes drawing conclusions after implementation 
impossible.  Therefore, our analysis through this point indicates that CAFTA has had an 
indeterminate effect on Open and Accountable Institutions.  We must rely on individual 
cases, rather than data, to assess the institutional effects of CAFTA in Costa Rica.  The 
proposed effort to privatize the national electricity and telecommunications industry may 
serve as an exemplar.   
In many Latin American countries with extensive welfare states, such as Costa 
Rica, efforts to reform institutions have faltered due to complex organizational turf wars 
between state and societal interests groups.52  In the implementation of CAFTA in Costa 
Rica, this scenario played out in the attempt to privatize the state electricity and telecoms 
company, the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE), the last monopoly of this industry in 
                                                           
51
 Daniel Chacón, “Retraso con ley del Cafta sería un problema de imagen,” La República, 
December 12, 2009.  See also Chrissie Long, “In Costa Rica, CAFTA hits a snag,” Tico Times 
January 15, 2010. 
52
 Clark, 9.   
160 
 
 
 
Latin America.  In Costa Rica, the “telecommunications” sector has encompassed the 
telephone system in addition to modern internet and network information technology.53  
The process to reform this important institution serves as a notable case study in 
assessing the Open and Accountable Institutions in that country.  
The ICE enjoyed high esteem among the population and had historically 
accomplished its objectives efficiently despite being state-run.  Established in 1949 
alongside the drafting of the current constitution, the ICE provided for both energy 
generation and national telecommunications.  It played a significant role in the state-
directed industrialization of the mid-20th Century: “as electricity was a key concern for all 
sectors of society, the ICE became probably the most emblematic institution of the Costa 
Rican development model.”54  The Institute’s work enabled Costa Rica to develop one of 
the most comprehensive telephone networks in the developing world.  The ICE had 
successfully connected 95 percent of the population with phone coverage and had 
electrified almost 97 percent of the territory, charging service fees far lower than the 
prevailing rates in the rest of Central America.55  For this reason, it became a source of 
significant national pride.   
Notwithstanding this success, the state electricity industry could not avoid the 
paradigm shift in the Costa Rican economic model toward market liberalization after the 
1980’s foreign debt crisis.  During the first Arias administration, it became clear the ICE 
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could not afford the necessary investments in infrastructure as rapid technological change 
rendered many of them obsolete and unproductive.56  Once a regional leader in 
telecommunications, Costa Rica now lags behind its less developed neighbors in terms of 
phone line penetration – only 44 lines per 100 residents.57   The ICE could not sustain its 
previous successes in supplying nearly ubiquitous electrical and telephone service.  By 
the end of the 1990’s, 70 percent of rural households lacked phone service.58  Keeping 
with the hegemonic neoliberal model, subsequent PLN and PUSC administrations 
proposed plans to privatize the industry or at least start to open it somewhat to investment 
from the private sector.  These projects consistently collided with vocal opposition from 
public sector unions and the general public, which overwhelmingly opposed breaking up 
state monopolies such as the ICE.59  Indeed, loyalty to the ICE divided the political 
parties themselves: Ottón Solís was originally Arias’s planning minister until he resigned 
in protest of the administration’s plans to liberalize the ICE.60   
The 2000 attempt to privatize the telecommunications industry erupted in massive 
protests across the country.  The “Combo del ICE” law restructured the state company 
and initiated the liberalization of the energy and telecommunications sectors.  While the 
bill narrowly passed the Legislative Assembly with support from the PLN and PUSC, 
previous popular disillusionment with the political parties erupted into outright anger; 
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this would be a crucial episode in the rising national dissatisfaction with democracy at the 
beginning of the decade.   Union members and university students organized large anti-
Combo mobilizations that were supported by two-thirds of the population, according to 
one survey.  Eventually, the government succumbed to the demonstrations and retracted 
the law, but citizens expressed their sentiments at the ballot box in 2002, handing a large 
portion of the vote to the PAC’s Solís, the anti-Combo candidate.61 
  This brief account is necessary to explain the precarious political environment 
encountered by telecommunications reform through CAFTA.  Not only is the ICE a key 
state institution, it carries with it a sense of patriotism.  As the government entered into 
CAFTA negotiations, its largest state enterprise was the ICE, which employed some 
12,000 workers, or 10 percent of federal employees.62  Initially the Costa Rican trade 
delegates balked at offering any concessions on telecommunications reform, but they 
eventually surrendered.   In the ratified text, Costa Rica pledged to undertake a gradual 
privatization of the private network services, internet services, and mobile phone services 
sectors, as long as the process facilitated the inclusion of poor and underserved segments 
of society.63  By embedding the entire telecoms liberalization scheme in the free trade 
agreement, the government managed to reignite the fury from the “Combo del ICE” 
fiasco as well, helping unite social groups in opposition to institutional restructuring.64 
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 In terms of the actual institutional reform, the ratification of CAFTA set in motion 
a series of processes to privatize the ICE.  One law in the implementation agenda opened 
mobile phone and Internet services to private concessions.  In signing it into law, 
President Arias called it part of the “backbone” of the implementation agenda, further 
declaring that its passage reinforced Costa Rica’s commitment to free trade.65  In May 
2008, the Legislative Assembly approved a law that finally dissolved the ICE’s 
monopoly in the telecommunications market.  It then created a new government body, the 
Superintendence of Telecommunications (SUTEL), to regulate the privatized industry.  
The piecemeal liberalization will not completely sideline the ICE, which will keep 
control over telephone land lines and will grant the obligatory licenses for private entities 
to operate legally in the market.66  The state has since granted access for 19 
telecommunications companies to enter the newly competitive Internet services market, 
choosing from hundreds of potential investors that submitted requests.67  SUTEL has 
lauded the rise in competition as a means to improve rural access to technology.  More 
providers will race to provide services in remote areas of the country currently untouched 
by Internet connections due to the inefficiencies in the ICE infrastructure.68   
Cellular phone deregulation has taken place more slowly, due to bureaucratic 
wrangling over the process during the first year of CAFTA’s implementation.  After 
liberalization, ICE will no longer be the sole cellular phone provider in Costa Rica, as 
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SUTEL has called for an auction to sell off the rights to the mobile phone sector.  
Investors include a number of multinational telephone companies based in Latin America 
to offer wireless service alone in Costa Rica.  These private businesses will have to 
compete with ICE, which will maintain a smaller but still substantive influence in the 
telecoms market.69  
 How does telecommunications reform in Costa Rica fit into the Open and 
Accountable Institutions Dimension?  Through CAFTA, the government has finally 
managed to surmount obstacles to liberalize ICE, perhaps one of the most popular and 
most accessible state institutions.   It is too early to say how liberalization will affect the 
ICE’s ability to provide quality products for the population and how responsive this state 
enterprise will be to both popular needs and the market.  We can make some projections, 
however, based on the literature discussed in Chapter 2 on capitalism and democracy.  A 
stronger market for telecommunications will improve and increase the connectivity of the 
citizens and will thus enable them to communicate faster and better, serving the 
democratic process.  On the other hand, citizens may not rely on the state as a voice 
acting nominally in their favor would once foreign telecoms firms began to penetrate the 
market.  Still, though, the government has approached the process to open up the 
telecoms market systematically by auctioning some sectors while keeping others state-
owned.  Through SUTEL it also will maintain a strong regulatory capacity, thus ensuring 
that Costa Ricans receive fair treatment and that the market remains accountable.  At this 
                                                           
69
 Ronald Buchanan, “Costa Rica bandwidth sale pulls wide interest,” Financial Times, January 
25, 2010.  
165 
 
 
 
time, then, I will argue that telecommunications liberalization, as initiated through 
CAFTA, will have a positive effect on Costa Rican institutions. 
 Based on my two grades for the Open and Accountable Institutions Dimension – 
indeterminate and positive – I will assert that overall, the dimension has enjoyed a 
weakly positive impact from CAFTA.  The actual consequences of the new laws on 
intellectual property and government institutions are still being explored, and further 
study will provide some answers to the questions that arose during the agreement’s 
negotiation.  These include the role of the state to protect natural resources, for example.   
In the coming years, analyses of democracy and CAFTA in Costa Rica should pay 
attention to manner in which the government addresses the future of the ICE, a once 
beloved state enterprise.   This episode may offer clues in future institutional 
development. 
 
Civil and Political Liberties 
 Given the short amount of time that CAFTA has been in effect in Costa Rica, the 
Civil and Political Liberties dimension will consist of the least amount of information.  
Unlike in El Salvador, where four years of implementation has yielded some positive and 
negative consequences in labor rights – the specific focus in this analysis – Costa Rica 
has had little opportunity to initiate and undergo major reforms in its labor sector.   
Therefore, I will mostly consider the content of the treaty and the trade capacity 
agreements alongside it that have intended to address labor rights.  Their successes or 
failures, however, are still undetermined.   
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 According to the International Labor Organization, Costa Rica maintained 
relatively high labor standards before enacting CAFTA.  The strong democracy with a 
substantial social welfare system offered workers considerable benefits and protections.  
The Labor Code recognizes the freedom of workers to associate into unions or even 
dissociate from them.  The Code also sets obligatory minimum standards for employees 
to accept worker collective bargaining and strikes.70  Costa Rica ratified all eight 
fundamental Conventions considered by the ILO, including the two that El Salvador had 
not prior to CAFTA implementation.  In fact, according to the Costa Rican legal system, 
international labor laws to which Costa Rica supersede any related constitutional or 
domestic statutory law.  The ILO did raise a concern over the speed at which anti-union 
discrimination suits are adjudicated, mostly because Costa Ricans feel so confident with 
the labor law courts that they flood the system with claims.  Nonetheless, the Supreme 
Court heeded the international organization’s recommendations and prepared new 
reforms to expedite the judicial process.71  
The U.S. Trade Representative’s office heralded several immediate improvements 
to Costa Rican labor laws that resulted from CAFTA-related negotiations.   The 
Legislative Assembly passed new regulations to clarify legal protections for labor unions 
and to guarantee an expedited trial of anti-union violations – notably, an ILO 
recommendation.  The appointment of 37 new labor court judges has helped to accelerate 
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the judicial process. Additionally, the government created a new alternative dispute 
mechanism to solve labor abuse cases through conciliation.72  Notably, these initiatives 
only dealt with legal adjudication of violations, rather than through bureaucratic 
mechanisms to monitor or curtail them in the first place.   Costa Rica did not receive the 
same trade capacity projects that El Salvador or any other CAFTA signatory did; 
furthermore the Trade Representative does not list any program to modernize or improve 
the Costa Rican Ministry of Trade from its $40 million appropriated for this purpose 
across Central America.73  Scholars speculate that since Costa Rica did not implement the 
treaty until 2009, the year the appropriated funds were set to expire, it could not enjoy 
any of the benefits offered through the U.S. labor capacity projects.   In this respect, 
CAFTA has not had the same initial programmatic effects for political and civil liberties 
in Costa Rica as it did in El Salvador.   
 A number of projects stipulated by the labor side agreements to CAFTA for 
Central America have initiatives in Costa Rica.  Part of the $6.92 million appropriation 
through the U.S. Department of Labor is distributed to the Costa Rican Foundation for 
Peace and Democracy (FUNPADEM) to provide better equipment and training for labor 
inspectors.  FUNPADEM received an additional $4.2 million to support its work.   
 Fortunately, Costa Rica has not experienced the instances of labor repression as in 
the other countries that signed onto CAFTA.  The WOLA report on labor rights does not 
mention any examples of labor intimidation, harassment or even assault related to 
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CAFTA in Costa Rica.  This distinguishes the country from El Salvador, where the 
Pacific Rim Mining dispute has turned violent at times, and from Guatemala, for example, 
where many labor organizers have been assassinated.   One proposed bill in the 
Legislative Assembly did attempt to restructure the work week that could have eliminated 
overtime pay for some workers, but it is unclear if this bill became law.74 
A thorough analysis of the labor situation in Costa Rica post-CAFTA is extremely 
complicated, not least because the relevant laws are still fresh.  Furthermore, there is little 
information available about the improvements rendered to the institutions charged with 
protecting labor rights.  Costa Rica started with such a high level of political protections, 
so it is questionable that the funds authorized from the U.S. government had the same 
rate of impact as they did in other CAFTA countries.  The U.S. appropriations to improve 
the labor ministries were dispersed across Central America to subsidize similar projects 
in each country.  While some funds were earmarked for country-specific initiatives, one 
can wonder the degree to which the authors of the bill took into account differences in the 
particular national demands.  Without any data to prove otherwise, I must conclude that 
CAFTA has had an indeterminate effect on the Civil and Political Dimension.   
 
Civil Society: The 2007 Popular Referendum 
 Indisputably, the most significant aspect of Costa Rica’s CAFTA debate was the 
2007 popular referendum on the agreement’s implementation.  For the first time 
anywhere, the government of a country seeking a free trade agreement placed the policy 
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decision up to a vote, thus enabling citizens to express their opinion on such a divisive 
issue through a legitimized medium.  The narrow victory of CAFTA did permit Arias, the 
champion of the agreement, to realize his long-sought goal, but this belies the actual 
momentous nature of the referendum.  The vote reinvigorated Costa Rican democracy 
through a fierce debate that enflamed civil society.  As I will continue to detail, these 
results had a positive effect on the Civil Society Dimension in this Democratic Audit.   
  Costa Rica enjoyed a relatively strong civil society sector for much of its history 
as a democracy, as its citizens have taken part in civic organizations and engaged in 
political affairs at levels far higher than their peers in the Latin America and the 
developing world in general.75  Unlike the political environment, civil society did not 
enervate in the beginning of the decade; in fact, the crisis of legitimacy wrought by the 
corruption scandals mobilized civil society discontent.76  The 2000 protests against the 
threatened ICE privatization amassed a large social movement that clearly had an impact, 
since the government reneged on its objective.  This movement also laid the foundation 
for the later anti-CAFTA protests; the resentment of demonstrators who opposed 
liberalization of one key industry only multiplied once Costa Rica began to pursue an 
international treaty that would extend liberalization through the economy.   
The negotiations themselves did encourage some level of civil society participation, but 
as in El Salvador, in reality the participation was minimal.   A commission of prominent 
citizens formed by Pacheco to assess the treaty concluded that the agreement was neither 
positive nor negative prima facie but that measures should be implemented to mitigate its 
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more harmful effects.77   In the earlier round of negotiations, President Pacheco seemed 
more amenable to the participation of civil society groups.  The Ministry of Foreign 
Trade established venues for citizen feedback that received commendation for its 
inclusiveness.78  Forty-two “side room” sessions were convened over the duration of the 
negotiations.  Certain think tanks, universities and trade unions sponsored additional 
forums – with trade negotiators in attendance – to discuss the implications of the treaty 
and, in many cases, offer alternatives to the market-based development strategies.79  The 
actual impact of this civil society representation, though, is dubious: one reflection on the 
negotiation process suggested that, “participants were unable to effectively raise 
questions about larger social and economic goals and the way the trade agreement 
advanced of impeded the realization of these objectives.”80  
Regardless of their involvement, civil society groups had to cope with Pacheco’s 
signing of CAFTA.  Almost immediately, though, anti-CAFTA organizations began to 
protest further implantation of neoliberalism in Costa Rica.  The groundswell of popular 
resistance gave the Pacheco administration pause, leading to his rather cautious position 
and postponement of ratification.  As was already addressed, CAFTA occupied a 
significant position in the Arias election and the early part of his presidency as he tried to 
pass the treaty through the legislature.  In October 2006, resistors held two days of public 
                                                           
77
 Carazo Vargas, 3. 
78
 Frajman, 2. 
79
 Diego Sánchez-Ancochea, “State and Society: The Political Economy of DR-CAFTA in Costa 
Rica, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador,” in Responding to Globalization: The Political 
Economy of Hemispheric Integration in the Americas, ed. Diego Sánchez-Anchochea and 
Kenneth C. Shadlen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 193.  
80
 Spalding, 11. 
171 
 
 
 
action against the agreement, enthused by a poll showing a majority of voters now 
supporting withdrawal of CAFTA from consideration.81   
Popular anti-CAFTA organizations began to call for a national referendum on 
CAFTA’s ratification in the Legislative Assembly.  The ability to convene a referendum 
was only a recent phenomenon in Costa Rica.  A 2002 constitutional amendment had 
bestowed the citizenry with so-called “direct democracy” powers, including the right for 
the people to enact a popular initiative or the right for the legislative or executive 
branches to convoke a referendum.  Citizens themselves proposed the anti-CAFTA 
referendum to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal armed with 132,000 signatures, the 
required five percent of the electorate needed to present an initiative petition.82  In April 
2007, the Tribunal consented, but Arias, once skeptical of a referendum, co-opted the 
plan and personally called for a simple “yes” or “no” vote on CAFTA ratification.  The 
Legislative Assembly and the Electoral Tribunal quickly approved the referendum and 
set the date for September but later postponed it until October 7.83   
The referendum campaign polarized two formidable forces to determine the future 
of free trade in Costa Rica.  The resistance movement was composed of a heterogeneous 
amalgamation of groups that managed to proclaim a united message while keeping some 
level of autonomy.  The level of organization and tactics that they exercised has been one 
of the most significant factors in determining the impact of the CAFTA debate to civil 
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society.  Opponents of CAFTA admonished the agreement and the means to approve it as 
an affront to Costa Rican democracy.  Throughout the public deliberations these factions 
claimed that the state institutions failed to oversee the referendum process, advantaging 
the proponents and even undermining the rule of law.  The latter argument came from an 
understanding that a functioning liberal democracy encouraged equal levels of political 
expression.84 
Small membership-based groups formed the seeds of the later organized anti-
CAFTA movement.  The National Coordinating Committee Against CAFTA emerged in 
2002 to help arrange loose mobilizations of trade unions, small civic organizations, 
student and church groups, and non-governmental policy organizations.  They began to 
draw more support as CAFTA was approved and set to become law.  A number of 
smaller constituent committees within the larger group helped organize resistance 
activities across Costa Rica, including one national strike that paralyzed the economy 
briefly.85  The Patriotic Committee Supporting the National Campaign against CAFTA 
tried to legitimize the cause in the mainstream political arena by presenting official 
statements of oppositions by prominent politicians, artists and academics.86 Distinct 
branches of Patriotic Committees emerged in a rapid and decentralized way across the 
nation.  They had an impressive ability to raise funds and coordinate activities through 
informal networks that emphasized discussions and participation of each individual 
member.  These groups seem particularly important in considering the political 
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consequences of civil society development. “Generally, it seemed those in the 
Committees worked hard to democratize the whole CAFTA debate, by bringing up 
concerns and ideas from ‘below.’”87  
 The phenomenon of transnational advocacy networks is reified in the Costa Rica 
anti-CAFTA debate.  The Iniciativa CID and the Bloque Centroamericano (another name 
for the Foro Mesoamericano), the two major coalitions that directed the protests in El 
Salvador also maintained ancillary organizations in Costa Rica.  After the Salvadoran 
counterparts failed to thwart CAFTA’s implementation in their country, they organized in 
solidarity with their Costa Rican brethren to defend against the agreement there.   In 
Costa Rica, the Iniciativa CID coalesced a number of unions and university groups, while 
the Bloque Centroamericano mainly acted through a different organization, the Encuentro 
Popular, itself a synthesis of a hundred smaller groups.  The Encuentro Popular was 
rather loose in its structure, as its members participated in a variety of other activities, but 
they had all united to resist the application of the neoliberal ideology behind CAFTA.88  
Furthermore, the membership of Patriotic Committees often consisted of veteran activists 
who recruited new people, and they often collaborated with other civil society groups.89  
As in El Salvador, the CAFTA debate thus encouraged pre-existing civil society 
organizations to associate into larger bureaucratic structures that could express 
themselves more influentially through their size.   
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 The PAC, the leftist party that emerged in the 2002 election under Ottón Solís, 
had less impact in the run-up to the referendum than one might expect from a mainstream 
political party.  Bereft of a coherent message, which wavered between renegotiation and 
outright rejection of CAFTA, the PAC ultimately relinquished much of the leadership in 
the resistance movement to the civil society.90  This seems to demonstrate the legitimacy 
of the civil society organizations in the debate, as they succeeded in outdoing an actual 
political party in running the campaign.   In fact, research showed that anti-CAFTA 
voters were more influenced by members of civil society, particularly scholars, than by 
the PAC.  In contrast, pro-CAFTA voters were more likely influenced by the PLN than 
by non-governmental groups.91 
In the period preceding the referendum, all these organizations joined forces 
behind one Movimiento Patriótico NO al TLC.  Still, they maintained some autonomy 
and diversity, which afforded them the ability to personalize their messages.  The 
unconventional use of art and humor in the campaign materials, for example, contrasted 
with the tactics of the CAFTA proponents.92  This did put them at a major cost 
disadvantage: they could only rely on grassroots funding to bring what amounted to about 
$30 million, unlike the “YES” campaign that generated an estimated $500 million 
through private individual and corporate donations.93  Without the means to finance 
large-scale media blitzes, anti-CAFTA activists organized marches, work stoppages, 
highway blockades, mass distribution of educational materials, and meetings with 
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legislators.94  Eugenio Trejos, the rector of the National Technologic Institute of Costa 
Rica, adopted the top leadership role of the nationwide “NO” campaign.  As an academic, 
not a politician, he represented a more impartial wing from the hodge-podge of anti-
CAFTA activists.  Because of the campaign’s regional decentralization, Trejos primarily 
contributed a recognizable face to the public, rather than overt management.95 
 On the other side, the CAFTA proponents executed a well-organized campaign to 
showcase the trade agreement as beneficial for the country and to marginalize the 
opponents as fringe radicals.  Some analysts have accused the debate of asymmetry, as 
the “YES” side had the financial and organizational advantages that accompany 
government backing.  Arias and the PLN headed the strategy by proposing that the 
agreement would benefit the country while not encumbering the state’s ability to fund its 
entitlement programs.  Rejecting CAFTA would actually harm the economy, they argued, 
as it would force foreign capital flight and then contribute to job losses.96  Because of the 
resulting inconsistency with its other Central American neighbors, Costa Rica might lose 
its destined FDI to a different CAFTA.     
As “YES” on CAFTA was the position of the administration, proponents of the 
agreement enjoyed incredible advantages by mechanizing state institutions. Unlike the 
PAC, the PLN employed its party apparatus to campaign in favor of the referendum.  As 
a political organization with far more regional influence, the PLN circulated its national 
policies through local party operations and placed pressure on regional mayors in rural 
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areas.  During legislative recesses, PLN deputies returned to their constituencies and 
named certain local leaders as the catalysts for district-wide campaigns.97  President Arias 
made CAFTA a cause célèbre of his presidency, calling it an “opportunity” to solve 
underdevelopment of Central America and a “step that has to be taken.”98  He personally 
appeared on television to stump for the referendum and assumed the undisputed 
leadership role in the campaign.   Had the PLN not funneled such active support and 
organizational strength to the referendum, it is somewhat doubtful that the CAFTA vote 
would have succeeded.99  
 The political establishment framed the discourse by attributing the legitimacy of 
the transformational referendum to the fortitude of Costa Rican democracy.  Distancing 
itself from its earlier skepticism of a popular vote, the mainstream described it as a 
natural and stabilizing democratic process.100  In their opinion the popular demonstrations 
mobilized by the anti-CAFTA movement actually jeopardized democracy through 
violence.101  The proponents also capitalized on their relationship with the news media to 
publicize their arguments.  They published editorials in newspapers, ran television and 
radio propaganda, and distributed informational documents to generate conversations at 
universities and public forums.102 The “NO” movement accused the news media of 
generally offering relatively favorable coverage of CAFTA.  The media often 
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downplayed the policy alternatives enunciated by the resistors and instead sensationalized 
their demonstrations, effectively depicting them as extremists.   News stories allegedly 
held a bias that made a vote against CAFTA seem abnormal and frankly ludicrous.103  
The U.S. media also propagated a fear that the anti-CAFTA movements were covertly 
supplied by Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro.104  The conception that anti-CAFTA 
movements aligned with the radical leftist agenda in Latin America resembles much of 
the debate in El Salvador; in Costa Rica, trade advocates sparked fears that a rejection of 
CAFTA would draw the country into the sphere that was markedly undemocratic.   
 In the middle of the referendum battle, an official government memorandum 
directed to President Arias was leaked that revealed the administration’s strategy.  
Authored by Kevin Casas, the vice-president and Minister of Planning, and Fernando 
Sánchez, a legislator and Arias’s cousin, the memo consisted of several recommended 
tactics to confront the vocal opposition.   For example, they called for a broad social 
coalition beyond government officials out of trepidation that the referendum could fail 
without support for it coming from small businesses or amenable labor unions.  “The 
coalition against us is formidable: universities, the church, universities, environmental 
groups, etc.  And, on the other side, in favor of CAFTA, there is only the government, 
and some of the big entrepreneurs.  There is no way to win like this.”105  The memo also 
recommended a massive media campaign, saying that, “we should have no shame in 
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saturating the media with publicity.”  In particular, the authors argued that fear tactics 
should be employed – a rejection of CAFTA would cripple democratic institutions and 
would increase the influence of Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro in the country.106  One 
particularly egregious item in the memo also recommended that the central government 
withhold funds from mayors whose localities voted no in the referendum and to 
surreptitiously channel funds to the referendum campaign. 
The memo spawned a massive outcry when it went public.  Not only did it 
unequivocally outline the strategies that CAFTA’s proponents would (and did) pursue, it 
personified their genuine fear of the anti-CAFTA movement.  Although Casas resigned 
from his office after the scandal broke, the controversy still strengthened the anti-CAFTA 
movement’s position.107  Had the movement lacked potency, the administration would 
have had little need to devise a grand strategy to take it on.  In this way, the memo 
actually can be seen as legitimizing the civil society uprising against CAFTA.  In 
addition, the document advised methods that were either pure propaganda or blatantly 
against the law.  This challenged proponents’ claim that their form of discourse was 
actually supporting democracy.    
As the referendum drew closer, both sides ramped up their intensity.  On 
September 30, more than 100,000 citizens, many dressed as skeletons or wearing masks 
of U.S. President Bush, demonstrated in San José.108  Given the small population of 
Costa Rica, these attendance figures are especially significant.  Meanwhile, the U.S. 
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threatened to eliminate Costa Rica’s trade preferences and declared that it would not 
renegotiate the deal if voters rejected CAFTA.109  Several television stations aired stories 
on this threat, defying the ban on campaigning three days before an election.110  Costa 
Rican authorities prepared for a potentially earth shattering election. 
The referendum on October 7, 2007, took place without violence and charges of 
fraud.  After the votes were counted, it was determined that the agreement passed 51.56 
percent in favor to 48.44 against, with a turnout of 59.2 percent of the electorate.111   This 
figure is well above the 40 percent threshold mandated by the Electoral Tribunal to 
validate the vote, as well as the 46 percent predicted by a poll taken just before the 
referendum.112  The high turnout, commensurate with recent voting patterns, reiterates 
the fact that the CAFTA debate aroused massive interest in the direction of the country.  
Post-election analyses revealed that predominately urban provinces voted in favor of the 
referendum, while the “no” vote prevailed in rural provinces.113 
The spirited debate surrounding the CAFTA referendum left a significant impact 
to Costa Rican democracy, specifically in the Civil Society Dimension.  The anti-CAFTA 
movement grouped a variety of citizen organizations behind a single banner but still 
allowed them to exercise their own authority and initiative.   Decentralization allowed 
people from disparate backgrounds who otherwise might have felt alienated from the 
mobilization after hearing the biased, sensationalist news coverage to learn about the 
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movement and to participate in it.  Hence this aspect upholds one of the two named 
indices in the Civil Society Dimension – the ample share of participation in the society.   
The ability of grassroots organizations to connect with individual voters helped 
strengthen communications across society.  Activists attended meetings and visited 
ordinary citizens in order to spread their message as much as possible.114  They managed 
to reframe the debate into one dealing with the nature of the society at large beyond a 
question of free trade.  As the leaked government memo warned, “the campaign about 
CAFTA is becoming what we should have never allowed it to become: a struggle 
between rich and poor, and between the government and the people.”115  The anti-
CAFTA movement took on the well financed and well organized “YES” campaign with 
incredible skill, only narrowly being defeated at the ballot box.   Both sides permeated 
society with their messages, the proponents using the established media circuit and the 
detractors using non-traditional material distribution at their demonstrations and 
presentations.   
Moreover, the act of holding a referendum itself signals that a major step forward 
for Costa Rican democracy.  The civil society lobbied successfully to put the trade 
agreement to a vote.  The government took the referendum seriously and used the 
opportunity to advocate even more forcefully for the trade agreement.  It confronted the 
anti-CAFTA activists directly, legitimizing them while – as the memo illustrated – trying 
to undermine them.  Even before the referendum was called, Arias recognized the large 
civil society-based resistance movement and said in an interview, “I actually think it is 
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their right to oppose it for different reasons.”116  Civil society also approached the 
referendum peacefully, expressing itself through popular demonstrations but accepting 
the results, albeit reluctantly. 
These reasons justify my conclusion that, in terms of civil society, CAFTA had a 
positive effect on Costa Rican democracy.   Even though their struggle ended in defeat, 
the anti-CAFTA movement was not for naught.  It is difficult to imagine that the strong 
popular networks that were created will be abandoned. Instead, the referendum helped 
reinsert a popular voice in the political debate through a dedicated instrument, civil 
society.   
 
Conclusions 
 Costa Rica enjoyed high levels of democratic and institutional stability, even in 
spite of the changes in popular sentiment, when the government decided to embrace 
CAFTA.  Still, the agreement has had provided some key consequences to the country’s 
political system.  Because of the vast disparity in available knowledge, though, I am 
forced to offer two separate conclusions, unlike in my studies of Mexico and El Salvador.  
Based on my appraisal of the Electoral Process and the Civil Society Dimensions, I argue 
that CAFTA as a political entity has had a positive effect on Costa Rican democracy.  
However, based on my appraisal of the Open and Accountable Institutions and Political 
and Civil Liberties Dimensions, I suggest that CAFTA’s textual mandates have had an 
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indeterminate effect, as the positive characterization for the Open and Accountable 
Institutions dimension is still slightly weak and does not permit larger conclusions. 
The main deficiency in the Costa Rica case is the challenge of time; at this 
moment, the bulk of CAFTA’s impact has occurred through its relationship to politics.   
During the elections and the referendum, CAFTA acted as an emblem of the market-
based economic ideology that has prevailed in Costa Rica.  In that regard, the policy issue 
as a whole ignited debate and dissent, two key elements in a functioning democracy.    
Irrespective of these actual conclusions, this case study has demonstrated that, on 
the larger level, the application of the Democratic Audit can work even in cases with 
insubstantial data.  By categorizing different themes into the four Dimensions, the 
framework can help us extrapolate conclusion on the entire political system without 
overemphasizing one aspect that may have less support in the data.  The evaluation of 
CAFTA in Costa Rica is well served in this regard, as I have been able to construct a 
picture of the country’s democratic development based on those categories with greater 
information.   
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Table 5.1.  Costa Rica Economic Indicators, 2003-08 
Year 
GDP per capita 
growth (rate) Trade Exports Imports FDIa Manufacturing Agriculture 
Real Wages 
(Index) a 
Unemployment 
(Annual %)a 
2003 4.38 95.2 46.69 48.53 3.90 21.16 8.75 122.5 6.7 
2004 2.38 95.74 46.26 49.48 3.30 21.74 8.62 115.5 6.5 
2005 4.07 102.47 48.5 53.97 4.30 21.71 8.73 111.3 6.6 
2006 7.01 104.41 49.13 55.27 6.50 21.56 8.97 115.7 6 
2007 6.26 102.45 48.81 53.64 7.20 20.89 8.71 126.5 4.6 
2008 1.48 101.6 46.03 55.57 6.90 20.69 7.29 129.2 4.9 
 
Source (unless otherwise noted): World Bank, World Development Indicators 2010. 
aSource: Inter-American Development Bank, Latin America and Caribbean Macro Watch (2010). 
Note: All data given in percent (%) GDP unless otherwise noted. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusions 
 When the Bush Administration declared that CAFTA would strengthen 
democracy in Central America, the actual outcomes are likely not what they had in mind.  
U.S. trade Representative Robert Zoellick remarked that trade liberalization would 
stimulate economic growth, which would further lift people out of poverty and help 
expand the middle class. The logic behind his argument is well founded in the theories 
discussed in Chapter 2 linking economic development, capitalism and democracy.  
Incorporation in the economic system would in turn integrate previously 
underrepresented sectors into the political system.  According to his reasoning, a stake in 
the economy would enable a stake in the democracy.   
  Unfortunately, the lack of viable socio-economic measures to gauge the effects of 
CAFTA on economic development in Central America means that it is nearly impossible 
to consider the accuracy of this argument.  The short time period of CAFTA’s existence 
further hinders the present accumulation of such data.  This dearth of reliable information 
is omnipresent.  Even in the Mexican case noted in Chapter 3, it was difficult to establish 
a correlation between NAFTA and economic and political development without 
econometric analysis, and, indeed, confidence in the conclusions from these regressions 
could be limited.  Economic growth is contingent on a multiplicity of factors: even if 
CAFTA did encourage greater trade and investment in El Salvador, for example, it 
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exposed the country to greater repercussions from the 2009 economic crisis and hence 
may have facilitated an economic contraction.  The inadequacy of empirical evidence, 
therefore, might belie some of the assertions of ardent trade proponents.   
 Notwithstanding this skepticism, one can make a formidable case can be made 
that free trade does contribute to strengthening democracy.  The Democratic Audit 
methodology helps us conceptualize those facets affected by the trade agreement, since 
quantitative economic growth figures alone may not suffice.  A qualitative measure of the 
trade agreement works strictly because a significant amount of the agreement’s content is 
itself qualitative by dealing with regulatory and institutional reform.  Categorizing a 
democracy based on its electoral processes, open and accountable institutions, political 
and civil liberties, and its civil society, the Democratic Audit can consider more than just 
economic variables that are influenced by trade liberalization.   In that sense, it can be 
utilized to measure far more aspects of democracy than just socio-economic factors. 
 Comparing the results from the Democratic Audit for El Salvador and Costa Rica, 
CAFTA did impact democracy in these countries, but not in the ways expected by its 
advocates.   I determined that CAFTA had a weakly positive effect in El Salvador on the 
whole: after differentiating the dimensions into two sub-categories, I could argue further 
that as a policy phenomenon, it was positive, and as a textual mandate of reform, it was 
neutral.  I also determined that in Costa Rica, as a policy itself CAFTA had a positive 
effect while its provisions had an indeterminate effect.   My hypothesis, that there would 
be a positive impact overall, was correct, but not for the reasons that I had anticipated; the 
policy, rather than the content, presented the greatest influence to democratic institutions. 
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 I resolve that CAFTA has had a stronger impact on democratic development in 
these countries as a policy itself than as a treaty calling on each signatory to enact certain 
commercial regulations.   As a policy, it represented a major step of the prevailing agenda 
to pass market capitalist initiatives.  Regardless of their ideological spectrum, political 
candidates and social groups articulated the ideas behind CAFTA in the public square.  
Proponents saw it as an instrument to expand economic development through commerce 
and investment, while detractors denounced it as an entrenchment of an ideology that 
marginalized citizens and subjugated them to foreign manipulation.  Therefore, as a 
symbol of a transformational policy program, CAFTA became a feature in presidential 
elections and inspired the civil society.   Information gleaned from Chapter 2’s test of the 
Democratic Audit, Mexico and NAFTA, supports this conclusion – the nature of the 1994 
campaign, Zedillo’s reforms (which built upon Salinas’s policies to garner American 
endorsements for Mexico’s entrance into the trade agreement), and the Zapatista uprising 
may be the strongest factors resulting from NAFTA that contributed to Mexican 
democratization.   
 In Central America, CAFTA helped frame the debate through which more voices 
have been heard.  The democratization of dialogue advanced political democracy.  In the 
electoral processes, CAFTA and the domestic economic situations played authoritative 
roles in the Salvadoran 2009 election and the Costa Rican 2006 and 2010 elections.  
Interestingly, in all these examples, voters ultimately elected a candidate who endorsed 
CAFTA, even if the popular opinion generally did not.  In terms of civil society building, 
CAFTA had an indubitable effect in both countries.  Even though the anti-CAFTA 
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organizations lost their battles, they still developed strong relationships and adopted new 
tactics to express themselves.  Once mobilized, these groups will continue to monitor the 
activities of the government and speak out on behalf of the population, as the example of 
the Salvadoran civil society outcry against the Pacific Rim Mining Company shows.  The 
Costa Rican case serves this argument because of the referendum held over the 
agreement’s ratification, which allowed a popular decision for the first time to determine 
if that country would implement some restructuring of its economy.  Greater pluralism in 
the public sphere serves to consolidate democracy in countries that, for much of their 
existence, were beholden to the interests of foreign investors, elite landowners, or 
authoritarian regimes. 
   Also notable about the results from this assessment is the dearth of clear 
evidence suggesting that CAFTA has substantively affected the institutions and liberties 
of the countries examined.  In neither case could an argument be made that the agreement 
had more than a neutral effect on the state institutions or on civil liberties, specifically 
labor rights.  Unfortunately, this conclusion may illustrate the largest shortcoming of this 
study.  Development of stronger institutions, rule of law, and individual rights takes time 
to occur.  Such a generational shift cannot be assessed in the short period that CAFTA 
has existed.  Most of all, the analysis demonstrates that an entire culture, in which the 
rights of businesses, organizations and workers are respected, must still grow and mature.  
One trade agreement, regardless of its impact on the country, can hardly foster this 
culture alone.   More attention should be placed on improving the country’s capacity to 
monitor and enforce these laws before we can adjust our conclusions about the 
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institutions and liberties in El Salvador and Costa Rica.  This time issue aside, these 
conclusions reiterate the strength of the Democratic Audit as a construct.  Even by 
showing that two categories may have indeterminate or neutral data, the Audit isolates 
those variables more or less affected.  From this analysis, we can prescribe more 
normative solutions to address the gaps left by the trade agreement.  
 Above all, this thesis has revealed the irony in the democratization argument for 
trade agreements.  CAFTA helped stimulate the democratic institutions of elections and 
civil society especially through opposition to its implementation.  Rather than through 
increasing socio-economic standards, it enabled pluralism and representation.  While 
these may be more immediate gains, and socio-economic and institutional reforms may 
lag, it is nonetheless clear that the initial effects of trade agreements on democracy are 
political, rather than economic in nature.  The benefits of eliminating tariff barriers on 
sensitive products may make economic sense and in the long run promote development, 
but in the short run, these advantages can be masked by the “sound bites” of trade politics.  
 The implications of this thesis are vast.  In considering the effects of CAFTA on 
political institutions in Central America, it ventures into scholarship relatively untouched 
by present literature.  The major difficulties that it encounters due to the recency of 
CAFTA are not insurmountable; rather, they suggest areas of further research in the 
future as the provisions of agreement have had a longer time to permeate the democratic 
institutions.  For instance, the effects of privatization of the Costa Rican 
telecommunications industry on that country’s democracy will be particularly noteworthy, 
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as it may illustrate the efficacy of balancing state regulations with private investment in a 
once protected sector that has a visible impact on citizens.   
 As this thesis has demonstrated, the Democratic Audit offers an ideal 
methodology to study the impacts of trade on democracy.  After adapting it somewhat to 
the particular circumstance, it is a strong construct that integrates a number of dimensions 
that together uphold democracy.  It even allows dimensions like electoral processes and 
civil society, ones that a trade agreement does not purport to involve, to be considered in 
the evaluation.  As the question of CAFTA shows, these dimensions are of utmost 
importance and in fact exhibit some of the clearest evidence that trade agreements can 
influence a democracy. 
 Academics and policy-makers alike can reflect on the implications of this thesis 
and of the use of the Democratic Audit in considering future trade agreements.  Bilateral 
trade agreements with developing countries will continue to serve as a key tool for U.S. 
foreign policy, and their proponents undoubtedly will assert that their implementation 
will advance democracy.  The U.S. Trade Representative declares that approving the 
pending trade agreement with Colombia will “strengthen peace, democracy, freedom and 
security,” echoing the same arguments made about passing CAFTA less than a decade 
ago.1  The results of the Democratic Audit in this thesis indicate that one should view this 
claim with some skepticism unless the potential effects to democratic institutions, not just 
economic growth, are taken into account. 
                                                           
1
 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, The Case for the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement 
(Washington D.C.: Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, October 2008). 
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 The negotiation and implementation of CAFTA was a historic moment for 
Central America.  By choosing to cement their economic relationship with the United 
States, the governments of the region further dedicated themselves to advancing a project 
harnessing market capitalist principles to generate economic and political development.   
While it may be premature to suggest that they achieved the first objective, it is 
unquestionable that the experience begat new and stronger voices in the political debate 
and thus helped cultivate democracy.   
191 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abrahamson, Peter.  “Free Trade and Social Citizenship.”  Global Social Policy 7, no. 3  
(2007): 339-57. 
 
“Adoption of the Central American Free Trade Agreement.” American Journal of 
International Law 98, no. 2 (2004): 350-2. 
 
Andrews, Edmund L. “House Approves Free Trade Pact.” New York Times, July 28, 2005. 
 
Angus Reid Global Monitor. “Election Tracker: Costa Rica.”  http://www.angus-
reid.com/tracker/view/costa_rica_2010/. 
 
“Around 54% of interviewed in Costa Rica agree with US-Central America agreement; 
Growing support for CAFTA.” La Nación, August 25, 2005. 
 
Audley, John, and Vanessa Ulmer. Strengthening Linkages Between U.S. Trade Policy 
and Environmental Capacity Building. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, July 2003.  
   
Ayala, Edgardo.  “El Salvador: Activists Link Mining Co. to Murders.” Inter Press 
Service, January 27, 2010. 
 
Barahona, Marvin, Ludwing Duarte and Suyapa Castro. Impacto político del CAFTA en 
los países centroamericanos.  Tegucigalpa: Centro de Estudios Históricos y 
Sociales para el Desarrollo, October 2004. 
 
Barahona, Rocío, and Benjamín Ramos.  El legado del CAFTA DR: Millonaria demanda 
de Pacific Rim al Estado Salvadoreño.  San Salvador: Centro de Investigación 
sobre Inversión y Comercio, June 2009. 
 
Becker, Elizabeth. “Amid a Trade Deal, A Debate Over Labor.” New York Times, April 6, 
2004.   
 
Beetham, David, ed.  Defining and Measuring Democracy.  London: SAGE Publications, 
1994. 
 
192 
 
 
 
Beeton, Dan.  “The Media Need More TLC in CAFTA Reporting.” Media Accuracy on 
Latin America, NACLA Report on the Americas, March/April 2008.   
 
Booth, John A. “Costa Rica: The Roots of Democratic Stability.”  In Democracy in 
Developing Countries: Latin America, 2nd ed., edited by Larry Diamond, Jonathan 
Hartlyn, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1999. 
 
Breuer, Anita.  “Costa Rica’s 2007 Referendum on the Dominican Republic-Central 
America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR): Citizen Participation or Citizen 
Manipulation?”  Representation 45, no. 1 (2009): 455-69. 
 
Buchanan, Ronald. “Costa Rica bandwidth sale pulls wide interest.” Financial Times, 
January 25, 2010. 
 
Bumiller, Elisabeth. “In El Salvador, Bush Talks of Trade and Criticizes Democrats.” 
New York Times, March 25, 2002.   
 
Bush, George W.  Notification of intention to enter into a free trade agreement (FTA) 
with the governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua.  Message to the House Committee on Ways and Means. 108th Cong., 
2d sess., February 20, 2004. H. Doc. 108-159. 
 
Buxton, Julia, and Nicola Phillips, eds. Developments in Latin American Political 
Economy. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999. 
 
Camp, Roderic Ai. “Battling for the Voter: Mexico’s Path to Democracy.” Mexican 
Studies 11, no. 1 (1995): 133. 
 
------.  Interview by author.  Claremont, California, November 18, 2009. 
 
------.  Politics in Mexico. 5th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
 
Campos, Gabriela.  “The Struggle Against Free Trade Continues.” Foreign Policy in 
Focus, October 27, 2009.  Available at www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/6527/. 
 
Carazo Vargas, Eva.  Costa Rica: Why We Reject CAFTA.  Washington, D.C.: IRC 
Americas Program, March 8, 2007. 
 
Casas, Kevin, and Fernando Sánchez, “Urgent actions to activate CAFTA’s YES 
campaign.” Memo to President Óscar Arias, 29 July 2007.  Accessed from 
Washington Office on Latin America, “Leaked Memo on CAFTA Vote in Costa 
Rica,” September 17, 2007. Available at 
www.wola.org/media/memocasasanchez_english.pdf. 
193 
 
 
 
 
The Center for Democracy in the Americas. Report on El Salvador’s Presidential 
Election. Washington, D.C.: The Center for Democracy in the Americas, March 
15, 2009.  Available at: 
http://www.democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/El_Salvador_Election_Trip_Report09.
pdf. 
 
Chacón, Daniel. “Retraso con ley del Cafta sería un problema de imagen.” La República, 
December 12, 2009.   
CID-Gallup. “Costa Rica: Referéndum se decide en la recta final.” Opinion Poll number 
113, July 2007.   
 
Clark, Mary A. Gradual Economic Reform in Latin America: The Costa Rican 
Experience.  Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001. 
 
Comeforo, Kristin.  “The referendum & freedom: The hegemonic struggle to define 
authentic participation and public reasoning through the discourse of CAFTA-DR 
in Costa Rica.” Paper presented at the Human Development and Capability 
Association Conference, New York, September 17-20, 2007. 
 
“Congreso de Costa Rica aprueba ley clave para vigencia de TLC con EEUU.” Agence 
France Presse, February 14, 2008. 
 
Contreras, Claudia. “CAFTA-RD, un cambio de mente y cultura de negocios,” Revista 
Summa, March 1, 2010. 
 
 “Costa Rica’s government denies re-negotiation of Central America-US Agreement.” La 
Nación, March 31, 2005. 
 
Cordero Pérez, Carlos.  “Costa Rica posterga ‘sine die’ licitación de telefonía móvil.” El 
Financiero, February 5, 2010. 
 
Cunningham, Frank.  Theories of Democracy: a Critical Introduction.  London: 
Routledge, 2002. 
 
Dahl, Robert.  On Democracy.  New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. 
 
Diamond, Larry.  “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation.” 
Journal of Democracy 5, no. 3 (1994): 4-15. 
 
Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner, eds.  Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
Revisited. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.   
 
194 
 
 
 
Dickerson, Marla, and Evelyn Iritani. “Trade Accord with U.S. Splits Voters in Costa 
Rica.” Los Angeles Times, February 7, 2006. 
 
Domínguez, Jorge I., and Abraham E. Lowenthal, eds.  Constructing Democratic 
Governance: Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean in the 1990s.  
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 
 
DR-CAFTA Ministers of Trade and Economy.  The Labor Dimension in Central America 
and the Dominican Republic – Building on Progress: Strengthening Compliance 
and Enhancing Capacity.  Submitted to the Vice Ministers Responsible for Trade 
and Labor in the Countries of Central America and the Dominican Republic. 
April 2005. 
 
Duncan, Pablo. “Partidos políticos tras las elecciones.” La Nación, February 19, 2010.   
 
Economist Intelligence Unit.  “El Salvador Country Outlook.”  January 1, 2010.   
 
Elliott, Kimberly Ann.  Labor Standards, Development, and CAFTA. International 
Economics Policy Briefs (Washington, D.C: Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 2004).   
 
“El Salvador, U.S. mark CAFTA anniversary.” Associated Press, March 1, 2007. 
 
“El Salvador: Funes exhorta a aprovechar CAFTA.” Associated Press, March 4, 2010. 
 
“FMLN utiliza forma de protesta de EEUU para oponerse a CAFTA.” Deutsche Presse-
Agentur, March 1, 2006.   
 
Forero, Juan. “Report Criticizes Labor Standards in Central America.” New York Times, 
July 1 2005.   
 
Frajman, Eduardo. “Paradise Transformed? CAFTA and Costa Rica’s New Politics.” 
Delaware Review of Latin American Studies 9, no. 2 (2008): 1-8. 
 
Gallagher, Kevin. “Stop private firms exploiting poor states.” The Guardian, February 5, 
2010. 
 
Gallagher, Kevin P., and Timothy A. Wise. Reforming North American Trade Policy: 
Lessons from NAFTA.  Washington, D.C.: Americas Policy Program, December 2, 
2009. 
 
Gass, Vicki. DR-CAFTA and Workers’ Rights: Moving from Paper to Practice.  
Washington, D.C.:  Washington Office on Latin America, May 2009. 
 
195 
 
 
 
Gilbreth, Chris, and Gerardo Otero.  “Democratization in Mexico: The Zapatista Uprising 
and Civil Society.” Latin American Perspectives 28, no. 4 (2001): 7-29. 
 
Graham, Carol, and Sandip Sukhtankar.  “Does Economic Crisis Reduce Support for 
Markets and Democracy in Latin America?  Some Evidence from Surveys of 
Public Opinion and Well Being.”  Journal of Latin American Studies 36 (349-77).   
 
Grayson, George. The North American Free Trade Agreement: Regional Community and 
the New World Order.  Edited by Kenneth W. Thompson. Latham, MA: 
University Press of America, Inc., 1995. 
Gutiérrez, Raúl.  “‘Life is Worth More than Gold’ say Anti-Mining Activists.” Inter-
Press Service News Agency, February 1, 2009. 
 
Hernández Chávez, Anna. Mexico: A Brief History.  Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2006. 
 
Hicks, Raymond, Helen V. Milner and Dustin Tingley.  “Globalization and Domestic 
Politics: Party Politics and Preferences for CAFTA-DR in Costa Rica.”  Paper 
prepared for the American Political Science Association conference, Toronto, 
2009.   
 
Hippler, Jochen, ed.  The Democratisation of Disempowerment: The Problem of 
Democracy in the Third World. London: Pluto Press and the Transnational 
Institute, 1995. 
 
Hoffmann, Bert.  Why Reform Fails: the ‘Politics of Policies’ in Costa Rican 
Telecommunications Liberalization. Working Paper no. 47.  Hamburg: German 
Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2007. 
 
Holmes, Kim R., Edwin J. Feulner and Mary Anastasia O’Grady, eds.  2008 Index of 
Economic Freedom.  Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2008. 
 
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Diana Oreja.  NAFTA Revisited: 
Achievements and Challenges.  Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, 2005. 
 
Human Rights Watch.  CAFTA’s Weak Labor Rights Protections: Why the Present 
Accord Should be Opposed.  New York: Human Rights Watch, March 2004.   
 
Hussain, A. Imtiaz.  Running on Empty in Central America?  Lanham, MD: University 
Press of America, 2006 
 
Imendia, Carlos A. “Fondo de Desarrollo del CAFTA: Una propuesta.” Revista 
Centroamérica en la Economía Mundial del Siglo XXI, no. 1. December 2003. 
196 
 
 
 
 
Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública. “Encuesta de evaluación del gobierno de 
Antonio Saca, Asamblea Legislativa y Alcaldías y expectativas hacia el nuevo 
gobierno.”  Serie de informes 120.  San Salvador: Universidad Centroamericana 
“José Simeón Cañas,” May 2009. 
 
------. “Encuesta sobre conocimientos y percepciones hacia la minería en zonas afectadas 
por la incursión minera en El Salvador.”  Serie de informes EP.  San Salvador: 
Universidad Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas,” November 2007.   
 
Inter-American Development Bank.  Latin American and Caribbean Macro Watch.  2010. 
International Country Risk Guide.  El Salvador.  May 2009, 14 
 
International Labor Office. Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work: A Labour Law 
Study.  Geneva: International Labor Organization, 2003.   
 
International Trade Administration.  “Trade Stats Express.”  National Trade Data.  
Available at http://tse.export.gov/NTDHome.aspx. 
 
Jaramillo, Carlos Felipe, and Daniel Lederman. Challenges of CAFTA: Maximizing the 
Benefits for Central America.  Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2006. 
 
Jimenez, Marianela. “With U.S. approval, CAFTA turns to last battle in Central 
America.” Associated Press, July 28, 2005.   
 
Korzeniewicz, Roberto Patricio, and William C. Smith.  Politics, Social Change, and 
Economic Restructuring in Latin America.  Miami: North-South Center Press. 
 
Koven, Peter. “El Salvador stalls PMU permit; Miner’s shares drop 30% after drilling 
stops,” Financial Post, July 4, 2008. 
 
Lauer, Martha.  “CAFTA’S October Referendum: A Death Sentence for Costa Rican 
Trade & Foreign Investment?” Washington D.C., Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 
2007. 
 
Lawrence, Robert Z. Capitalizing on CAFTA: Enhancing El Salvador’s Integration into 
the Global Economy.  San Salvador: FUSADES, 2003.  Available at 
www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rlawrence/Lawrence-CapitalizingonCAFTAfinal.pdf. 
 
Lederman, Daniel, Norman Loayza and Rodrigo Reis Soares.  Accountability and 
Corruption: Political Institutions Matter.  Policy Research Working Paper 2708.  
Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001.   
 
197 
 
 
 
Lederman, Daniel, William F. Maloney and Luis Servén.  Lessons from NAFTA for Latin 
America and the Caribbean.  Palo Alto: Stanford University Press and 
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2005. 
 
“Leftist Salvadoran says won’t drop dollar, CAFTA.” Associated Press, September 26, 
2008.   
 
Lehoucq, Fabrice. “Costa Rica: Paradise in Doubt.” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 3 
(2005): 140-54. 
 
------. “Policymaking, Parties and Institutions in Democratic Costa Rica.” Unpublished 
manuscript.  Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2006. 
Li, Quan, and Rafael Reuveny. “Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical 
Analysis.” British Journal of Political Science 33, no. 1 (2003): 29-54. 
 
Lipset, Seymour Martin.  “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy.” The American Political Science Review 
53, no. 1 (1959): 69-105. 
 
Llana, Sara Miller.  “The big loser in the Honduran political crisis?  The economy.”  The 
Christian Science Monitor, November 3, 2009. 
 
Long, Chrissie.  “In Costa Rica, CAFTA hits a snag.” Tico Times January 15, 2010. 
 
Lovato, Roberto.  “El Salvador’s President-Elect Seeks Close Ties to U.S.” New 
American Media, March 17, 2009.   
 
Madrid, Cori. “El Salvador and the Central American Free Trade Agreement: 
Consolidation of a Transnational Capitalist Class” Perspectives on Global 
Development and Technology 8 (2009): 189-210.   
 
Marroquín, Jorge Coronado, Ariane Grau Crespo and Manuel Pérez Rocha.  Impacto del 
TLC: Sintesis del informe preliminar.  San Salvador: Red Regional de Monitoreo 
DR-CAFTA, September 2007.   
 
McDonald, Patrick J. “Peace through Trade or Free Trade?”  The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 48, no. 4 (2004): 547-72.   
 
Méndez, William.  “Cambios obligados tras Cafta,” El Financiero, April 20, 2008.   
 
Miller, Eric T.  Achievements and Challenges of Trade Capacity Building: A 
Practitioner’s Analysis of the CAFTA Process and its Lessons for the Multilateral 
System.  Occasional Paper 32.  Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development 
Bank, 2005.   
198 
 
 
 
 
“Minería y CSJ.” Diario Co Latino, February 10, 2010.   
 
Mora, Carlos J. “Ottón inicia nuevo round contra las encuestas.” La República, January 
22, 2010. 
 
Moreno, Raúl. “Free Trade Agreements, CAFTA and FTAA: Key Pieces in 
Accumulation of Transnational Capital.”  In The Bush Doctrine and Latin 
America, edited by Gary Prevost and Carlos Oliva Campos, 161-84.  New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2007. 
 
Morley, Samuel, Eduardo Nakasone and Valeria Piñeiro. The Impact of CAFTA on 
Poverty, Distribution and Growth in El Salvador.  Discussion Paper 743.  
Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, December 2004. 
 
Muñoz, Luis Alberto, and Carlos J. Mora.  “‘No estamos por la vanagloria’: Ottón Solís 
aseguró que en su eventual administración promoverá un diálogo fluido con la 
oposición.” La República, January 28,  2010. 
 
Murphy, John. “DR-CAFTA: The Record So Far.”  Washington, D.C.: U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce and the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin 
America, November 2007. 
 
“A nation divided: Will a country still haunted by the cold war dare at last to embrace the 
left?”  The Economist, March 14 2009.   
 
Núñez Olivas, Oscar. “Ottón Solís quiere renegociar el CAFTA si gana elecciones en 
Costa Rica.” Agence France-Presse, February 4, 2010.   
 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.  CAFTA-DR – Labor Capacity Building.  
Washington, D.C.: Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, July 2007.   
 
------.  CAFTA Rhymes with NAFTA But Is Better in Many Ways. Washington, D.C.: 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, June 2005. 
 
------.  The Case for the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (Washington D.C.: Office 
of the U.S. Trade Representative, October 2008). 
 
------.  Dispute Settlement: Equivalent Procedures & Remedies for Commercial and 
Labor Disputes.  Washington, D.C.: Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, July 
2007. 
 
------.  Environmental Firsts in CAFTA. Washington, D.C.: Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, February 2005. 
199 
 
 
 
 
------.  Free Trade with Central America: Highlights of the U.S.-Central America Free 
Trade Agreement. Washington, D.C.: Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 22 
April 2009. 
 
------.  Real Results on Labor Rights: Improvements as a Result of CAFTA.  Washington, 
D.C.: Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, February 2005. 
 
------.  Support from Environmental Groups. Washington, D.C.: Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, February 2005. 
 
Orellana Merlos, Carlos. “Desarrollo del comercio y la inversión a 4 años del CAFTA-
DR.”  Lecture, Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social, 
March 2010. 
 
Pacific Rim Mining Corporation. “El Dorado, El Salvador.” Pacific Rim Mining 
Corporation, www.pacrim-mining.com/s/ES_Eldorado.asp.  Accessed March 1, 
2009. 
 
Peeler, John. Building Democracy in Latin America. 3rd ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc., 2009. 
 
Pinkney, Robert. Democracy in the Third World. 2nd ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc., 2003.   
 
Poitras, Guy and Raymond Robinson. “The Politics of NAFTA in Mexico.” Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 36, no. 1 (1994): 1-35.  
 
“Poll: Laura Chinchilla Clear Frontrunner in 2010 Costa Rica Presidential Race.” Al Día, 
November 10, 2009.   
 
“Presidente Arias firma Ley General de Telecomunicaciones.” Business News America, 
June 6, 2008. 
 
Quinteros, Carolina.  “Corporate Responsibility and the U.S.-Central America Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA): Are They Compatible?”  Development in Practice 15, no. 
3/4 (2005): 572-83. 
 
Quinteros, Carolina, Maria Eugenia Ochoa and Diego Salcedo. “Impacto del Tratado de 
Libre Comercio entre EEUU y Centroamérica en los movimientos sociales 
centroamericanos.” Revista Centroamérica en la Economía Mundial del Siglo XXI.  
San Salvador: Universidad Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas,” 2004.   
 
200 
 
 
 
Robey, John S. “Civil Society and NAFTA: Initial Results,” The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 565 (1999): 113-25. 
 
Rodlauer, Markus, and Alfred Schipke, eds.  Central America: Global Integration and 
Regional Cooperation.  Occasional Paper 243.  Washington, D.C.: International 
Monetary Fund: 2005. 
 
Ross, Michael.  “Is Democracy Good for the Poor?” American Journal of Political 
Science 50, no. 4 (2006): 860-74. 
 
Rudín, Mercedes Alvarez and Helen Hintjens.  The 2007 “No-CAFTA” Movement in 
Costa Rica. Working Paper no. 479.  The Hague: International Institute of Social 
Studies, 2009. 
Rudra, Nita.  “Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing 
World.” American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 4 (2005): 704-30. 
 
Salinas-Leon, Roberto. “Free Trade and Free Markets: A Mexican Perspective on 
NAFTA.” In NAFTA and the Environment, edited Terry L. Anderson.  San 
Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, 1993. 
 
Salvadoran Ministry of the Economy. “El Salvador conmemora primer aniversario del 
TLC con Estados Unidos.”  San Salvador: Ministerio de Economía de El Salvador, 
March 1, 2007. 
www.cafta.gob.sv/.%5cdoc_interes%5Cpagina_2%5Ccomunicado_1_CAFTA.pd
f. Accessed December 15, 2009. 
 
Sánchez-Ancochea, Diego. “State and Society: The Political Economy of DR-CAFTA in 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador,” in Responding to 
Globalization: The Political Economy of Hemispheric Integration in the Americas.  
Edited by Diego Sánchez-Anchochea and Kenneth C. Shadlen, 171-200.  New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
 
Schmidt, Blake. “Chinchilla Wins as First Female Costa Rican President.” Bloomberg, 
February 8, 2010.   
 
Schott, Jeffrey J.  Does the FTAA Have a Future? Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 2005. 
 
------, ed.  Free Trade Agreements: U.S. Strategies and Priorities. Washington, D.C.: 
Institute for International Economics, 2004. 
 
Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. 2nd ed. New York: Harper & 
Brothers Publishers, 1947).   
 
201 
 
 
 
Shaffer, Ellen R., and Joseph E. Brenner. “A Trade Agreement’s Impact on Access to 
Generic Drugs.” Health Affairs 28, no. 5 (2009): w957-w968. 
 
Solomon, Joel.  Trading Away Rights: The Unfulfilled Promise of NAFTA’s Labor Side 
Agreement. Human Rights Watch 13, no. 2 (April 2001).  Available at 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2001/nafta/. 
 
Spalding, Rose. “The CAFTA Debate in Costa Rica.” Paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 
September 1-4, 2005. 
 
------.  “Civil Society Engagement in Trade Negotiations: CAFTA Opposition 
Movements in El Salvador.” Latin American Politics & Society 49, no. 1 (2007): 
85-114. 
Stahler-Sholk, Richard, Harry E. Vanden and Glen David Kuecker, eds.  Latin American 
Social Movements in the Twenty-First Century.  Lanham, MA: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008. 
 
Stop CAFTA Coalition.  DR-CAFTA: Effects and Alternatives.  Washington, D.C.: Stop 
CAFTA Coalition, 2009. Available at www.stopcafta.org.  
 
------. DR-CAFTA Year Two: Trends & Impacts. Washington, D.C.: Stop CAFTA 
Coalition, 2007.  Available at www.stopcafta.org. 
 
Swiston, Andrew.  Spillovers to Central America in Light of the Crisis: What a 
Difference a Year Makes.  Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 
February 2010. 
 
Tarrow, Sidney.  Power in Movement.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.   
 
U.S. Agency for International Development.  Optimizing the Economic Growth and 
Poverty Reduction Benefits of CAFTA-DR.  Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for 
International Development, September 2008. 
 
U.S. Congressional Research Service. DR-CAFTA Labor Rights Issues.  By Mary Jane 
Bolle.  RS22159.  June 2, 2005. 
 
U.S. Congressional Research Service. The Dominican Republic-Central America-United 
States Free Trade Agreement.  By J. F. Hornbeck. RL31870. January 8, 2009. 
 
“U.S., Salvadoran officials say CAFTA is boosting economic growth in El Salvador.” 
Associated Press, November 29, 2007. 
  
“U.S. Trade Pact is Protested in Central America.” Reuters, September 30, 2007. 
202 
 
 
 
 
“U.S. Urges Costa Rica to Back Trade.” The Associated Press, October 7, 2007. 
 
Ulloa, Félix. “Mauricio Funes: His Way.” Americas Quarterly, February 11, 2010. 
 
Weintraub, Sidney B.  “The Interplay between Economic and Political Opening in 
Mexico.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 137, no. 1 (1993): 
64-78. 
 
Williams, Adam.  “Candidates Eye Business Needs.” Tico Times, January 22, 2010.   
 
------.  “Economy Begins a ‘Slow Recovery.’” Tico Times, March 5, 2010. 
 
------. “Preparing for Telecom Industry Competition.” Tico Times, August 28, 2009. 
Wise, Timothy A.  Agricultural Dumping Under NAFTA: Estimating the Costs of U.S. 
Agricultual Policies to Mexican Producers.  Working Paper No. 09-08.  Medford, 
MA: Global Development and Environment Institute Working Paper No. 09-08, 
2009. 
 
World Bank.  Doing Business 2010: Costa Rica.  Washington, D.C.: International Fund 
for Reconstruction and Development, 2009. 
 
------.  Doing Business 2010: El Salvador.  Washington, D.C.: International Fund for 
Reconstruction and Development, 2009).  
 
------.  World Development Indictators 2010.   
 
------. World Governance Indicators.  Available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. 
 
Zoellick, Robert.  “From Crisis to Commonwealth: CAFTA and Democracy in Our 
Neighborhood.”  Lecture, the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., 16 May 
2005.  Available at www.heritage.org/research/tradeandforeignaid/hl884.cfm. 
 
Zueras, Daniel.  “CAFTA Not a Solution But an Opportunity, Says Óscar Arias.” Inter 
Press Service, February 7, 2007. 
 
------.  “Costa Rica: Se remueve ultimo obstáculo al DR-CAFTA.” Inter-Press Service, 
November 13, 2008 
 
 
 
  
 
 
